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Slurring epithets or slurs like ‘Frog’ and ‘Boche’ are derogative terms but it
is unclear why they are derogatory. This work discusses several proposals
to answer this question. One commonality with the discussed views is that
they all hold that derogation has something to do with semantics, broadly
with the meaning of slurs. I disagree with this. I go on to introduce generic
descriptivism. It is a novel view to handle slurs and it has two distinctive
features.
First, generic descriptivism holds that the nature of derogation is epis-
temic. derogation is due to the information which slurs contain. This is
specified with the notion of stereotype. I claim that negative and unwar-
ranted stereotypes are responsible for derogation. This information is not
semantic. That is, it is to be distinguished from the meaning of slurs.
Secondly, the eponymous feature of generic descriptivism is that it
holds that the information which slurs contain is generic. I argue that
generic beliefs are produced with a psychological mechanism of generali-
sation. In relation to social kinds, the mechanism can produce xenophobic
generalisations and the use of slurs display these negative beliefs. Deroga-




This work contains offensive language. However, the offensive words are
only mentioned, they are not applied to anyone. I find it illuminating to
use actual slurs as example. For that purpose, I have chosen slurs which
are outdated. I use slurs like ‘Frog’ for the French and ‘Boche’ for the
Germans. Even though these slurs not as highly charged as some of the
more current slurs, I think they work well enough for illustrative pur-
poses. More current slurs do come up in this work, mainly in quotations.
However, I have tried keep those instances to the minimum.
Terminological notes
Concepts and linguistic expressions
I follow the convention that concepts are denoted with small caps and
linguistic expressions are denoted with single quotation marks, for example
‘Hesperus’. In case there is any ambiguity due to this convention, I stress
that this work is first and foremost about linguistic expressions. So my
claims are about linguistic expressions.
Direct quotation
Short direct quotations are indicated with double quotation marks, e.g
“Truth is immune to epithetical color”. Longer quotations are not indi-




The linguistic evidence in this work is mostly anecdotal. While admitting
this, I insist on two points. First, I do not think that the linguistic evi-
dence which supports my view is in anyway controversial. Secondly, even




1.1 Slurs and derogation: central features
1.1.1 Nature of derogation
Slurs are expressions like ‘Boche’, ‘Frog’ and ‘Limey’. On the one hand,
they seem to be common nouns, just like the ‘Germans’, the ‘French’ and
the ‘English’ are but, on the other hand, they seem to import something
extra. They are derogatory expressions and they seem to belittle the
addressed. Some of the more current slurs are much more charged and it
is fair to say that they do not just belittle the target but rather dehumanise
those to whom the slur is applied.
To say the least, the use of slurs is offensive. The use offends the
person or the group that the slur is applied to. The main question about
slurs is what causes this offence. The receiving end of the utterance:
(1) Max is a Boche.
is entitled to be offended. The question is why not only Max but also
anyone of German descent hearing (1) is entitled to be offended. It seems
that the term ‘Boche’ produces the entitlement.1 Let us call this feature
of slurs derogation.2 Slurs are then derogatory expressions. If one uses a
1There is more anecdotal discussion on the entitlement below.
2There are many terms for this feature. For example, you can speak of in-
sult or you can say that the use slurs is offensive. Some people have sug-
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slur, one gives offence. The invited question then is:
What is the property of slurs that makes their use offensive?
This is the focus of our investigation and there are two specific sub-
questions:
(i) What is the derogatory feature?
(ii) Is the derogatory feature part of the meaning or is it something
outside the meaning of the slurs?
The main question is approached through these sub-questions. They aim
to explain the entitlement to be offended by investigating what is the exact
nature of derogation and how derogation is attached to slurs. In the course
of the argumentation, I will go through different proposals concerning the
nature of derogation. At the same time, the proposals inevitably offer a
view on how derogation is attached to a given slur.
1.1.2 Central features
As language users, we have a lot of intuitions concerning the use of slurs
and sometimes these intuitions can be conflicting. The motivation for
putting forward these central features is to narrow down the scope of
the investigation. In other words, the central features aim to map the
common ground concerning slurs. In my view, four main features of slurs
and derogation are
A. Derogation is autonomous.
B. Target of derogation is a social group.
C. Slurs are epithets.
gested that slurs express contemptuous attitude. I chose ‘derogation’ because it
seems the most neutral term. According to Oxford English Dictionary, deroga-
tion means “detraction from the honour, or reputation of; lowering or lessening
in value or estimation, disparagement, depreciation”. (The entry is the following:
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/derogation.) This is, I think, a fair de-
scription of what happens with slurs. At any rate, slurs can express other attitudes
than contempt and the use of slurs is not always offensive.
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D. Derogation is systematic.
These features are confirmed by most theories out there. One could say
that the features from A to D are the minimal features of slurs which are
still confirmed by the intuitions of the majority of speakers. Because most
of the theories also aim to explain these features, it is justified to say that
with these features we can reach a minimal level of agreement.
A. Autonomy of derogation
It has been noted that a slur is a device which is used to express contempt
for, to deride, and to insult its targets. It has also been argued that slurs
can be used to insult, vilify and to snub. (Richard 2008, 15; Hornsby
2001, 135.) As accurate as these remarks are, they seem to concentrate
on how slurs are used intentionally but it should also be added that the
consequence of the use of slurs is derogation, whatever the intention is. It
is also noted that slurs are among the most rhetorically powerful and in-
sidious expressions in a language (Camp 2013, 330). The emphasis is now
on the word ‘insidious’ just because slurs are offensive even when deroga-
tion is not intended. It is an assumption of this work that derogation just
comes with the slur. Derogation is autonomous from anyone’s intentions.3
One could say that the derogatory feature is there despite anyone’s inten-
tions. For example, if someone used ‘Boche’ in a soundcheck instead of
“one, two, three . . . ”, it would probably upset the audience just as much
if it was applied to someone. The point is that in this case the slur is not
intentionally applied to anyone in the audience and yet it can be offensive.
However, it seems a fairly uncontroversial claim that slurs do not al-
ways derogate. There is for example the in-group use. This might also be
called re-appropriated use. When slurs are used within the target group,
the effect can be the opposite. In these situations, slurs may create soli-
darity among the group, certainly not derogation. (See e.g. Richard 2008,
12.) However, it will be argued here that this effect is parasitical to the
3The term ‘autonomous’ is borrowed from Pekka Va¨yrynen: “Racial slurs provide
a robust example of expressions which carry objectionable content autonomously from
speaker’s intentions” (Va¨yrynen 2009, 441).
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main effect of slurs which is derogation. The idea is that even when a
slur is subject to in-group, the target is entitled to be offended but that
entitlement is often waved within the group. In his seminal book Nigger:
The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word, Randall Kennedy says that
there were different ways to use the N-word, already when he was growing
up:
There was often a generational difference in evidence in com-
peting uses of the N-word with younger people experimenting
with nonderogatory versions. On the other hand, while some
of my younger relatives are adamantly opposed to any use of
nigger, believing it to be only and unalterably a debasing slur,
some of my older relatives anticipated by many years the trans-
formation of nigger (or “nigga”) that is now widely attributed
to the hip-hop culture. Long before the rapper Ice-T insisted
upon being called a nigger, my father declared that he was
proud to be a “stone nigger”—by which he meant a black man
without pretensions who was unafraid to enjoy himself openly
and loudly despite the objections of condescending whites or
insecure blacks. (Kennedy 2002, xvii.)
Just because Kennedy’s surrounding black community was divided in his
childhood concerning the use of the N-word, the use of the word, even his
father’s use, brought about the entitlement to be offended as Kennedy’s
younger relatives (who believed the word is “unalterably a debasing slur”)
might have been be offended with any use of the word. The upshot is that
even within the target groups, slurs wear derogation on their sleeve.
B. Social group as a target
Slurs differ from common pejorative expressions, such as ‘you idiot’. This
contrast seems to bring out another essential feature of slurs. When slurs
are used, the target is always a specific ethnic group, religious group or
sexual orientation. Even nationality can be the basis of a slur.4 Luvell
4Most of the slurs used as examples in this work are, in fact, based on nationality.
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Andersen and Ernest Lepore note: “the apparent presumption is that
anyone who uses the N-word slurs all black people, but one who uses
‘moron’ needn’t be slurring every mentally disabled person” (Andersen
and Lepore 2013, 26). In general, the target of a slur is a social group.
Even when the target is clearly an individual, the individual is a target as
a representative of a social group.
The term ‘target’ has a two-fold purpose. It specifies the extension of
a slur. For example, the extension of ‘Boche’ is the Germans. At the same
time, derogation targets the Germans. So the term ‘target’ includes two
components. The extension of the slur is the target group of derogation.
This is the view I am proposing but, in distinction to my view, some of the
views discussed below hold that the extension of a slur and the target of
derogation are distinct. For example, Christopher Hom and Robert May
think that the extension of slurs is uniformly empty but a slur like ‘Boche’
still targets the Germans. That is, the derogation is directed towards the
Germans.
When someone utters (1), the offence is based on Max’s ethnic back-
ground. Namely, the offence is based on the fact that Max is a member of
certain social group, the Germans. As it has been emphasised, the target
can just as easily be a whole group, as in
(2) The Boches are cruel.
At the same time, in contrast to (2), we have (3) which shows that slurring
epithets are not essential in offensive language. You can present offensive
thoughts with neutral terms too, as in
(3) The Germans are cruel.
One of the features of slurs is that the mere use of a particular slur pro-
duces the offence. If there is not much difference between (2) and (3),
observe the contrast between the following statements
(4) The Germans are honest.
(5) The Boches are honest.
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In both cases, the same property is attributed to the Germans, honesty.
The attribution of honesty, in general, should be a commendation but still
(5) remains offensive. The upshot is that although (5) is probably meant
as a commendation or at least as a neutral, factual statement, it remains
offensive and this is the special feature of slurring epithets.
C. slurs as epithets
According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, epithets are often associated
with racial abuse, especially in the current use. It seems that there are
good reasons for this. Epithets are characterising words that can occur
in the place of a name or a person or a thing, says Merriam-Webster.5
There are two important points to notice. First, epithets are names that
characterise the referent in some way. For example, the epithet ‘Alexander
the Great’ describes Alexander as great because he did conquer a good
part of the known world. Secondly, they can be somewhat colloquial
names. Alfred the Bald was also known by the people as ‘Alfred the
Fat’. Hence, epithets are conventionally and colloquially recognised other
names for the target.
Both of these features play a part in the way I see ethnic slurs. I take
them to be conventionally recognised. For example, the conventional slur
for the French is ‘Frog’, not ‘toad’. The conventional slur for the English is
‘Limey’, not ‘lemon’. Slurs are not just any kind of abusive constructions
but they are conventionally recognised as derogatory terms. Let us take
the ‘John Terry case’ as an example. There is no doubt that when Chelsea
played against Queen’s Park Rangers in 2011, Chelsea’s John Terry eth-
nically abused QPR’s Anton Ferdinand by saying ‘you fucking black cunt’
and this was widely covered in the media. The altercation was covered in
the media as “John Terry’s slur”. I am not claiming that the characterisa-
tion in the media was inaccurate but I want to concentrate on a narrower
characterisation of slurs. The concentration here is on epithets. That is to
say, a slur is an established noun and it usually has a neutral counterpart,
5The online entry is the following:
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/epithet
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for example ‘German’ in the case of ‘Boche’. If the concentration was on
any linguistic (complex) construction, then we might learn that there is
nothing special about slurs. However, the assumption here is that there is
something special about slurs. After all, slurs are not the only words that
can be derogatory. As Terry’s utterance shows, you can surely achieve
ethnic abuse without the use of abusive epithets.
Finally, one of the crucial features of epithets is that the referent of
a given epithet is somehow earned the epithet. Because Alexander con-
quered a good part of the known world, he earned the descriptive epithet
‘Great’. Similarly, with the slurring epithets, the idea is that the xeno-
phobes think that the target has earned the derogatory epithet. The
xenophobes think that the slurring epithet is appropriate because it char-
acterises the target in the right way. This is discussed in detail next.
D. Systematic derogation
John Terry received £220 000 fine plus a ban from four Chelsea Premier
League matches. A notable thing is that the whole altercation was initi-
ated by Anton Ferdinand. He abused Terry with the words ‘you fucking
cunt’ first and Terry responded to this by just adding the word ‘black’
to the abuse: ‘you fucking black cunt’. However, The FA Commission
did not fine Ferdinand for the initial abuse. It might be speculated that
the Commission thought that it is not their job to monitor how harsh
language players might use. This is an essential difference between slurs
and say ‘bastard’. Slurs are always offensive and should not be used at
all. Whereas, there seems to be appropriate uses of the word ‘bastard’.
It expresses contempt towards the target but maybe the person deserves
this contempt. Maybe the target just is a very nasty person and someone
had to point that out, even if it is done in a very harsh manner but that
is, more or less, a matter of taste. Observe the contrast between (6) and
(7):
(6) That bastard stole my car.
(7) That Boche stole my car.
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It could be that (6) is appropriate given the circumstances but that is
a matter of taste but (7) is never appropriate. You can imagine even
a more horrendous crime which could make the harsh language in (6)
more appropriate. But it does not matter how horrible the crime is,
(7) still remains offensive and inappropriate. Slurs are derogatory and
inappropriate in a systematic way.
There is a further point that highlights the decision to concentrate
on atomic construction and on the systematic nature of derogation that
accompanies these slurring epithets (understood as conventionally recog-
nised names). Some philosophers have claimed that slurs can be expressed
in many ways, even in extralinguistic ways. It has been noted that the
use of a slur is like saying out loud the neutral word while making a rude
gesture. It has also been noted elsewhere that slurring can be accom-
plished, among other things, by tone like sneering and gesture like looks
of disgust. (See Hornsby 2009, 128-141 and also Hom and May 2013,
298.) My first response to this idea is that it seems to me that gestures
and tone are more comparable to slurs like the one Terry used. If this
is so, there could actually be appropriate uses of these expressions even
when they are coupled with expressions of ethnicity. Let me illustrate
this with another Chelsea-related football anecdote. In March 2016, Paris
Saint-Germain eliminated Chelsea from the Champions League. Imagine
a die-hard Chelsea fan commenting the match:
(8) . . . and then those fucking French scored another goal . . .
This line of commentary is at least excusable. Even more so, if we know
that the speaker uses the F-word frequently. I am even willing to say that
these kind of comments may even be part of the package. As a proper fan
you are not supposed to like the opposing club when it is hammering your
own club. Nevertheless, the following remark is not excusable, let alone
part of the package:
(9) . . . and then those Frogs scored another goal . . .
The inappropriateness of (9) is not lessened if the speaker uses the slur
frequently; quite the opposite. Xenophobia is not a part of the package
17
in football (or anywhere else). In the light of this example, I think it is
justified to concentrate first and foremost on epithets, instead of any kind
complex linguistic constructions or any kind of extralinguistic expressions.
1.2 Civilised and xenophobic speakers
It goes without saying that the question “what are slurs?” is important
to anyone who is interested in the topic. Another question, of almost
equal importance, is ”who uses slurs?”. Slurs divide speakers into two
categories, to
civilised speakers who do not apply them.
and to
xenophobic speakers who apply slurs.6
There is a small but crucial difference between the use and the application.
Civilised people may use slurs for educational purposes. A parent might
say to a child:
(10) Do not ever use the word ‘Boche’ !
6I am not completely happy with the terms used in this distinction. Especially, I am
dissatisfied with the term ‘civilised’. I borrowed the term from Timothy Williamson
(2009, 137-158). Still, the term is indeterminate in respect to the criteria of being
civilised. Are some speakers more civilised because their linguistic competence is supe-
rior to xenophobes (as Christopher Hom and Robert May argue)? Are some speakers
more civilised because they have better moral compass and wish not to offend anyone?
And finally, are they epistemically in better position to evaluate xenophobic beliefs?
It seems to me that this indeterminacy is resolvable. I will argue that civilised people
have an epistemically better handle to evaluate xenophobic beliefs. Because of the
epistemic edge, civilised people are more equipped to evaluate the appropriateness of
expressing xenophobic beliefs.
A more difficult problem concerns the genealogy of the term ‘civilised’. For colo-
nialism was largely justified with the distinction between civilised Westerners and un-
civilised natives. It was the civilised nature of the colonisers that justified their racism.
That is, it justified that the civilised Westerners ruled the uncivilised natives. This was
pointed out to me by Cassie Herbert in Third Barcelona Conference on Gender, Race,
and Sexuality in June 2016. Still, I am happier with the term ‘civilised’ than with any
other term. It seems to me that the specification that a civilised speaker has a better
handle on the epistemic consequences of the use of slurs, makes the term most apt for
people who do not use slurs.
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In this work, slurs are used frequently as examples. Importantly, in these
educational uses they are not applied to anyone. The parent in (10) or an
author of academic thesis on slurs does not apply slurs like the speaker in
(1) and (2) applies them. They are only examples and hence (to use an
old distinction) only mentioned, not applied to anyone. The speaker of
(7) applies a slur to the car thief and the speaker of (5) applies the slur
to a German. That is why (5) and (7) are offensive.
On the basis of this, it seems obvious to say that civilised speakers
do not apply slurs. But to articulate why civilised people do not apply
them, seems to go to heart of the problem. To give it an initial stab, what
has been said above might give us a clue. So far we have seen, first, that
slurs express derogation and hence the use of a slur gives the entitlement
to be offended and, secondly, that they target social groups. From these
points can be drawn the conclusion that with slurs are expressions of
xenophobic attitudes and when slurs are used, the targets are entitled
to be offended. And unless the speaker specifically wanted to express a
xenophobic attitude towards an individual or a social group, the speaker
should refrain from using slurs.
Mark Richard points out that slurs “express strong negative attitudes
towards member of a group, attitudes in some sense grounded in nothing
more than membership in the group” (Richard 2008, 12). People who
refrain from using slurs do not want to insult, vilify or derogate people
on the basis of their belonging to some social group. People who use
slurs seem to have no such problems. This marks a difference between a
xenophobic person and a civilised person. For the xenophobe the mere
inclusion in some social group entitles him to derogate and to offend peo-
ple but for the civilised person the mere inclusion in a certain group does
not yet entitle derogation. It may very well be that the target is a hateful
and petty person and hence deserves the speaker’s contempt. However, a
civilised person does not pretend to know that on the basis of the target’s
ethnicity, nationality or religion. The upshot is that while both parties,
the xenophobes and the civilised speakers, probably agree that slurs ex-
press contempt and derogate their targets, the xenophobes think that this
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contempt or derogation is justified; whereas civilised people think that the
contempt is baseless and thereby wish not to express it. To illustrate the
situation, one could say that xenophobes confuse slurs for words like ‘bas-
tard’. They think that the membership in a certain social group justifies
the use of slur, just like it might be justified to call a car thief a ‘bastard’.
1.3 Cognitivism and non-cognitivism
1.3.1 Thickness in metaethics
One major strand in the study of slurs is the metaethical study of thick
concepts. It already provides an important distinction which is very much
present throughout this work. Within the tradition of moral philosophy,
factual statements like
(11) Snow is white.
are distinguished from moral statements like
(12) Lying is wrong.
It is thought that the first one is true if and if only (iff from now on) it
is a fact that snow is white. But concerning the second one it is doubtful
whether there is a factual correspondence to the moral statement. It is
thought the second one expresses the speaker’s attitude towards lying.
The statements attributes a moral evaluation to lying, either (morally)
good or (morally) bad or simply ‘hurray’ or ‘boo’ evaluation.7 There are
also concepts that can have “a bit of both”. These concepts are called thick
concepts. On the one hand, thick concepts have descriptive (i.e. factual)
content. On the other hand, they also have moral content. For example,
liar can be thought to be such a concept. Considering (12), most of us
7Of course, there are views according to which the two previous statements are
on a par. Both correspond to facts. It is just that the second one corresponds to a
moral fact. For example, Cornell Realists have argued for this kind view (see Boyd
1988, 181-228 and Sturgeon 1988, 229-255). But for the illustrative purposes, let us
keep the discussion simple and concentrate on the expressivist tradition within moral
philosophy.
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do confirm the sentence. We think lying is morally reprehensible. As a
consequence, the sentence
(13) Max is a liar
not only has truth conditions (it is true iff Max does lie frequently) but
it also adds a moral evaluation on Max’s conduct. The discussion on
thick concepts provides a good starting point also for the study of slurs.
Metaethical discussion on thickness began in the sixties and it has at least
two parties, the cognitivist and the non-cognitivist.
Non-cognitivism: reductive thickness
A thick concept comprises two thin parts. It has an descriptive part
and it has an evaluative part.8 The cognitivist and the non-cognitivist
argue about the relationship between these two parts. According to the
non-cognitivist, there is a clear distinction between the two parts. The
descriptive part explicates the reference of the term and the evaluative part
adds a moral evaluation of the reference, either good or bad, right or wrong
or simply ‘hurray’ or ‘boo’. In his Freedom and Reason (1963), R. M. Hare
cited as an example concepts like industrious and courageous. These
are concepts which have an extension but they also express moral appraisal
towards the target.
The flipside of the coin is concepts which come with a ‘boo’. In con-
nection to these words, Hare says: ”if we want, in the Southern States, to
speak to a [black person] as an equal, we cannot do so by addressing him
as a nigger” (Hare 1963, 25). According to Hare, the N-word expresses a
moral evaluation of the target which is objectionable and unless we specif-
ically want to adhere to those objectionable moral values, we should not
use the word. This is the non-cognitivist view about thickness. The idea
is that the slur ‘Boche’ has two parts: the descriptive part fixes the refer-
ence to the Germans and simultaneously the slur adds a ’boo’ evaluation
toward the Germans. This is sometimes called a reductive view because
8This is generally agreed on but, as explained below, there are also dissidents like
David Hume and Simon Blackburn.
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the thickness can be reduced to two thin bits: to the descriptive part on
the one hand and to the evaluation on the other. (See e.g. Elstein and
Hurka 2009, 515-535.)
Cognitivism: entangled thickness
Hare’s view on thickness soon enough gained opposition. The main source
of this opposition is John McDowell. He challenged the reductive view.
The challenge could be paraphrased in the following way. Cognitivism
agrees that thick concepts have two parts but it denies the reduction.
There are some thick concepts which are very difficult to explain in a
reductive sense. Sometimes the two parts are entangled in such a way that
they may not be separated so easily. Let us call this the Entanglement
Challenge. It is very difficult to apply courageous to someone if one
does not understand what it is to morally admire courageous acts:
Consider, for instance, a specific conception of some moral
virtue: the conception current in a reasonably cohesive moral
community. If the disentangling manoeuvre is always possi-
ble, that implies that the extension of the associated term, as
it would be used by someone who belonged to the commu-
nity, could be mastered independently of the special concerns
which, in the community, would show themselves in admira-
tion or emulation of actions seen as falling under the concept.
(McDowell 2002, 201.)
According to McDowell, there are thick concepts which include two parts
such that they are inseparable so that one cannot learn a thick concept
in a piecemeal fashion: first one understands the extension and then one
learns to appreciate the evaluation which the thick concept carries (or
perhaps the other way round). This is McDowell’s original point about
understanding of thickness.
McDowell’s thought has gained support from Bernard Williams and
from Hilary Putnam. Williams repeats McDowell’s point by saying that
”an effective point” has been made against the non-cognitivist view and
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he summarises it as follows. If the non-cognitivist view is right, then there
should be a neutral term which picks up exactly the same reference as the
thick one but without the moral evaluation. (Williams 2006, 141-142.)
However, it is indeed very hard to think of a purely descriptive concept
that picks up the very same reference as courageous or picks up the very
same reference as the concept cruel has but without the evaluation. We
can label this the point as the absence of descriptive synonymity.
Hilary Putnam explains the dialectics by noting that there is a long
tradition which distinguishes between subjective value judgements and
objective statements of facts. Statements of facts which are objectively
true are distinguished from value judgements which are incapable of being
objectively true. Putnam’s point is to reject this distinction.9 He goes on
to discuss thick concepts. According to him, non-cognitivism adheres to
the distinction. In the face of the entanglement, the non-cognitivist has
two options how to deal with thickness:
(i) Deny thickness : Insist that thick concept can be reduced exhaus-
tively either to the descriptive part or to the evaluative part.
(ii) Claim that thickness is reducible to two distinguishable parts : The
purely descriptive part which states the matters of facts and an at-
titudinal part which expresses ‘boo’ or ‘hurray’ attitudes.
Option (i) was taken by David Hume, at least according to Putnam. Hume
discuss the factuality of crime by which Hume meant ‘grievous wrong’
and Hume denied that there are any such matters of facts as ‘grievous
wrong’. This then means that Hume denied the descriptive component of
crime. Thereby thick concepts express only ‘boo’ or ‘hurray’ attitudes.
Simon Blackburn picks option (i) too as he says that thickness is very
much overrated (usually by the cognitivists). The contrast to Hume is that
Blackburn believes that thickness is completely reducible to the descriptive
part (Blackburn 2010, 129-146). Option (ii) is taken by Hare. Hare thinks
9It seems obvious that Putnam is aiming his criticism towards the distinction be-
tween sentences (11) and (12).
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that cruel is the kind of concept that lends to two-part analysis as seen
above.
However, Putnam is not impressed by either option and he thinks that
the entanglement argument challenges them both. He repeats Williams’
explication of the argument. Putnam thinks that it is impossible to say
what is the descriptive component of cruel without using the word ‘cruel’
or a synonym (which, presumably, is equally thick). Hare suggests that
the descriptive part of cruel is ‘causing to suffer deeply’. Against this
Putnam says:
[I]t certainly is not the case that the extension of ‘cruel’ (set-
ting the evaluation aside, as it were) is simply ‘causing deep
suffering’, nor, as Hare himself should have noticed, is ‘causes
deep suffering’ itself free of evaluative force (Putnam 2002, 38).
Putnam then goes on to give an example. Think of the nineteenth century
doctors before the introduction of anaesthesia. At that time, any surgical
operation caused great pain but we would not describe the doctors or the
surgical acts as cruel.
However, the non-cognitivist could appeal to the so-called doctrine of
double effect. The doctrine admits that some morally good acts might also
have bad consequences but adds that such acts should be distinguished
from acts that aim only at the bad consequences. It could be argued that
what distinguishes doctor’s attempts to save a patient from acts of torture
is the intention that accompanies the acts. (see e.g. Quinn 1989, 334-
351.) If this kind of appeal to the doctrine of double effect is successful,
then there is a way to paraphrase ‘cruelty’. However, it is still a question
whether ‘intentionally causing deep suffering’ is free from evaluative force.
It may not be. Hence, it seems to me that Putnam is warranted in quoting
McDowell:
Now, it seems reasonable to be sceptical about whether the
disentangling manoeuvre can always be effected; specifically,
about whether, corresponding to any [thick] concept, one can
always isolate a genuine feature of the world [. . . ] to be that
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to which competent users of the concept are to be regarded as
responding when they use it: that which is left in the world
when one peels off the reflection of the appropriate attitude
(McDowell 2001, 201).
Whatever our conclusion is concerning the debate between Hume, Hare
and Blackburn on the one hand and McDowell and his followers on the
other hand, the main point is that all parties agree that slurs are thick in
the reductive sense. Even the followers of McDowell admit this. Later,
we will see that the McDowell-style cognitivism has its followers in the
study of slurs too. Christopher Hom and Robert May have proposed a
view which utilises the entanglement of thickness. The view sympathises
first and foremost with McDowell’s point about understanding.
1.3.2 Descriptive and expressive content
Gottlob Frege’s distinction between sense and reference is well known. He
thought that although ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ have the same refer-
ence, the planet Venus, they differ in their sense. The mode of presentation
(of the same reference) is different. Consider the pair
(14) Phosphorus is Phosphorus.
(15) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
(14) is trivially true and (15), although true, is not trivially true. The
different senses of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ can explain the cognitive
significance of (15). There are two important points. First is that the
sense of an expression determines the reference of the expression. Second
point is that expressions with different senses are not apt for salva veritate
substitution in all sentential contexts, even if they refer to the same object.
Consider the pair
(16) Max believes that Hesperus visible in the evening sky.
(17) Max believes that Phosphorus visible in the evening sky.
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It might be that Max does not know that ‘Phosphorus’ refers the same
planet Venus as ‘Hesperus’ does. Hence, Max does not believe that Phos-
phorus is visible in the evening sky and the upshot is that co-extensive
expressions with different senses are not substitutable in any given con-
text. Propositional attitude reports like (16) and (17) make this clear.
In contrast to this, Frege also distinguishes tone of an expression from
its sense and reference. The tone (or colouring)10 is something that does
not alter the meaning. According to Frege, ‘walk’, ‘stroll’ and ‘saunter’
all mean the same, i.e. they have the same sense (and hence the same
reference). They differ only in tone. Frege gives an example of a pejorative
term ‘cur’ which has the same sense as ‘dog’. He thinks that the pair
(18) that dog howled the whole night.
(19) that cur howled the whole night.
express the same thought. Their descriptive content is the same. Hence,
the truth conditional contribution of these words has to be the same.
This points to a conclusion that expressions with the same sense but with
different tones are salva veritate substitutable (Frege 1980, 140; see also
Dummett 1973, 82-90; Neale 1999; Predelli 2013, 96-97.)
Timothy Williamson’s work on slurs is directly based on the distinc-
tion between sense and tone. Williamson thinks the distinction between
sense and tone can be explicated with conventional implicature. David
Kaplan also takes seriously Frege’s suggestion that the tone does not af-
fect the truth conditions. His work is a major influence for contemporary
non-cognitivism concerning expressives. Joseph A. Hedger’s treatment
of slurs is a continuance of Kaplan’s view. Also Christopher Potts, Eric
Mcready and Robin Jeshion adhere to Kaplan’s insight that derogation is
truth conditionally irrelevant. Finally, the most detailed continuance of
Kaplan’s ideas is Stefano Predelli’s work.
10Frege’s original German terms were ‘Fa¨rbung’ and ‘Beleuch’. Dummett translates
the notion as ‘tone’ but the term ‘colouring’ is also used (see e.g. Picardi 2007, 491-520
and Neale 1999, 35-82).
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1.4 Taxonomies






The views are discussed in relation to two dimensions which are interre-
lated but which, for illustrative purposes, are separated in this section.
Both of these dimensions relate to the discussion on cognitivism and non-
cognitivism. The dimensions are
1. Derogation-semantics dimension
2. Descriptivism-expressivism dimension
1.4.1 Derogation and semantics
Figure 1.1 categorises the views on the basis of semantics they adhere
to. Specifically, the distinguishing point is how derogation is spelled out.
The explanation for Figure 1.1 is the following. Pure views hold that











Figure 1.1: The influence of derogation on semantics
derogation influences truth conditions. Namely, pure views assign different
truth conditions for the pair
(20) Max is German.
(21) Max is a Boche.
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Hence, it can be said that pure views hold that derogation in (21) in-
fluences the truth conditions of the sentence. This means that a truth
conditional treatment can spell out derogation.
Moderate views, on the other hand, hold that truth conditions for (20)
and (21) are the same. So derogation cannot be spelled out with truth
conditions. Still, moderate views hold that the nature of derogation is
semantic. In order to spell out derogation, moderate views expand the
notion of semantics beyond mere truth conditional semantics. Finally,
generic descriptivism is my proposal. Generic descriptivism holds that
the nature of derogation is not semantic. That is why derogation does not
influence semantics. Crucially, I agree with moderate views that deroga-
tion does not affect truth conditions. Rather, the nature of derogation
is epistemic. More detailed explanation of views from A to D is offered
below. First, I will specify how each view accounts for derogation seman-
tically. Then I will move on to descriptivism-expressivism dimension. In
these explanations, generic descriptivism is omitted as Section 1.5 below
will be devoted to the introduction of my view.
Pure expressivism
Joseph A. Hedger’s pure expressivism posits a strong tie between dero-
gation and truth conditional semantics as he argues that slurs are pure
expressives. In a sentence
(22) Snow is white.
snow is described as white. That means that the sentence is true iff snow
actually is white. In comparison, slurring sentences are not like this,
according to pure expressivism. Slurring sentences do not describe the
target in any way. Slurs are more comparable to an expression like ‘ouch’.
Hence, a slurring sentence like
(23) Max is a Frog.
is comparable to a sentence
(24) Max is ouch.
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which may not even be a well-formed sentence; it certainly does not at-
tribute any property to Max and that is why it is not a truth-apt state-
ment. The same goes for the slurring expression. It does not succeed in
attributing any property to Max. In this sense, pure expressivism takes
the Humean road. Hume argued that a thick concept like crime does
not state factual matters. Similarly, pure expressivism denies the descrip-
tive component in slurring terms. That is why slurs are not truth-apt at
all. The upshot is that derogation of slurs seeps down to semantics and
derogation robs the slurring utterance of truth value.
Pure descriptivism
Pure descriptivism posits an equally strong tie between derogation and
truth conditional semantics but in a different way. The main strand of
pure descriptivism is Christopher Hom and Robert May’s view. They
argue that derogation is based on morally questionable (stereotypical)
properties such as “Frogs are vulgar”. Slurs then capture these stereotypes
as their content. The content of ‘Frog’ is riddled with lots of mistaken and,
not to mention, morally offensive stereotypical descriptions. The content
of ‘Frog’, according to Hom, is something like
Ought to be placed in one of the lesser tables in restaurant because
of being vulgar all because of being French.
For one thing, there is the mistake that it is alright to treat French badly
and the other mistake is to think that the property of vulgarity is somehow
inherent in the French. Because of this kind of characterisation, the refer-
ence of ‘Frog’ is empty. Hence, slurring utterances are always false. This
brief presentation of pure descriptivism is enough to show the connection
with McDowell’s entanglement challenge as pure descriptivism argues that
moral evaluation in slurs influences the extension of slurs.
I will be considering also another form of pure descriptivism, Michael
Dummett’s inferentialist treatment of slurs. His view is a weaker form of
pure descriptivism. One of the core claims of pure descriptivism is that
there is something wrong with the meaning of slurs. Dummett argues
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that even though slurs are not systematically false, they produce dubi-
ous inferential patterns. Furthermore, he equates the inferential patterns
with meaning. This then naturally leads to the conclusion that there is
something dubious about the meaning of slurs.
Moderate expressivism
Moderate views hold that the slurring terms and their neutral counterparts
are co-referential. So moderate views deny that the derogatory part of a
slur influences truth conditional semantics but the views still hold that
derogation affects the meaning of slurs. Christopher Potts’ conventional
implicature strategy and Stefano Predelli’s ‘Kaplanian’ view accommodate
the two claims by imposing semantics which is rich enough to handle non-
truth conditional content.
Christopher Potts’ moderate expressivism is based on conventional
implicature. The central feature of conventional implicatures is that even
false implicatures do not falsify the truth conditional content of the orig-
inal statements. In order to explicate this point, Potts proposes an ex-
pansion of the semantic domain which incorporates the expressive content
into semantics in a way that semantics respects the independence prop-
erty. He introduces new non-truth functional, expressive types. As a
consequence, the truth functional and the expressive dimension do not
mingle with each other. That is, they are independent of each other but
both are incorporated into the formalisation of expressives.
Moderate descriptivism
One part of moderate descriptivism is Stefano Predelli’s Kaplanian devel-
opment. On the kaplanian frame, the notion of logical validity is extended
in the sense that the basis of validity is not truth but the notion of seman-
tic information. In general, a valid inference is an inference which carries
the truth of the premises to the conclusion. On the Kaplanian frame-
work, inferences transmit semantic information from the premises to the
conclusion. Following Kaplan, Predelli distinguishes two notions of valid-
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ity: truth functional validity and expressive validity. The transmission of
semantic information is captured with these two notions of validity.
The other part of moderate descriptivism is Timothy Williamson’s
conventional implicature strategy. Williamson does not extend the notion
of semantics (in any technical sense) but agrees that derogation is part of
the meaning and can be made explicit with conventional implicature. The
stereotypical information of ‘Frog’ produces a conventional implicature:
(25) French are vulgar.
which is false and abusive. According to Williamson, the implicature
that slurs like ‘Frog’ produce are part of their meaning, in the broad
sense. He explicates this by saying that if a speaker is ignorant about
the implicature concerning ‘Boche’, then the speaker is at least partly
ignorant of the meaning of ‘Boche’. (Williamson 2009, 152-153.) I will
explore the notions of meaning and stereotype in greater detail next.
1.4.2 Meaning
The meaning of an expression relates to the understanding of that expres-
sion. Semantics provides the means to explicate that meaning. Semantics
aims to respect the notion of compositionality. That is, the meaning of a
complex expression is determined by the meaning of the constituent parts.
Two notions of semantics are relevant:
1. Truth conditional semantics
2. Expanded semantics.
Pure views adhere to truth conditional semantics and hold that deroga-
tion can be explicated with truth conditional semantics. Moderate views
adhere to expanded semantics. They hold that derogation cannot be ex-
plicated with truth conditional semantics. Rather, it can be explicated
with the help of the expanded notion of semantics. Potts and Predelli
each have their own methods of expanding semantics. Potts proposes a
conventional implicature strategy which expands the domain of semantics
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with new types. The crucial point is that there are no truth functional op-
erations over these types. Predelli takes his cue from Kaplan and proposes
that derogation does not affect the truth conditional meaning. Rather, it
affects the use of slurs and proposes a semantic method to explicate this.
Williamson and Dummett add complications to this picture but the
distinction can still accommodate their views. Dummett thinks that the
meaning of a given term is first and foremost identified with the inferential
patterns related to the term. As a consequence, the inferential patterns
produced by the slurring term do affect the truth conditions of that term.
Williamson, on the other hand, holds that the differences between the
slurring term and the neutral term are truth conditionally irrelevant but
still he holds that derogation is a part of the meaning of a slur in a broader
sense. Because of this, I think that Williamson should be categorised as
a proponent of expanded semantics.
1.4.3 Role of stereotype
The main issue with the stereotype is whether the negative stereotype
associated with a social group contributes to derogation. The views are
categorised to those which recognise the role of stereotype in derogation
and to those which do not. Figure 1.2 below illustrates the situation. I will
first elaborate the notion of stereotype and then I will briefly characterise












Figure 1.2: Is the stereotype a part of derogation?
Target and stereotype
One of the major themes is the nature of descriptive content. There are




The target of the expression is fairly clear. It has been claimed so far that
derogation targets a specific social group. For example, ‘Boche’ targets
the German, ‘Limey’ targets the English and ‘Frog’ targets the French.
In the course of the argumentation, my main claim is that the stereo-
type is responsible for derogation. However, the stereotype is not the
easiest notion to capture. Oxford English Dictionary (OED) says that a
stereotype is “a preconceived and oversimplified idea of the characteris-
tics which typify a person, situation, etc.”. Cambridge Online Dictionary
(COD) says that a stereotype is “a set idea that people have about what
someone or something is like, especially an idea that is wrong”. Finally
according to Urban Dictionary (UD), “a stereotype is used to categorize
a group of people”.11 All these entries contribute to the way I see the
stereotype. I view it as an over-simplification of the characteristics of so-
cial kinds, as OED suggests. Thereby, it can be misleading as COD hints
and, from Urban Dictionary, I take it that the function of a stereotype is
to categorise individuals into groups. There is an important distinction to
made on the basis of the definitions. The definitions provided by OED and
COD apply just to social kinds as they highlight the over-simplification
and the wrongness of the characterisation that the stereotype contains.
The characterisation in Urban Dictionary covers all stereotypes, whether
the stereotype applies to a social, a natural or a biological kind. It is a
key point that only in the case of social kinds, the over-simplification is
in some way harmful. Putnam, for instance, argues that stereotypes are
an important way to pass on information about natural kinds. Accord-
ing to him, a stereotype can be equated with a description. He says of a
stereotype that it is
a standardised description of features of the kind that are
typical, or ‘normal’, or at any rate stereotypical. The cen-





tral features of the stereotype generally are criteria - features
which in normal situations constitute ways of recognizing if
a thing belongs to the kind or, at least, necessary conditions
(or probabilistic necessary conditions) for membership in the
kind. (Putnam 1975, 230.)
In short, stereotypes have an important role in passing on information
about natural kinds. Because of the stereotypes of gold (it is yellow,
shiny, precious metal), the linguistic community can recognise gold and
for this reason the stereotype is useful. In this sense, there is a stark
contrast with the stereotypes of natural and even biological kinds and the
stereotypes of social kinds. The stereotype of social kinds have very little
to do with the recognition of a specific kind. Rather, the stereotypes of
social kinds are over-simplifications and there is something wrong with
them. Putnam elaborates his idea of stereotype:
In ordinary parlance a ‘stereotype’ is a conventional (frequently
malicious) idea (which may be wildly inaccurate) of what an
X looks like or acts like or is. Obviously, I am trading on some
features of the ordinary parlance. I am not concerned with
malicious stereotypes (save where the language itself is mali-
cious); but I am concerned with conventional ideas, which may
be inaccurate. I am suggesting that just such a conventional
idea is associated with ‘tiger’, with ‘gold’, etc. [. . . ] (Putnam
1975, 249-250.)
Putnam says that he trades off the “malicious” nature of the stereotype
but leaves the inaccuracy as it is.12 It seems to me that his idea is that
a stereotype is crucial in passing on information about natural kinds in a
linguistic community, even if that stereotype is in fact inaccurate.13 In a
similar spirit, my idea is that a competent speaker knows that ‘Frog’ comes
12The idea that a stereotype can be inaccurate has been pointed out by Williamson
(2009, 137-158).
13His example is again gold. A stereotype of gold is that it is yellow but, according
to Putnam, this stereotype is inaccurate as pure gold is white. It is the impurities
(namely, copper) that make gold yellow. (Putnam 1975, 250.)
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with a stereotype of vulgarity or that ‘Boche’ comes with the stereotype
of cruelty. The idea of a xenophobic stereotype can be characterised in
probabilistic terms. A stereotype characterises a normal member of a kind
and in this sense, a xenophobe believes that if someone has vulgar eating
habits and slurps red wine at noon, then there is a high probability that
the person is a ‘Frog’.14
Pure expressivism
Pure expressivism does not recognise the role of a stereotype in the se-
mantics of slurs. Hedger argues that slurs are pure expressives. So they
do not have any descriptive content. Hence, they cannot express any
stereotypical characters either. Slurs do not describe the stereotype of the
target.
Moderate expressivism
Moderate expressivism also denies the role of stereotype. Moderate ex-
pressivism holds that slurs have a dual content. The content of a slur is
partly expressive and partly descriptive. Moderate expressivism is a very
faithtful follower of Hare’s reductive view. Moderate expressivism holds
that, on the one hand, slurs have descriptive content in the sense that
they refer to what ever their neutral counterparts refer to but, on the
other hand, slurs add an ‘boo’ attitude towards the target.
Hence, moderate expressivism accepts (i) but denies (ii). Potts intro-
duces a whole host of properties that relate and contribute to the idea of
expressive independence. Potts’ most direct argument against stereotypes
is descriptive ineffability. Potts argues that since competent speakers can-
not paraphrase the descriptive content of expressives, the descriptive con-
tent cannot be taken seriously as an explanatory notion. (Potts 2007,
176-179.)
Concerning slurs, Robin Jeshion makes a similar point. She says that
bigotry and racism are rooted simply in finding others different (Jeshion
14Putnam’s thoughts on stereotypes are further discussed in Chapter 5.
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2013, 322). Xenophobia is not based on specific stereotypes.
Moderate descriptivism
Moderate descriptivism recognises the role of stereotype in derogation.
Timothy Williamson proposes an interesting variation of the conventional
implicature strategy, extending it to moderate descriptivism. Moderate
expressivism claims that the implicature produced by the use of ‘Frog’ is
(26) ‘Boo’ the French.
The notable thing is the absence of the stereotype. There is only the
disrespectful attitude towards the target. Contrary to this, Williamson
thinks that the stereotype
(27) The French are vulgar.
is a part of the implicature. Williamson thinks that while the statement
(28) Max is a Frog.
is true iff Max is French, the implicature that the French are vulgar is not
only abusive but also false. Williamson says that since the false impli-
cature (27) does not falsify slurring (28), the implicature is not a logical
entailment of (28). (Williamson 2009, 149.)
Another moderate descriptivist discussed is Stefano Predelli. His gen-
eral view is to some extent compatible with moderate expressivism. He
thinks that slurs express a subjective attitude towards the target. How-
ever, he incorporates the idea of a stereotype with a semantic witness of
an expressive. The semantic witness explicates the stereotype involved
with the subjective attitude towards the target. Most importantly, the
witness does it in a truth conditional manner. For example, the semantic
witness of ‘Frog’ is something like “the speaker regards the French as vul-
gar”. There are then two aspects to (28). The first aspect is that (28) is
true iff Max is French and the other aspect is explicated with the semantic
witness. The use of (28) is correct (or non-defective in Predelli’s terms)
iff it is true that the speaker regards the French as vulgar.15
15This is a simple version of Predelli’s idea and it is elaborated in Chapter 4.
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Pure descriptivism
Pure descriptivism relies heavily on the notion of stereotype. Pure descrip-
tivism holds that the negative moral evaluation influences the extension
of a slur like ‘Frog’. According to Hom and May, the content of ‘Frog’ is
filled with xenophobic stereotypes: “the French are vulgar” and so on but
no one is vulgar just because they belong to a certain social group. Hence,
‘Frog’ does not refer to anything. This then explains the difference in the
truth values of the pair (20) and (21). Depending how things actually are
(20) can be either true or false but the slurring term in (21) makes the
sentence systematically false. There are no German people who are cruel




The core claims of generic descriptivism can be listed in the following way:
(A) Slurs have the same truth-conditional meaning as their neutral coun-
terparts.
(B) Derogation is truth conditionally irrelevant.
(C) Derogation is based on an epistemic stance towards the target.
(D) The stance is based on an unwarranted formation of negative beliefs
about the target.
(E) Slurs transmit unwarranted and stereotypical conceptions of the tar-
get.
In my view, truth conditional semantics is enough to explain the meaning
of slurs. Namely, with truth conditional semantics, it can be established
that the differences between the slurring term and the neutral term are
truth conditionally irrelevant. Since I think that truth conditional seman-
tics is enough to explain the meaning of slurs, I argue that derogation does
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not affect the meaning. I argue that the nature of derogation is epistemic,
not semantic. Slurs are expressions of unwarranted negative beliefs. The
beliefs are over-generalisations (or over-simplifications, as OED says it).
My view aims to accommodate the idea that slurs are expressions of xeno-
phobia and as such they transmit xenophobia. Just because the expressed
beliefs are unwarranted and negative over-generalisations, they are deroga-
tory. The epistemic stance towards the target is the reason to use a slur.
However, this stance can be very idiosyncratic. The speaker might think
that stereotypically ‘Frogs’ are thieves because the speaker just noticed
that a French-speaking person shoplifted something. From that incident,
the speaker generalised that all French people are shoplifters. So when
that speaker uses the term ‘Frog’, the speaker aims to express that belief.
However, when the term ‘Frog’ is used, the transmitted information is the
conventional stereotype that ‘Frogs’ are vulgar.
I will elaborate these claims more below. First, I will discuss the claims
in relation to the derogation-semantics and the descriptivism-expressivism
dimensions and then I will proceed to detailed analysis of the claims.
Derogation and semantics
One of the most important claims I make is that derogation is not seman-
tic. Generic descriptivism adheres to the moderate view that the slurring
term and the neutral term are co-referential. That means that generic
descriptivism is at odds with the pure views which hold that the exten-
sion of the slurring term diverges from the neutral term. According to
pure expressivism, the slurring term does not have an extension at all and
pure descriptivism says that the extension is empty. In addition, there
is a contrast to moderate views as generic descriptivism does not adhere
to any sort extension of semantics. Moderate views hold that in order to
accommodate the behaviour of slurs, the notion of semantics needs to be
extended. Specifically, the semantic apparatus needs to incorporate the
expressive dimension in a non-truth functional way. Generic descriptivism
disagrees. It holds that truth conditional semantics is an exhaustive ex-
planation of the meaning of slurs. Since generic descriptivism adheres to
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the conjunction of two things:
(i) the slurring term and the neutral term are co-referential
(ii) truth conditions are an exhaustive explanation of semantics,
it entails that generic descriptivism holds that
(iii) the derogatory feature does not affect the semantics of the slurring
words.
One way to summarise the point of this work is that it aims to purge the
meaning of slurs from any derogation. That is why generic descriptivism
has its own entry in figure 1.1.
Role of stereotype
Figure 1.2 characterises the role of stereotype. On this scale, generic de-
scriptivism accepts both components of the descriptive content: the target
and the stereotype. In this respect, moderate descriptivism is the closest
ally to generic descriptivism. Just like moderate descriptivism, generic de-
scriptivism holds that the truth conditional content of a slur is the target,
and both hold that the stereotypes are responsible for derogation. How-
ever, both deny that stereotypes are part of the truth conditional content.
The claims of generic descriptivism can be summarised as
(i) The referent of a slur is the target.
(ii) Stereotypes are responsible for derogation.
However, generic descriptivism has affinities with pure descriptivism too.
Pure descriptivism denies the expressive dimension altogether, at least
in any explanatory sense. Pure descriptivism adopts the cognitivist view
on thickness in order to explain derogation. That means that they deny
that the expressive dimension has explanatory relevance. The derogatory
feature of slurs is part of the descriptive dimension. Generic descriptivism




Although we can see some of the main differences already in the big pic-
ture, it is really the small print that gives generic descriptivism its unique
character. The previously introduced claims reflect mainly contrast with
other views. In the following, generic descriptivism is characterised in its
own right.
Cognitive and epistemic differences
According to generic descriptivism, the truth conditional content of any
given slur is the target. The content of the slurring term and its neutral
counterpart is the same. That means that derogation is not part of the
truth conditional content. Generic descriptivism does not think that we
need to accommodate the expressive dimension with an extension to non-
truth conditional semantics. Rather, generic descriptivism sees derogation
as an epistemic feature.
Potts lists six properties that are distinctive to expressives. However,
It is held here that the evidence for the expressive dimension is not con-
vincing as almost all of the properties mentioned and discussed by Potts
can be given an equally plausible explanation of another kind. It is shown
that only the so-called perspective dependence is a genuine sign of the ex-
pressive dimension. In other words, generic descriptivism concedes that as
far as perspective dependence is concerned, expressivism has a point but
even this can be explained in broadly cognitivist terms. The perspective
dependence is explained as a property of negative and biased beliefs that
accompany the use of slurs.
Slurs and generic information
According to my proposal, all of the features of slurs mentioned so far
can be explained with the information which accompanies slurs. It is
claimed that slurs come with stereotypical and mostly negative informa-
tion and this information is the key to derogation. The eponymous feature
of generic descriptivism is the claim that
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Slurs contain generic information.
The description of the psychological mechanism which produces generic
information is the first step in revealing the cognitive status of the infor-
mation associated with slurs. The psychological mechanism is based on
distinction between surface features and deeper features. We recognise
kinds (whether biological or social) on the basis of distinctive surface fea-
tures and then posit some other deeper features to the kind on the basis
some individuals of that kind. It is claimed that sentences like
(29) Tigers are striped.
(30) Ducks lay eggs.
are based on this sort of generalisation. Sarah-jane Leslie hypothesises
that there are qualifications on the features. She thinks that the surface
features have to be distinguishable in some way. She also thinks that the
deeper feature has to be striking or even horrific in order to get generalised
across the kind. I grant that this mechanism works rather well in the case
of biological kinds. The generalisation
(31) Tigers are ferocious.
seems sensible and it continues to be sensible when we attribute (on the
basis previous encounters) the ‘ferociousness’ to a sleeping tiger. It is
sensible even in the case the tiger is not sleeping but dead. In this case,
even though we make a mistake, it does not seem like a big mistake.
“Better safe than sorry”, you might say. A more controversial claim is
that this mechanism can produce generalisations about social kinds and
such generalisations can lead to pernicious effects, for example prejudice
and xenophobia.
It is important to connect the above view with the previous discussion
about the stereotypes of natural kinds. If you are looking for gold and
you find something that satisfies many of the stereotypes (is yellow, is
shiny and is metal), the probabilities for (literally) striking gold are high.
In similar sense, xenophobes think that if someone satisfies many of the
sterotypes of ’Frog’, drinks red wine inappropriately early and eats dis-
gusting things, there is high probability that that person is a ‘Frog’. The
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inferences, of course, goes the other way round too. If someone is a ‘Frog’,
then the previous features come with the package.
Slurs and negative information
It has been noted that generic statements about social groups are often ac-
companied by negative attitudes, more negative than specific statements
about the individual members of the same group. In this light, it is not a
surprise that the stereotypes concerning social groups are also often neg-
ative. I can think of at least two reasons for this. First, the stereotypes
often involve evaluative attributions and some of these evaluations can also
be positive. But since they are evaluative, the xenophobes are able to put
a negative spin even on the good attributions. For example, the Chinese
are stereotypically smart but for a xenophobe this means that ‘Chinks’
are devious or sneeky. Secondly, the negative information involved with
stereotypes and with generic statements (or indeed generic beliefs) can be,
at least partially, explained with the postulated psychological mechanism.
The thought is that the generalised feature is somehow striking and what
is more striking than some negative feature. This thought is supported by
studies on emotions and attention. The features to which we have strong
emotional response are more likely to catch our attention. Concerning
social kinds, the sad truth is that by far our strongest emotions are nega-
tive: fear, anger, contempt. In this work, I will concentrate on the second
reason and investigate that in detail.
Emotions and attention
The studies on the connection between emotions and attention support
the claim that our attention is guided by our emotions. Fear draws our
attention to a bear’s claws and sharp teeth instead of its cute bobtail.
This is old news but this is also true in the case of social kinds. So if
someone has a strong moral stand against stealing, he or she much more
likely focuses on an act of, say, shoplifting than on an act of generosity
when encountering a social kind that is different from his or her own.
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At the same time, this ‘striking’ feature (i.e. striking for him or her) is
quickly generalised across the whole kind.
Cognitivism - non-cognitivism debate
There are two reasons why generic descriptivism has an non-cognitivist
outlook. First, the cognitivism – non-cognitivism debate revolves a lot
around the engtanglement point which is denied by generic descriptivism.
The reductive analysis of slurring terms is not only achievable but proba-
ble: The extension of a slur is one thing and derogation is another. This
is only to be expected from a view that aims to purge derogation from
semantics. The upshot is that generic descriptivism resides firmly on the
non-cognitivist side concerning the truth conditional aspect of the debate.
Secondly, one of the big philosophical themes concerning emotions is
the rationality or irrationality of emotions. It has often been said that
emotional judgement is the opposite of rational judgement and that they
are the hallmark of non-cognitivism. But recent literature on emotions
emphasises that emotions are a part of rational deliberation processes, i.e.
they are an essential part of the cognitive machinery. Emotions help us
to make quick decisions in a hostile environment. When we see a ticking
time bomb it is better to run than to stay and deliberate the best possible
action through a painstaking process. Fear of exploding to pieces makes us
ditch the deliberation process and run. At the same time, it seems obvious
that after the painstaking deliberation process the best possible action is
to run away anyway. So emotions can enter into our rational deliberation
process in a beneficial way. This is why recent literature suggests that
emotions should count as a part of the rational processes. It is granted
here that in the right conditions these cognitive processes are rational
but, at the same time, xenophobia clearly shows that sometimes they are
not. In other words, the cognitive machinery might be working just fine
and yet the machinery produces xenophobia. However, xenophobia is not
rational. This is another sense that this work aims at a non-cognitivist
outlook.
To sum up the two points, one could present an analogy. The use of
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slurs might reveal the user’s negative biased beliefs about the target and
these biases are not rational. In fact, they are mistaken. In this sense,
they resemble the wrong answer to the ‘Linda the bank teller’ question.16
Because of the elaborate background story people tend to choose the con-
junctive answer which is not the most probable answer. The machinery of
generalisation can produce similar mistakes which count as genuine cog-
nitive differences. However, these differences do not show on a semantic
level. Just like the participants in the ‘Linda the bank teller’ experiments
are not confused about Linda’s identity, xenophobes are not confused
about the identity of ‘Frogs’. It seems pretty clear that they know that
‘Frogs’ are French. Albeit, they might have weird and false beliefs about
French people. Just like the participants in the experiments have false
beliefs about Linda.
However, there is a cognitivist aspect to this work. The contrast be-
tween non-cognitivism and cognitivism which is developed here could be
put forward in the following way. The non-cognitivist claim is something
like:
Slurs are expressions of xenophobic attitudes.
Whereas, the claim of generic descriptivism could be put forward as
Slurs are expressions of xenophobic thoughts.
Generic descriptivism claims that the use of slurs can reveal genuine cogni-
tive differences which non-cognitivism denies. The difference stems from
the way stereotypes are incorporated to the account. With the help of
stereotypes, generic descriptivism can say that the xenophobes think of
the target in a different way. Furthermore, I claim that the view on slurs
should reflect these differences.
16Here is one version of the question:
Linda studied sociology at LSE. She reads the Guardian, is a member of the Labour
Party, and enjoys experimental theatre. Which of these is more probable?
(A) Linda is a bank teller.
(B) Linda is a bank teller and an active feminist.
(See Papineau 2006, 42; see also Tversky and Kahneman 1982, 84-98.)
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Affiliation with originalism
The final point with generic descriptivism is its affiliation with Mark Sains-
bury and Michael Tye’s originalism. The main and eponymous point in
originalism is that concepts are individuated by their origin. Concepts are
not individuated by their content17 as Millians suggest nor by their sense
as Fregeans suggest. Originalism denies senses but admits the so-called
Fregean data which means trouble for Millians. That is why originalism
claims that concepts are not individuated by their content but instead by
their origin. This move explains Fregean data related to concepts. For ex-
ample, Frege thought that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are co-extensional
but they have different senses. Originalism also denies two-level semantics.
There is no room for senses. Instead, originalism holds that the difference
between ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are explained with different origins.
Senses are sometimes equated with definitions and these definitions
then determine the content. For example, bachelor is an unmarried man.
Originalism does admit that concepts come with information but, accord-
ing to originalism, the information attached to the concept and the content
of a concept live separate lives. The Fregean claim is that a competent
language user has to know that a bachelor is an unmarried man. Origi-
nalism does not believe so. According to originalism, the content is fixed
in the origin and after that the concept starts to accumulate information
around it but this information does not have anything to do with the con-
tent, except that the information usually is about the content. Generic
descriptivism does not have a strong opinion on concept individuation but
it agrees with the two previous points. According to generic descriptivism,
there is only one level of semantics, truth functional. That is part of the
purging programme.
17From now on, ‘content’ refers to Millian conception of content, i.e. to the referent
of the expression. This makes content somewhat synonymous with the semantic value
of an expression.
45
1.5.3 Scope of generic descriptivism
There are two important aspects in the application of generic descrip-
tivism. First, my view holds that derogation involves the ethnic back-
ground of the target. An important part of the view is xenophobia. Not
only does generic descriptivism apply to the most obvious racist slurs, but
also to slurs which are based on ethnic background in general, specifically
on nationality and religion. In my view, all racist slurs are at least partly
based on xenophobia but not the other way round. It seems to me that
the physical or the geographical distance is not so much a factor in xeno-
phobia. You can be xenophobic towards your neighbour with her strange
customs, attire or language. In general, it is the strangeness of your neigh-
bour’s appearance that triggers xenophobia. Xenophobia, in a sense, is a
tendency to react strongly to an appearance or a behaviour which does
not confirm with the subject’s expectations how people should look or
behave. Racism comes after this. Racism is an ‘ism’, an ideology that
is meant to justify the xenophobic thoughts about your neighbour (solely
on the basis of the ethnic background). It is an ideology which explains
that some groups of people are inferior to you and they deserve to be
treated differently but not all xenophobes are racist. It is true that some
xenophobes adopt a racist ideology to justify their thoughts about their
different neighbours, but not all. Most importantly, the slurring language
does not require the adoption of racism. The slurring language may well
be explained with xenophobia. Furthermore, the British who use the term
‘Frog’ are not basing derogation on race. Presumably, the British and the
French are of the same race; whatever the definition of race is.
At the same time, a view that takes xenophobia to be the basis of
the slurring language can well accommodate religious slurs. Concerning
religion, the trigger to xenophobia can be the strange religious customs
and traditions. As a result, the current view allows a rather wide range
of application, ranging from racist slurs to religious slurs.
The second aspect is that my view holds that slurs transmit conven-
tional and stereotypical information about the target. This allows to
widen the scope of application. Slurs transmit negative information about
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the target but this information is not a part of the (truth conditional)
meaning of slurs. Rather, the nature of the information is epistemic.
Slurs express the speaker’s negative thoughts and beliefs about the tar-
get. This mechanism of spreading negative information applies not only
to ethnic slurs but also to homophobic slurs and slurs based on gender.
1.6 Structure of the work




It would seem highly implausible that anyone suggested that the target
is the source of derogation. That would make the neutral term offensive
too. The views discussed oscillate between these sources of derogation.
However, the other important aspect is semantics. In fact, the general
exposition follows Figure 1.1. The general plot is the purging operation.
The story begins with the two views which posit the thickest relationship
between derogation and semantics and then proceeds to purging deroga-
tion from semantics. When the generic descriptivism is finally reached,
the derogatory influence on semantics is diluted to minimum.
Pure Expressivism
The first part of Chapter 2 investigates the possibility of pure expres-
sivism. The chapter discusses Joseph A. Hedger’s thinking. According to
him, slurs do not have descriptive content at all. Hence, slurring sentences
are not truth-apt. They do not have truth value while a corresponding
sentence with a neutral term is evaluated in terms of truth and falsity. Fol-
lowing Adam Croom, I will present linguistic evidence which suggest that




In the second part of Chapter 2, pure descriptivism is discussed. I will
begin the discussion with Hom and May’s version of pure descriptivism.
There are three main points about Hom and May’s pure descriptivism.
It denies the expressive dimension altogether and it explains derogation
through the stereotypes. Finally, pure descriptivism explains derogation
by truth conditional means. Slurring statements are systematically false.
The upshot of the discussion is that Hom and May’s descriptivism is
inconsistent with the presented linguistic evidence. The inconsistencies
in the face of the linguistic evidence suggest that Hom and May’s pure
descriptivism cannot explain the understanding of slurs.
I will proceed to discuss another form of pure descriptivism, Michael
Dummett’s inferentialist approach. He argues that while slurring terms
are not systematically false, there still is something wrong with the mean-
ing of slurs. His argument goes that abusive terms like slurs produce
non-harmonious inferential patterns. They allow inferences that do not
carry the warrants from the premises to the conclusions. Hence, slurs are
defective concepts. But as Williamson’s objection shows, even the lighter
version of pure descriptivism is inconsistent in the face of linguistic evi-
dence. The conclusion drawn from this is that slurs cannot be defective
concepts, not in the sense that Dummett intends them to be.
Facts over morality
One way to put the findings at this point is that facts concerning the use of
slurs trumps the moral stand against xenophobia. Admittedly, Hedger’s,
Hom and May’s and even Dummett’s intentions are good. They argue
that there is something wrong with the meaning of slurs. Thereby, they
argue either directly (as Hom and May do) or hint (like Dummet does)
that xenophobes are less competent language users than civilised people
are. As tempting as this conclusion is, I will deny the claim. There is
nothing wrong with the semantics of slurs. Slurs are co-extensional with
their neutral counterparts. As it is shown, this is the most compelling
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way to explain the understanding of slurs.
Moderate expressivism
Moderate expressivism is non-cognitivism par excellence. The underlying
point in moderate expressivism is that the truth conditional content of
slurs is the target but that content comes with ‘boo’ attitude. Hence
moderate expressivism subscribes to (i) but it denies (ii). Potts denies
(ii) because, according to him, people just do not know the strereotypes
of slurs. The ignorance is manifested as ineffability. Potts says that slurs
are descriptively ineffable which is typical for expressives in general. The
speaker’s inability to paraphrase slurs is the main reason why moderate
descriptivism denies stereotypes.
However, I do not think the argument from ineffability is conclusive
evidence against stereotypes, at least in the case of slurs. It is granted
that in the case of pure expressives such as ‘damn’ or ‘bastard’, the de-
scriptive content might be ineffable because it could be very well argued
that there is not any descriptive content to pure expressives. Neverthe-
less, even moderate expressivism holds that slurs have descriptive content,
namely the target. At the same time, it is argued here that there is, at
least, a moderate consensus about stereotypical characters conveyed by
slurs. Besides this, I will proceed to a much bolder claim. A xenophobic
slurring speaker can attribute very idiosyncratic stereotypes to the target
and those stereotypes contribute to derogation. At first sight, this seems
to contradict the automony claim presented earlier. Generic descriptivism
resolves the matter with its affinity with originalism. The speaker does
not need to know a specific definition to be a competent user. Accord-
ing to generic descriptivism, the speaker knows a lot: he or she knows
the target and the speaker knows that he or she can express his or her
xenophobic thoughts with slurs. So when we look at things more care-
fully, we can see that the contrast between moderate expressivism and
generic descriptivism holds. Moderate expressivism says that slurs are
expressions of xenophobic attitudes while generic descriptivism can still
hold that xenophobes think about the target in a derogatory way, even if
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that way of thinking is idiosyncratic.
This idea is made more explicit with a contrast to Robin Jeshion’s
moderate expressivism. She also denies that stereotypes contribute to
derogation. She holds that xenophobia is first and foremost an attitude
towards the target. But I will show that the evidence that she gives for
this view is not convincing. At any rate, generic descriptivism can account
for her examples better.
Moderate descriptivism
Moderate descriptivism includes the views of Predelli and Williamson.
First, Williamson continues his dialogue with Dummett’s inferentialism
and then Predelli’s Kaplan-inspired proposal is introduced. Both views
hold that the truth functional content is the target. At the same time and
in contrast to moderate expressivism, both views hold that the stereotype
contributes to derogation.
Generic descriptivism
The nature of derogation cannot explain the differences between moderate
descriptivism and generic descriptivism for the simple reason that they
both hold the same combination. The (truth functional) content of a slur
is the target and there is an expressive element to slurs.18 Finally, the
stereotype contributes to the expressive element. Hence, the stereotype
contributes to derogation. Williamson’s version could be even construed
as a version of cognitivism. He argues that the outcome of using slurs
such as ‘Frog’ is an implicature that
(32) The French are vulgar.
Hence, the implicature, at least, partially reveals that the user of ‘Frog’
believes that French are vulgar. However, Williamson denies that this is in
any way central to his view. His thought is that the belief that French are
18Even though generic descriptivism claims that the evidence for expressive element
is mostly inconclusive, generic descriptivism does admit that the use of slurs involve
perspective dependence which is an expressive feature, according to Potts.
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vulgar is just a by-product of the linguistic implicature. For Williamson
slurs are first and foremost about the use of language. In other words, the
study of slurs tells us something about language and how it works, not
about the psychology of xenophobia.
Predelli has a similar background assumption. His study of slurs is
specifically motivated by the interest in the relationship between truth
functional validity and expressive validity. His interest lays in extend-
ing the semantic toolbox: to see how the expressive dimension can be
incorporated to semantics. In this way, his motivation is in line with
moderate expressivism. It is also clear that Kaplan’s motivation is in the
background. Kaplan says that in his ”Ouch and Oops” he continues his
long-time project of trying to unmask semantic truths in epistemological
clothing. He illustrates this by saying that the connection between ‘ouch’
and “I am in pain” is purely semantic. I suspect that Predelli thinks that
this holds for slurs and their semantic witnesses too. This work agrees; but
just because there are no epistemic differences between the slur ‘Frog’ and
its semantic witness “the speaker holds that French are vulgar” is precisely
the reason to hold that there are epistemic differences between a slur and
its neutral counterpart. Even though there are no semantic differences.
1.7 Summary
We can categorise the rival views as pure views and moderate views. There
are things to learn from both camps, both good and bad. The good thing
about pure views is that they tie the confusion of xenophobia to slurs
but do this in the wrong way. According to my view, the badness of
xenophobia does not affect the truth conditional semantics of slurs.
In my view, moderate views are right about the truth conditional
semantics of slurs. A slur refers to whatever the neutral counterpart refers
to. However, moderate views claim that the study of slurs reveals first
and foremost something about language. According to Kaplan, his project
is to show that seemingly epistemic differences between expressives and
corresponding neutral expressions turn out to be semantic. My aim is
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precisely the opposite. I aim to show that between semantically identical
slurring terms and neutral counterparts there can be genuine epistemic






2.1.1 Hedger on slurs
In his “The Semantics of Racial Slurs” (2012), Joseph A. Hedger makes
an interesting proposal concerning the semantics of ethnic slurs. As a
starting point, Hedger makes a distinction between ‘asshole’ and ‘fucker’.
According to him, the assertion
(33) My neighbour is an asshole.
has a descriptive content. It says that speaker’s neighbour is not a nice
person. At the same time, it expresses the speaker’s contempt towards the
neighbour (for being the a-hole that he is). ‘Fucker’, on the other hand,
does not contribute in any descriptive way to the content of
(34) My neighbour is a fucker.
It merely expresses contempt towards the neighbour. In favour of an
expressive reading, Hedger says:
[W]e have no basis for arguing with someone who utters [34].
We may feel that the speaker’s hostile attitude is not war-
ranted, but we have nothing to say which is capable of demon-
strating that the neighbour is not a fucker. This is because
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‘fucker’ doesn’t describe the neighbour or say anything about
him. (Hedger 2012, 76-78.)
As a result, the sentence does not have a truth value at all. Hedger
wants to point out that there is “a sub-class of derogatory epithets which
lack any descriptive content whatsoever” such as ‘fucker’. (Hedger 2012,
76-77.) Hedger goes on to argue that slurs belong to this sub-class too.
Whether the specific contrast between ‘asshole’ and ‘fucker’ is accurate or
not, it is interesting to see how Hedger makes his case for slurs.
One of the central features of slurs is their projection behaviour. This
means that derogation projects out from the scope of truth conditional
operators. Thus, it poses a challenge for the truth conditional semantics.
For simplicity and brevity, I will discuss only negation at this stage.19
Consider the following:
(35) Prince Charles is a Frog. No, Prince Charles is not a Frog.20
Notice that the slurring effect is not cancelled by the negation. Even the
negation remains offensive. It seems that the negation does not succeed
in cancelling xenophobic language. The projection phenomenon suggests
that slurs have an expressive component to them and thus it seems that
they are not purely descriptive and hence they cannot be explained ex-
haustively with truth conditional semantics.
The projection behaviour is a stepping stone for Hedger. His example
is the following pair:
(36) a. Chirac is French.
b. Chirac is a Frog.
According to Hedger, these sentences differ in truth conditional meaning.
Both sentences express a complete thought but only (36a) is true. Since
the slurs in (36b) fails to describe Chirac in any way, it is not truth apt
at all. In Hedger’s terms (36b) “fails to offer sufficient descriptive content
to predicate anything of [Chirac]”. This view tries to accommodate the
19There is a detailed exposition of projection and related features of expressives in
Chapter 3.
20The example is borrowed from Mark Richard (2008, 12-13).
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thought that civilised people wish to condemn the content expressed by
(36b) and refuse to agree with it. (Hedger 2012, 77-78.)
Hedger’s thought is that slurs are on a par with honorifics like ‘sir’ or
‘miss’. These honorifics do not seem to describe the target in any way.
Although ‘sir’ applies to males and ‘miss’ applies to females, Hedger is
not happy to say that the extension of ‘sir’ is all males, as he would be
reluctant to address Hitler as sir. He concludes that honorifics also lack
extension all together. They only express admiration and respect. But
where honorifics express respect, slurs are the other side of expressive coin.
They express disrespect and contempt. Hedger concludes: “To sum up
our conclusion thus far, the truth about racial slurs is that they are not
truth apt”. (Hedger 2012, 78-79.)
2.1.2 Motivation for pure views
I think that it is important to make Hedger’s motivation for pure expres-
sivism explicit because both me and Hedger suspect that the other pure
view, pure descriptivism also shares a similar motivation. Hedger thinks
that it is unacceptable that many statements containing slurs are true.
He writes:
I think that logic, which is the basis for truth-conditional se-
mantics, is meant to be the science of reasoning, and should
adhere to norms of good reasoning. Part of my motivation for
wanting a semantic theory which doesn’t allow racist state-
ments to be true or to be validly inferred from neutral state-
ments is because this amounts to our accepting these sorts of
statements and inferences as somehow appropriate. (Hedger
2012, 79.)
After this he goes on to say that he suspects that Christopher Hom has
similar motivation behind his pure descriptivism.21 In both cases, the
motivations for the semantic view of slurs is moral.
21Of course, Hedger does not use the term ‘pure descriptivism’ as it is my term for
Hom’s view.
55
2.1.3 Croom’s objection to pure expressivism
Let us start with the following observation. The consequence of Hedger’s
view is that the N-word is offensive regardless of the target. He says that
it does not matter whether the target is a person of Swedish descent or a
black person. (Hedger 2012, 78.) I find this implausible. As a person of
(neighbouring) Finnish descent, my reaction to the N-word (when applied
to me) would probably be to wonder whether the person knows what
the slur means. In any case, I would imagine that there is a dramatic
difference when applied to a white Finnish person and when applied to a
black person.
Adam Croom’s thoughts confirm my intuition. In his response “Re-
marks on ‘The Semantics of racial Slurs’” (Croom 2014, 11-32), Croom
brings forth no less than 13 objections to Hedger’s proposal. Here I will
concentrate on one which seems to be the most important and is enough
to show that Hedger’s view cannot accommodate the linguistic evidence
concerning slurs, despite the admirable motivation.
Croom says that Hedger might be right in his analysis concerning
‘fucker’ but if so, then he demonstrates that slurs are closer to ‘ass-
hole’ which comprises expressive content and descriptive content. Croom
presents the following case against purely expressive treatment. Let us
start with the following pair
(37) a. Max is a fucker. But I deny saying anything about his [X].
b. Max is French. But I deny saying anything about [X].
Imagine that [X] represents a variable which ranges over descriptive con-
tent, i.e. you can substitute the variable only with descriptive content.
The substitution to purely descriptive content then blocks the felicity
(37b) but not the felicity of (37a). That tells that in (38b) the attribution
to Max is not purely expressive. Observe:
(38) a. Max is a fucker. But I deny saying anything about his [eth-
nicity].
b. Max is French. #But I deny saying anything about his [eth-
nicity].
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This seems obvious. Let us now broaden our examples
(39) a. Max is a fucker. But I deny saying anything about his [X].
b. Maxine is French. But I deny saying anything about his [X].
c. Max is a Frog. But I deny saying anything about his [X].
and then do the same substitution:
(40) a. Max is a fucker. But I deny saying anything about his [eth-
nicity].
b. Max is French. #But I deny saying anything about his [eth-
nicity].
c. Max is a Frog. #But I deny saying anything about his [eth-
nicity].
Croom explains that in the (a) cases, the descriptive features of the target
are inessential since the speaker is expressing her own attitude towards the
target. This confirms that Hedger is right in his analysis of ‘fucker’. But
the triplet in (40) shows, on the one hand, the distance between (40a) and
(40c) and, on the other hand, the similarity between (40b) and (40c). In
addition to (40c) being offensive, it is also infelicitous in a similar manner
as (40b). Both are infelicitous since the speaker is saying something about
Max’s ethnicity. Furthermore, it seems that ‘fucker’ and ‘damn’ do not
differ in descriptive content but there seems to be compelling case to
distinguish between the descriptive content of ‘Frog’ and ‘bitch’, as Croom
shows. consider again a variant of the triplet:
(41) a. Maxine is a fucker. But I deny saying anything about her
[gender].
b. Maxine is a Frog. But I deny saying anything about her [gen-
der].
c. Maxine is a bitch. #But I deny saying anything about her
[gender].
When the descriptive content is not about ethnicity, (41b) becomes felic-
itous (although offensive). Hence, there is a difference in the descriptive
content of slurs like ‘Frog’ and ‘bitch’.
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In sum, slurs do refer to social groups. Croom repeats Luvell Anderson
and Ernest Lepore’s point in “Slurring Words”:
[There is a category of slurs] that target groups on the basis
of race (‘nigger’), nationality (‘kraut’), religion (‘kike’), gen-
der (‘bitch’), sexual orientation (‘fag’), immigrant status (‘wet-
back’) and sundry other demographics (Anderson and Lepore
2013a, 25).
But ‘fucker’ does not insult the target on the basis of any of these things.
Hence, Hedger’s pure expressivism does not work because ethnic slurs do
have a descriptive content. This claim is highly plausible when the basic
behaviour of slurs is examined.
2.2 Varieties of pure descriptivism
In the remainder of this chapter, we will take a look at two forms of
pure descriptivism: Christopher Hom and Robert May’s view on slurs
and Michael Dummett’s inferentialist approach. The key idea in Hom
and May’s view is an asymmetry between the xenophobic understanding
and the civilised understanding. According to the view, the xenophobes
are less competent speakers because they attach wrong truth conditions to
the slurring sentences. Slurring sentences are systematically false but the
xenophobes think they are true. I will go on to show that this view is not
supported by the understanding of slurs. Particularly, it is not supported
by the civilised understanding. This is somewhat ironic since Hom and
May’s central question concerns the civilised understanding.
After this I will consider Dummett’s inferentialist view. I see Dum-
mett’s view as a weaker version of pure descriptivism. It does not say
that slurring sentences are systematically false but claims that there is
still something wrong with them. Inferentialism is based on the idea that
the inference patterns coverning a given concept ground the meaning of
that concept. Given this, Dummett claims that there is something wrong
with the inference patterns of slurs. Hence, he is saying that there is some-
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thing wrong with the meaning of slurs. Following Williamson, I conclude
that Dummett’s version does not work either.
Previously, I claimed that slurs divide the speakers to civilised speak-
ers and to xenophobic speakers. The concluding lesson of the chapter
could be said to be that pure descriptivism is challenged from both direc-
tions. Even though Hom and May’s version aims at explaining the civilised
understanding, it cannot explain it. Whereas, Dummett’s inferentialism
aims at explaining the xenophobic thinking (or aims at explaining what is
wrong with it) but it does not succeed in this task as Williamson shows.22
2.3 Hom and May on slurs
2.3.1 Semantic and moral innocence
According to Hom and May (2013), the most important question with
slurs is
How can a competent, rational speaker know the meaning of a slur
without being committed to, or even complicit with, xenophobic
attitudes?
The general outline of Hom and May’s view is encapsulated with the
following claims (or truths as Hom and May call them):
1. No Germans are Boches.
2. There are no Boche.
3. There are Germans.
According to Hom and May, the claims from 1 to 3 form the core of
semantic innocence. The idea behind semantic innocence is that although
the term ‘German’ refers to the set of German people, the slurring term
‘Boche’ does not refer to anything. Hence, everything expressed with this
term comes out false.
22Even though this is not the last word on the fate of inferentialism as it is revisited
later on. But Williamson’s point will do at this stage.
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Semantic innocence relies on moral innocence which is the thesis that
“there are no morally evaluable traits (good or bad) that are heritable on
the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, and the like”. Hom and May
continue:
Accordingly, there can be no terms that are satisfied in virtue
of there being individuals having those traits. There are no
kikes because there is no one who ought to be the object of
negative moral evaluation just because they are Jewish. (Hom
and May 2013, 295.)
Semantic innocence, the thesis that slurring utterances are false, follows
from moral innocence, from the thesis that no-one should be treated neg-
atively on the basis of their ethnicity and so on.
2.3.2 Semantics of slurs
The a priori moral truth of moral innocence (no one should be evaluated
negatively on the basis of their heritage) leads to the null extension.23
There are no ‘Frogs’ because there is no one ought to be the object of
negative moral evaluation just because they are French. (Hom and May
2013, 295.) The null extension then leads to semantic innocence, to the
thesis that the slurring utterances are false. When the extension of slurring
terms are empty, the atomic sentences containing them are false.
Hom and May introduce a formal tool to track the behaviour of slurs.
Intensionally, it is something like
(PEJ) (Individual) x ought to be the target of negative moral evaluation
and hence ought to be treated differently because of being (a member
of social kind or group) X.
Extensionally, it is
JPEJK: A function which takes the extension of a predicate expression
to an empty set.
23This was pointed out to me by Franz Knappik at the Humbolt University - King’s
College Workshop which was held in May 2015 in London.
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I will say a few clarifying points about the intensional side later on (in
relation to the two concerns) but now I will concentrate on the extensional
side.
PEJ denotes a second-level function that applies to a first-level con-
cept, i.e. to predicates like ethnicity, religion, . . . . So if F is a neutral
predicate for ethnicity, then PEJ(F) is a slurring term for F. If we have
a neutral term, such as the French, then Hom and May’s lexical analysis
of ‘Frog’ is PEJ(French). Hom and May point out that while PEJ(X) is
unambiguous, there is a variation in the expressions of PEJ(X). It can be
expressed with a single word such as ‘Frog’ but it can also be expressed
by combining a neutral term with a pejorative term such as ‘dirty Jew’.
It can even be expressed with extralinguistic markers such as tone and
gestures which accompany the utterance of the neutral term. For exam-
ple, one can give the ‘one finger salute’ while uttering the neutral term.24
(Hom and May 2013, 298.)
Hom and May exploit the behaviour of predicate modifiers. The sen-
tence
(42) Jack is a small elephant.
can be analysed at least in two ways. According to the conjunctive anal-
ysis, (42) comprises a conjunction of
(43) Jack is small and Jack is an elephant.
However, the problem with the analysis is that the conjunction entails
that Jack is small but Jack is an elephant and thus Jack is not small. A
mouse or an ant is small but even the smallest elephants are quite big. It
is just that Jack is small for an elephant. The predicate modifier analysis
respects the intuition that Jack is small for an elephant. According to this
analysis, ‘small’ is a predicate modifier that takes the extension of ‘x is a
elephant’ to a subset of elephants, namely to the set of small elephants.
However, sometimes the modifier does not take the extension to a subset
24As already noted, I am a bit sceptical about this idea. Rather, I will take it that
PEJ turns the neutral term into a conventionallly recognised slur, into an epithet. For
example, PEJ(French) stands for ‘Frog’.
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of the original set. This is the case with a predicate modifier like ‘toy’.
When applied to predicate ‘x is an elephant’, you do not get a subset
of elephants but something completely different as toy elephants are not
a subset of elephants but, presumably, a subset of toys. In the case of
‘toy’, the predicate modifier analysis provides another advantage over the
conjunctive analysis. It seems that for the sentence
(44) Jack is a toy elephant,
the conjunctive analysis offers the following conjunction:
(45) Jack is a toy and Jack is an elephant
which again entails that Jack is an elephant. However, the item in question
hardly is an elephant. It is a toy.
Bearing this in mind, Hom and May suggest that PEJ should be com-
pared with expressions like ‘fictional’ or ‘magical’. These take the exten-
sion (whatever it is) to an empty set. Surely, there are horses but there
are no magical horses. The extension of the expression ‘magical horse’ is
null.
Hom and May say that ‘magical’ brings out another useful comparison
with PEJ. They say that ontologically ‘magical’ carries a false assump-
tion “about the causal structure of the world”. They continue: “Nothing
is magical, so ‘magical’ as a modifier term, drains extensionality”. In a
similar manner, PEJ drains the extension but for a different reason. Ac-
cording to Hom and May, PEJ is ideologically, not ontologically, “loaded
with false assumptions about the social and ethical structure of the world”.
(Hom and May 2013, 299.) No one ought to be the target of a negative
moral evaluation because of their ethnicity or gender or so on as PEJ
suggests. The most important consequence of the proposal is that atomic
statements containing slurs always come out false: The xenophobes “are
not only wrong in the normative [moral] sense, but also wrong about
the world in falsely attributing [stereotypical] properties to people” (Hom
2008, 437).25
25I think that two clarifying points are worth emphasising. First, Hom and May seem
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Hom and May think that the understanding of slurs hinges on getting
the moral reality right. On the one hand, the xenophobes believe that
slurs are general terms that have a non-empty extension. That is, they
believe that there are people who deserve to be treated negatively on the
basis of their ethnicity. But they are wrong. Their beliefs go against the
universal moral truth that no one deserves to treated differently on the ba-
sis of their ethnicity. This fact makes the xenophobes, at least partially,
incompetent speakers. The xenophobes “are linguistically incompetent
as [xenophobic] knowledge does not issue the right truth-conditions con-
taining pejoratives” (Hom and May 2013, 297). On the other hand, the
civilised speakers understand correctly the meaning of slurs in that they
assign the correct truth values to sentences containing slurring terms.
Both parties do grasp the same concept but it is the difference in morality
that yields the difference in truth values. The civilised people know the
universal moral truth that produces the null extension of slurs: no one
should be treated differently simply on the basis of ethnicity. (Hom and
May 2013, 297.)26
to be concentrating on a straightforward correspondence notion of truth and they do
not think that fictional statements can be be true in this correspondence sense.
Secondly, as Hom quite rightly emphasises, the falsity concerns only atomic state-
ments: “Atomic predications with epithets will always be false [. . . ]” (Hom 2008, 437).
This is an important clarification because according to Hom and May’s view the fol-
lowing quantified statements:
∀x (PEJ(French)(x) → French(x))
∀x (PEJ(French)(x) → ¬French(x))
are both true just because the antecedent is false. I owe both of these points to Peter
Sutton.
26In Hom’s earlier work (which is discussed below), he says that his treatment of
slurs is influenced by Bernard Williams in that Hom regards slurs to be thick concepts,
combining a normative and a descriptive component into the analysis of slurs (Hom
2012, 394). It is a point worth making that the view on thickness is a branch of cogni-
tivism and it is targeted very much against non-cognitivism. It is clear that Hom and
May consider slurs to be first and foremost moral concepts in McDowell’s sense. This
is somewhat surprising since the received view of McDowell-style thickness is that it
does not affect slurs. In contrast to this, Hom and May go on to extent McDowell’s
view also to slurs. The sense of a slur contains a moral evaluation of the target (which
the neutral term does not contain) and given the right moral view, the evaluation influ-
ences the extension of the slurring term. This coheres with Williams’ argument when
he explicates McDowell’s point. Williams’ basic idea of the entanglement challenge
remains the same: The evaluation influences the extension.
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2.4 Two concerns
2.4.1 Understanding of slurs
Hom and May say that their main objective is to explain the civilised
understanding of slurs but it seems to me that there are some concerns
regarding this objective. Observe first the following discussion between
civilised Mary and xenophobic Jill:
(46) Mary: Hi Jill, do you know who were at the party yesterday?
Jill: Yes, there were a few Frogs and that Boche and . . .
Then imagine that later on Mary is asked about the party and she says:
(47) I heard there were a few Frenchmen and that German guy and . . .
On the basis of the conversation, it seems clear that Mary understands
Jill’s xenophobic utterance. That is because later when she was asked
about the party, she does not want to repeat Jill’s xenophobic words but
manages to explain who were at the party by using the neutral words.
Hence, the conversation addresses the main objective of Hom and May’s
project, to explain the civilised understanding. However, it is my con-
tention that their view does not provide a very good explanation for this.
It seems to me that there are two concerns about Hom and May’s view:
1. Entailment concern.
2. Aboutness concern
Admittedly, both of these are related to the civilised understanding but
there is a difference between them. In my view, the difference is crucial
because Hom and May address the aboutness concern and they seem to
think that this response is enough to explain the civilised understand-
ing. My argument is that their response to the aboutness concern is not
enough to explain the civilised understanding. Rather, certain entailment
patterns do explain the understanding but Hom and May cannot make
use of these patterns because they hold that slurring sentences are sys-
tematically false. First, we will look at the inference patterns and then we
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will see how Hom and May try to by-pass these patterns by providing an
explanation for the civilised understanding by addressing the aboutness
concern. The conclusion is that the response is not enough to explain the
civilised understanding. Finally, the concern about entailment is revisited
in the context of Hom’s previous work.
2.4.2 Entailment concern
In his “The Meaning of Ouch and Oops” (“Ouch and Oops” from now
on)27, David Kaplan makes a point about the inferences concerning ex-
pressives. His famous example is that the inference from (48) to (49):
(48) That damn Kaplan was promoted
(49) Kaplan was promoted
is valid. However, the converse is not. Kaplan points out that although
truth conditionally the premise and the conclusion are equivalent, there
is a difference which blocks the converse inference. The premise contains
more information, namely the expressive evaluation, which is not present
in the conclusion. Kaplan’s conclusion is that while truth is immune to
epithetical colour, the expressive content can affect logic in a way which
Kaplan calls information delimitation. For Kaplan, validity is a matter
of limiting semantic information in an inference. Good inferences should
never add information halfway through the inference as does the infer-
ence from (49) to (48). Good inferences only manipulate information
already there, never add information. The crucial point is that, accord-
ing to Kaplan’s view, there are no truth conditional differences between
(48) and (49) because the terms ‘Kaplan’ and ‘that damn Kaplan’ are
co-extensional. That is, the extra information in (48) is non-truth condi-
tional.
27This is an unpublished work but Kaplan has presented it as a talk many times
and there are several transcripts of these talks circulating. For this reason, “Ouch and
Oops” is only referred as ‘ms’ short for manuscript. Also the page numbers are omitted
since many of the transcripts do not contain page numbers or if they do, the numbering
varies.
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Kaplan also seems to be sympathetic to the idea that truth can ac-
count for information delimitation. According to this thought, there is
a narrower notion of truth which recognises only descriptive content and
then there is what Kaplan calls truth-plus. This is a kind of “truth with
an attitude” which can account for expressive information. However, Ka-
plan still challenges the view that logical consequence is based on a more
secure notion of truth:
The important point is that although we may have differing,
even shaky, intuitions about truth, we –or at least, I– have
more stable intuitions about logical consequence. These have
been ignored because of the nearly universal, and according
to me, fallacious, assumption that the notion of logical con-
sequence is derivative from the more secure notion of truth.
(Kaplan ms.)
Rather, logical consequence is based on information delimitation, accord-
ing to Kaplan. The refined conclusion then is that while truth (in the
narrow sense) is immune to epithetical colour, the expressive information
affects validity which is based on semantic delimitation. Most impor-
tantly, even the notion of truth-plus is based on logical consequence, not
the other way round.
It seems that Hom and May cannot account for the distinctive inferen-
tial patterns of slurs. They hold that slurring sentences are systematically
false. So any inference with a slurring sentence as a premise is indeed valid
but it is trivially so because the validity flows from unsoundness, i.e. from
false premises. One obvious explanation for Mary’s understanding in (46)
and (47) is that she draws a conclusion similar to (49). Hom and May, on
the other hand, cannot say this as they hold that slurs are systematically
false. In the next subsection, we will see how Hom and May try to explain
the civilised understanding while still holding that the inference patterns
are unsound.
But before that, I need to anticipate a later development and distin-
guish my aims from Kaplan’s. Kaplan aims to explain the asymmetry
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between the inference from (48) to (49) and the inference from (49) to
(48). Whereas, my aim is just to explain the validity from (48) and (49).
For this end, the co-extensionality between the slurring term and the
neutral term is enough and there is no need to mention informational de-
limitation. As far as I am concerned, Kaplan’s most important point is
that the semantic understanding of slurring words is sensitive to the fact
that the slurring words refer to whatever the neutral words refer to. In
my view, this is a crucial point in Kaplan’s thought and I think that it
is the underlying point in Mary’s and Jill’s conversation. So the point
against Hom and May is that the xenophobes may be morally confused
when they use slurs but the moral confusion does not make them linguis-
tically incompetent. Linguistically, the xenophobes are perfectly capable
of expressing their confused ideas.
2.4.3 Aboutness concern
Hom and May anticipate one worry concerning their view. They label it
the aboutness objection. As a first approximation, we have already seen
that Hom and May think that the xenophobes and the civilised speakers
both grasp the same slurring concept but only the civilised speakers realise
that the content of slurring concept is empty. The aboutness objection is
against this thought. Hom and May themselves express it in this way:
[S]urely racist users of such words manage to say (and are un-
derstood to say) derogatory things about something, namely
members of their target class–after all, isn’t someone who ut-
ters “Kikes are usurious” saying something about Jews? (Hom
and May 2013, 302.)
However, Hom and May hold that this objection stems from a fundamental
misunderstanding regarding the linguistic nature of slurs. Hom and May
appeal to Frege’s distinction between a concept and the characteristic
marks of a concept. On the one hand, there is a concept and, on the
other hand, there are properties which the object must have in order to
fall under the concept. Frege calls these properties characteristic marks.
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If a concept is defined on the basis of characteristic marks, that itself
does not guarantee that something falls under the concept. According
to Hom and May, this is exactly the case with slurring terms. When
‘French’ occurs in PEJ(French), it is a characteristic mark of the pejorative
concept. However, if a characteristic mark of a concept is instantiated, it
is not sufficient for the instantiation of the whole concept. For example,
if the property ‘squareness’ is instantiated, it certainly is not enough to
instantiate ‘rectangular square’. The term ‘rectangular square’ has no
extension. ‘Square’ has an extension, but ‘rectangular square’ does not.
Still squareness is a characteristic mark of ‘rectangular square’. (See Frege
1964, 11-12.) In a similar fashion, ‘Jew’ has an extension while PEJ(Jew)
does not. In this sense then, the characteristic marks of the pejorative
concept “fix the target of pejoration”. “It makes PEJ(Jew) be about
Jews, and not about some other group”. In essence:
Statements that contain pejorative terms are about their in-
tended targets because those targets satisfy the characteristic
marks of pejorative concepts, not because they fall under those
concepts. (Hom and May 2013, 302.)
I think that Hom and May are trying to say that even if the target sat-
isfies some of the characteristic marks, that is not enough for the term
to denote the target. Hom and May’s conclusion is that the response to
the aboutness objection does provide an insight how the civilised peo-
ple understand slurs. It is my interpretation that Hom and May think
that the response to the aboutness objection shows that they do not need
to worry about soundness as their response shows that they can explain
the civilised understanding even in the case the civilised inferences are
unsound. However, I am not so sure whether they have explained the
civilised understanding. Let us consider the analogue they present, the
analogue between PEJ(X) and a rectangular square. When a speaker
talks about rectangular squares, it is not very clear what the person is
talking about. Is the speaker talking about squares? In an everyday con-
versation, when someone starts to talk about rectangular squares, it is
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not that obvious that the speaker is talking about real squares. Whereas
it is perfectly clear that when someone talks about ‘Boches’, the speaker
is talking about the Germans. This shows that there is a disanalogy be-
tween the conversation between Mary and Jill and the conversation about
rectangular squares. It is my conclusion that more is needed to explain
the civilised understanding of slurs.
As a summary of the discussion so far, one could say that we have
two rival explanations for the civilised understanding of slurs. These ex-
planations correspond with the two concerns. On the one hand, we have
Kaplanian explanation which utilises the co-extensionality of the slurring
term and the neutral term. This explanation takes the entailment con-
cern seriously. It is also clear that this takes care of the aboutness concern
since the co-extensionality thesis says that a slurring term and its neutral
counterpart refer to the same thing. On the other hand, Hom and May
take only the aboutness concern seriously and aim to explain the under-
standing from this perspective. I presented my reservations towards this
response. At the very least, it is much weaker explanation for the civilised
understanding than the Kaplanian explanation. In the light of this, my
final conclusion is that it seems clear that Hom and May are not interested
in explaining the inference patterns but they should be as the inference
patterns provide better explanation for the civilised understanding.
2.5 Entailment revisited: Hom’s original
view
2.5.1 Hom’s combinatorial externalism
Before writing the joint paper with May, Hom made a proposal concerning
slurs in his seminal “Racial Epithets” (2008). Some aspects in these pro-
posals are the same. Notably, they are both based on McDowell’s view on
thickness, i.e. the moral evaluation and the extension of a slur are entan-
gled. However, there are also differences and, in my view, these differences
at least partly explain the difference in explaining the understanding. So
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it might be a good idea to start with a general view of Hom’s original
proposal and then track the key differences when compared to the pro-
posal Hom made with May. The main reason to discuss Hom’s original
proposal is that he also discusses the entailment concern but, according
to my assessment, Hom does not provide a successful solution.
Hom begins his exposition by noting that, according to his semantic
externalism, meaning is not completely determined by the internal mental
states of individual speakers. According to Hom, semantic externalism is
the thesis that meaning is “at least partly dependent on the external,
social practices of the speaker’s community”. Hom goes on to argue that
a speaker must also stand in the relevant causal relation to the world.
(Hom 2008, 430.) Hom refers to two prominent expositions of a causal
theory of reference. These are Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (1972)
and Putnam’s “The Meaning of ‘meaning’” (1975). Both of these develop
a causal theory of reference and both of them subscribe to a Millian view
about the content. With May, Hom adheres to a Fregean view. This
might be a crucial difference as the later Fregean framework provides a
response to the aboutness problem and Hom and May seem to think that
this explains completely the civilised understanding. But in the earlier
work, Hom does not have the “Fregean luxury”. So he needs to think
about the inference patterns.
Given that semantic externalism is on the background, Hom goes on to
argue for Combinatorial externalism. He characterises it in the following
way:
(CE) Racial epithets express complex, socially constructed, negative
properties determined in virtue of standing in the appropriate ex-
ternal, causal connection with racist institutions. The meanings of
epithets are supported and semantically determined by their corre-
sponding institutions.
The racist institutions in the characterisation are a combination of two
entities:
1. Ideology is a set of (usually) negative beliefs about particular people.
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2. Set of racist practices can range from impolite social treatment to
genocide.
These are, of course, closely related as Hom points out: Racists often
justify and motivate their racist practices with a racist ideology. (Hom
2008, 431.) According to Hom, the derogatory content is derived from
the racist social institutions, meaning that these institutions ground the
meanings of slurs. The content of a slur itself is the following complex
(i.e. combinatorial) property:
ought to be subject p1 + . . . + pn because of being d1 + . . . + dn all
because of being NT.
Here p1 . . . pn are deontic prescriptions for actions derived from racist
social practices and d1 . . . dn are negative properties derived from the
racist ideology and NT is the neutral term. For example, when the above
formula of content is applied to a slur ‘Frog’, we get something like:
ought to be placed in one of the lesser tables in a restaurant because
of being vulgar all because of being French.
The main difference to Hom and May’s joint proposal is the absence of
the two dimensional Fregean semantics. There is no intension which de-
termines the semantic value. Instead, the moral evaluation is a part of
the semantic value. In Hom and May’s proposal, it was only a part of
the intension of PEJ which then determined the extension of PEJ as a
function which takes the extension of the original predicate to an empty
extension. Whereas here the extension of ‘Frog’ is ”ought to be placed
in one of the lesser tables because of being vulgar all because of being
French”. However, the main consequence of this proposal remains the
same:
[W]hile racial epithets are entirely meaningful, the properties
expressed by them have null extension. [. . . ] Atomic predica-
tions with epithets will always be false because no one is in the
extension of the corresponding complex racist property. This
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seems to be correct result: atomic racist claims will always be
false. (Hom 2008, 437.)
While the neutral term ‘French’ refers to the French people, the reference
of the slurring term is null because of the moral evaluation which the slur
contains. Hence, the idea of robust thickness that cognitivism put forward
is still alive.
2.5.2 Orthodox and non-orthodox occurrences
In his “Puzzle about Pejoratives” (2012), Hom argues that the behaviour
of pejoratives can be differentiated to orthodox and non-orthodox occur-
rences. Hom says that the orthodox occurrences have at least two distin-
guishing features:
1. Orthodox occurrences project out from the scope of truth condi-
tional operators.
2. Orthodox occurrences do not make truth conditional contributions.
Consider again:
(50) Prince Charles is a Frog. No, Prince Charles is not a Frog.
The slurring effect is not cancelled by the negation. In (50), the negation
does not succeed in cancelling the xenophobic effect of the slur. The
following is even worse:
(51) Prince Charles is a Frog. No, he is a Limey.
If the purpose is to cancel the offensive part, (51) does it poorly. It not
only insults the French but manages to insult the English too.
The second feature is that slurs do not make a truth functional con-
tribution. The pair
(52) a. That damn Kaplan was promoted.
b. Kaplan was promoted.
have the same truth conditional content. This is a direct consequence of
the co-extensionality between ‘Kaplan’ and ‘that damn Kaplan’.
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However, Hom’s contention is that the orthodox occurrences must be
distinguished from non-orthodox occurrences because non-orthodox oc-
currences do make a truth conditional contribution. Hom thinks that
with this distinction, he can account for the inferential patterns which are
distinctive to expressives and to slurs in particular. He gives the following
examples:
(53) If John fucks up another project, the managing partner will fire
him for it.
(54) John fucked the managing partner’s daughter, and was fired for it.
In these examples, the expressives do seem to genuinely contribute to the
truth conditions. However, there is an important qualification. It seems
natural to interpret these as true if the state of affairs are appropriate:
John is fired because he messed up another project in (53) and the con-
junction in (54) is satisfied but Hom disagrees. He thinks that strictly
speaking (54) is false and (53) is always true because the antecedent is
always false.
Hom’s aim is to come up with a unified theory of expressives. At the
base, Hom has his combinatorial externalism and he builds his unified
theory of expressives on that. He first generalises his treatment of ethnic
slurs to a treatment of pejorative terms in general. As explained above,
for Hom the content of slurs is
ought to be subject p1 + . . . + pn because of being d1 + . . . + dn all
because of being NT.
Hom says that this content can then be extended to pejorative terms in
general. For example, the term ‘fuck’ is a term which contains a deon-
tic prescription, ideological properties which are norms surrounding pre-
marital sex for conservative social institutions and finally there is the
neutral term of ‘having sex’. As a consequence, we have the following
illuminating explanation:
So to say that John fucked Mary is to say (something like) that
they each ought to be scorned, ought to go to hell, ought to be
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treated as less desirable (if female), ought to be treated as more
desirable (if male), ought to be treated as damaged (if female),
. . . , for being sinful, unchaste, lustful, impure, . . . because of
having sexual intercourse with each other (Hom 2012, 395).
It is crucial to bear in mind that the analogue between slurs and pejorative
terms in general should be taken quite literally. The key elements are
in place in the generalised account too. Just like slurs are empty, so
are general pejorative terms like ‘fuck’. No one should be scorned or
treated as damaged for being sinful or impure just because he or she
has sex with someone but that is what the pejorative term suggests. Hom
points out: “The resulting empty extension for pejoratives is parallel to the
analysis that CE [combinatorial externalism] gives for slurs” (Hom 2012,
396). In the case of ‘fuck’ it is just that the word is more appropriated
because people do not subscribe to strict religious ideologies any more.
Nevertheless, a speaker who utters
(55) Fucking is not worse than making love. They are the same thing!
is making a mistake. The high appropriation of ‘fuck’ just conceals that.
2.5.3 Conversational implicature strategy
I think the previous view is far from plausible. According to my intuition,
it is natural to accept (53) and (54) as true or false, depending on the
circumstances. But if we leave that aside, we can move on to Hom’s main
point about the inference patterns. On the basis of the previous view,
Hom makes a proposal that aims to account for the inferences related to
slurs. He makes a distinction between literal non-orthodox occurrences
and non-literal non-orthodox occurrences. In the case of non-literal non-
orthodox occurrences, the literal content serves as a base to generate a
metaphoric content. So in
(56) John fucked up another case.
the speaker is using the term ‘fuck up’ in metaphoric way, drawing from a
complex ideological relation which suggests that ‘fucking’ has something
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to do with being damaged or devalued. Given this, Hom then goes on
to make use of Gricean conversational implicature to explain the ortho-
dox occurrences, i.e. the occurrences which project out, (do not make a
truth conditional contribution). Hom invites us to consider the following
orthodox occurrences:
(57) The dog is on the fucking couch.
(58) Heidi and Spencer are a fucking couple.
Hom admits that in these sentences the occurrences of the pejoratives are
non-truth conditional. That is the metaphoric reading. However, Hom
insists that there is also the literal truth conditional reading which says
something like:
(59) The dog is on the fucking couch (i.e. on the couch where morally
questionable sex occurs).
(60) Heidi and Spencer are a fucking couple (i.e. they have morally
questionable sex).
The question for Hom now is why the metaphoric and non-truth condi-
tional readings are much more plausible for a hearer of (57) and (58). In
his answer, Hom appeals to Gricean conversational maxims. According
to him, what happens is that the hearer arrives to the conversationally
implicated content with the following “calculation”:
1. Why would the speaker talk about a couch where morally imper-
missible sex occurs?
2. I do not believe that the speaker is opting out of being communica-
tively cooperative.
3. So there must be a relevant interpretation that she is intending for
me to grasp.
4. Since sexual intercourse isn’t relevant in this context, the speaker
must be expressing her extreme (either positive or negative) judge-
ment of the current situation with the dog on the couch, to the same
degree of severity as the negative attitudes associated with fucking.
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Armed with this machinery, Hom goes on to tackle the Kaplanian inference
patterns:
Kaplan [. . . ] points out that while inferences like (44) appear
to be valid, inferences like (45) do not:
(44) Heidi and Spencer are a fucking couple.
Therefore, Heidi and Spencer are a couple.
(45) Heidi and Spencer are a couple.
Therefore, Heidi and Spencer are a fucking couple.
[. . . ] The view under consideration has the virtue of a straight-
forward account for such inferences. If Heidi and Spencer are a
couple having morally impermissible sexual intercourse, then
it logically follows in (44) that Heidi and Spencer are a cou-
ple. But from Heidi and Spencer being a couple, it does not
logically follow in (45) that they are a couple having morally
impermissible sexual intercourse. (Hom 2012, 400-401.)
It seems that Hom thinks that his view does explain the inference patterns
but that is very questionable.
2.5.4 Two readings and a dilemma for Hom
To me, the entailment is still a problem. To recapitulate, Hom thinks that
there are two readings for “The dog is on the fucking couch”. Hence we
have two different sets of truth conditions: The truth conditions for the
non-literal reading are
(TCN) “The dog is on the fucking couch” is true iff the dog is on the
couch.
where the speaker expresses her annoyance for the situation with the word
‘fuck’ but this is not a part of the truth conditional content of the sentence.
The truth conditions for the literal reading are
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(TCL) “The dog is on the fucking couch” is true iff the dog is on a couch
where questionable sex occurs.
Hom clearly takes TCL reading to be the basis of his defence and goes
on to argue that when TCL reading is the premise, the inference is good.
Surely, Hom is right in saying that the inference from “the dog is on the
fucking couch” to “the dog is on the couch” is valid but not for the rea-
sons he says. It is valid because the premise is false as TCL readings are
systematically false, at least on Hom’s account. So the question we need
to ask is “Does (44) in the quotation really present good logical deduc-
tion on any standard account?” To me, it does not. In terms of validity,
you can infer anything from a contradiction but that does not mean that
contradictions are alright. Quite the opposite, just because contradictions
entail everything, they are bad. Similarly, when the premise set includes
false sentences, you can substitute the conclusion with any sentence and
the inference remains valid. This hardly is what logical entailment means
in any serious sense. In logical entailment, the idea is that a true conclu-
sion logically follows from true premises. The analogue between (44) in the
quotation and contradictions should be taken quite literally. The inference
A & not-A
A
is an instance of an absurdity rule which surely is a valid rule in clas-
sical logic. But it is valid because the counterexample set {A & not-A,
not-A} is inconsistent with any assignment, no matter what the conclusion
is. A contradiction like “A & not-A” is guaranteed to be false on logi-
cal grounds. The constant falsity stems from the logical rules governing
negation and conjunction. (That is, the content of A does not matter.)
The contradictory premise ensures the inconsistency alone. So it does
not matter what the conclusion is. Hence, contradictions entail every-
thing and thus should be avoided. In an analogous way, Hom thinks that
slurring statements are systematically false. On Hom’s account, slurring
sentences are false on semantic grounds, not on logical grounds. (Namely,
the content of A matters.) However, the crucial point is that both con-
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tradictions and slurring sentences are systematically false. The upshot is
that semantically unsound inferences should be avoided: No matter what
the conclusion is, the inference remains valid. In relation to the inferences
(44) and (45) in the quotation, Hom notes that any non-truth conditional
view must either posit some further mechanisms to explain the validity
(like Kaplan does with his informational delimitation) “or else develop
some kind of error theory for explaining our mistaken logical intuitions”
(Hom 2012, 401). But it seems to me that Hom needs to explain how
unsound inferences are good.
It could be that Hom is mistaken in the readings because, with TCN
reading, things would be more plausible. The metaphorical reading is
true just in the case the dog is on the couch and this is enough to explain
(44) in the quotation. However, the problem is that this would not do
in the case slurs. Hom (and May) have adamantly insisted that slurs
are systematically false and they have never suggested that there is a
metaphorical reading in the case of slurs to accommodate some of the
intuitions concerning the inference patterns of slurs. So with the help of
the two readings, you can set up a dilemma for Hom. The dilemma can
be highlighted with slurs. On the one horn, If Hom admits that slurs have
a TCN reading then the soundness of the inferences can be saved but, on
the down side, Hom has to give up the idea that sentences involving slurs
are always false which is very much his core thesis. The soundness of the
inferences concerning pejorative expressions requires that the premises are
true and only under the TCN reading, the sentences containing slurs are
true. On the other horn, if Hom maintains that the cases involving slurs
are cases of TCL readings, then he stays faithful to his starting point that
slurs are always false, but he looses the soundness of the inferences.
2.6 Intermediate summary
So far, we have been discussing Hedger’s view and Hom and May’s view.
They share the claim that there is something wrong with the semantics
of slurs. Both views have a moral motivation. Hom and May want to
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take the study of slurs back to semantic innocence. They do not want
that the xenophobes and the racists speak the truth and they dub any
view that allows this as morally corrupted. Hedger has a similar motiva-
tion. However, I think it is clear by now that this motivation just cannot
accommodate the linguistic evidence concerning the civilised understand-
ing. Hedger’s view does not do justice for the civilised understanding as
Croom shows that, contrary to Hedger’s thought, even under the civilised
understanding you can recover the descriptive content from a slurring sen-
tence. Hom and May take the civilised understanding to be the main aim
of their view but they fail to provide an adequate explanation for that
understanding. Their response to the aboutness concern just does not
provide an explanation for the civilised understanding. The problem is
the analogue with rectangular square. When a speaker is talking about
‘Frogs’, it seems bit of a reach to compare this to the talk about rect-
angular squares. The immediacy of the civilised understanding just does
not support the analogue. At the same time, I have discussed at length,
whether Hom’s original view could explain inferential patterns and the
conclusion is that Hom cannot explain them, not without abandoning the
claim that slurs are systematically false. Considering all this, I conclude
that pure views cannot explain the civilised understanding.28
28Hedger makes an interesting point against Hom and May. He says that the idea
that atomic slurring sentences are systematically false is in the end only a small victory
for the civilised side. On his account, truth aptness or the lack of truth aptness follows
also to complex sentences but on Hom and May’s view falsity does not follow in the
same way. (Hedger 2012, 80-81.) For example, Hedger mentions an implication which
has a slurring antecedent. That is enough to make the whole implication true on Hom
and May’s account. Furthermore, a sentence like “Pierre is a Frog and Mary is a
Limey and Hans is a Boche or snow is white” is true when disjunction is the principle
connective because snow indeed is white. In distinction, Hedger’s view categorises
these as not truth apt since they contain parts that are not truth apt. Finally, neither
Hedger’s nor Hom and May’s account can distinguish between the universal quantified
statements discussed in fn. 25. As discussed, on Hom and May’s account both are true
and on Hedger’s account both of them lack truth value. Of course, Hedger does not
want to distinguish these statement because he denies that slurs have any descriptive
content. But if we take that ‘Frog’ refers to the French but not to the English then
the quantified statements start to make sense: All ‘Frogs’ are French and there are
no non-French ‘Frogs’. That is, “∀x (PEJ(French)(x) → French(x))” is true and “∀x
(PEJ(French)(x) → ¬French(x))” is false. It seems to me that these problems (if they
are considered to be problems) are symptoms of a bigger problem which is the difficulty
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In the next section, the xenophobic understanding will be given cen-
tre stage as we will look at another version of pure descriptivism. The
proposal is based on the inferentialist conception of meaning.
2.7 Slurs and inferentialism
2.7.1 Debate between referentialism and inferential-
ism
Timothy Williamson captures nicely the dispute between referentialism
and inferentialism. He says that the difference is the direction of expla-
nation: “referential[ism] gives center stage to the referential semantics
for a language, which is then used to explain the inference rules for the
language, [. . . ] as those which preserve truth [. . . ]”. Inferentialism, on
the other hand, starts off with inferential rules “which are then used to
explain its referential semantics, [. . . ] as semantics on which the rules pre-
serve truth”. He adds that these directions cannot be combined because it
would cause an obvious circularity in the explanation. (Williamson 2009,
137.)
So far in this chapter, we have only considered referential treatments
of slurs. We started off with Hedger’s proposal and then proceeded to
Hom and May’s referential treatment of slurs and then moved on to see
how that treatment accommodates the most obvious inferential patterns
of slurring terms and the corresponding neutral terms. The conclusion was
that Hom and May’s treatment did not do a very good job in explaining
these patterns. Next we are going to see if pure descriptivism could work
if it started off the other way round. Michael Dummett’s inferentialist
treatment starts off with the inferential patterns of slurs and then proceeds
to assign semantic values to the slurring terms.
The upshot of the discussion at this point is that this does not work
very well either. Timothy Williamson’s objection to Dummett’s treatment
clearly show that in order to reveal the understanding of slurs, we need to
that pure views have in explaining the civilised understanding.
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see xenophobes as competent speakers. Contrary to what Hom and May
suggested and to what Dummett is suggesting below.
2.7.2 Outlining the inferentialist view of meaning
Dummett has proposed an influential analysis of the use of slurs based
on inferences. His analysis has been widely accepted, at least in the in-
ferentialist circles (see Brandom 1994, 94-130; McCullagh 2011, 293-319;
Whiting 2008, 375-388). Williamson, on the other hand, finds the analysis
problematic. It does not seem to explain how slurs are actually used which
is somewhat ironic because inferentialism has strong affiliations with the
view that meaning stems from use of language.
Inferentialism starts off with the inferential rules of language which are
then used to explain the referential semantics of the language on which
the rules preserve truth. Arthur Prior proposed a famous problem for
inferentialism. ‘Tonk’ is a sentential connective with the following intro-
duction and elimination rules:
Tonk-I: A
A tonk B
Tonk-E: A tonk B
B
Tonk-I is the standard introduction rule for disjunction and Tonk-E is
the standard elimination rule for conjunction. Let us suppose that A is
true and B is false, then it is obvious that the rules for ‘tonk’ still allow
the above inference and it is clear that the rules for ‘tonk’ are not truth-
preserving. (Prior 1960, 38-39.) The most obvious way to rule out ‘tonk’
is an appeal to semantics (of propositional logic): Since B is false but
‘tonk’ rules allow to infer that B is true anyway, the rules for ‘tonk’ them-
selves must be ruled out. This response however does not stay faithful to
the inferentialist project. It appeals to referential semantics to rule out
the bad inferential rule. In order to stay faithful to inferentialist direction
of explanation, the inferential rules must rule out bad semantics, not the
other way round.
In an equally famous response, Nuel Belnap showed that tonk-like
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connectives can be ruled out in a manner that stays to faithful to infer-
entialism. He sets two constraints on the inferential practice. First, he
introduces the notion of conservative extension. It means that if we start
with the part of the language that does not contain the connective ‘tonk’,
then by adding ‘tonk’ to the language we get a non-conservative extension
of the language. (Belnap 1962, 130-134.) As Williamson puts it, “the re-
striction of the extended consequence relation to the original language is
just the original consequence relation; the new rules do not interfere with
inferential relations between old sentences”. Williamson remarks that the
notion of conservative extension is available to the inferentialist since it
does not appeal to referential semantics of the original or the extended
language. Secondly, Belnap’s notion of unique characterisation provides
a characterisation of a new expression E iff given two new expressions
E1 and E2 governed by rules R(E1) and R(E2), then those rules should
make E1 and E2 equivalent. Williamson says that unique characterisa-
tion is there to make sure that the rules are not too weak to define the
new expression adequately. (Williamson 2009, 138-139 and Belnap 1962,
130-134.)
Michael Dummett’s notion of harmony is very close to Belnap’s con-
servative extension and unique characterisation. The requirement of har-
mony is that when the introduction rule specifies the conditions for ap-
plying the target expression, then the introduction rule have to match
the consequences of applying the rule that are specified by the elimina-
tion rules (Williamson 2009, 145). As Rumfitt points out, the elimination
rule can unpack only the information that the introduction rule packed
in (Rumfitt 2000, 789). In the case of ’tonk’, too much is unpacked. The
standard rules for conjunction are, on the other hand, harmonious:
&-I: A B
A & B
&-E(1): A & B
A
&-E(2): A & B
B
The conditions for asserting ”A & B” is that A is assertable and that
B is assertable. When you eliminate the symbol ’&’ from ”A & B”, you
are back in the starting point: A is assertable; B is assertable. These
82
rules determine the meaning of the symbol ‘&’. On Dummett’s terminol-
ogy, if conservative extension is in place between the introduction and the
elimination rules, the rules are harmonious.
It is also important to note that in the following we are only interested
in conservative extension, not so much in unique characterisation. That
is because Dummett claims that the inferential rules for a slurring term
like ‘Boche’ do not satisfy the notion of conservative extension. This
means that only conservative extension is at stake. Another terminological
point is that, following Dummett, the terms ‘harmony’ and ‘conservative
extension’ are closely related. Harmonious rules produce a conservative
extension and non-harmonious rules produce a non-conservative extension.
2.7.3 Inferentialist account of slurs
Whiting on conservative extension
Daniel Whiting characterises conservative extension in the following way:
An extension of the language is conservative if and only if one
cannot use the new vocabulary to derive any statements in the
original vocabulary that could not already be derived using the
original vocabulary. More informally, the problem is that non-
conservative rules for the use of an expression clash with the
meanings of existing expressions or, rather, the rules governing
their employment. The novel rules ‘clash’ in the sense that,
when added to the established rules, they lead to contradiction.
As a result, the extended language is inconsistent. (Whiting
2008, 376)
According to Whiting, the crucial point with defective concepts is that
the governing inferential patterns are non-harmonious and hence the non-
conservative extension of the language will clash with the original language
and ”as a result, the extended language is inconsistent”. Whiting goes on
to explain how this is then reflected by the use of defective concepts like
‘Boche’. Assume that language L does not contain the term ‘Boche’ and
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then you add the term to the language thereby forming extended language
Lex. In this case, extended Lex is inconsistent in respect to the original L.
According Whiting, this is what happens:
Suppose, for example, that Merkel was born in Germany and
does not cause suffering with disregard. On this basis – given
what one may assume to be among the established inferential
rules for the employment of ‘German’ and ‘cruel’ – one infers
‘Merkel is German and is not cruel.’ However, by following
Boche- introduction one may make the transition to ‘Merkel
is Boche and is not cruel,’ and in turn Boche-elimination al-
lows one to infer ‘Merkel is cruel and is not cruel.’ Hence, in
such a way, the introduction of the Boche-rules to a Boche-free
language leads to contradiction [. . . ] (Whiting 2008, 379.)
As a result, Whiting is settled that the inferentalist frame does show what
is wrong with a slurring (and defective) concept like ‘Boche’. It cannot be
a good thing if the adding of a defective concept produces a contradiction
as soon as it is added to the language. To repeat, the problem is the
meaning of ‘Boche’. Given this, Whiting sees a problem in explaining
how a defective concept like ‘Boche’ is part of natural language in the
first place. Whiting presents a disanalogy between ‘tonk’ and ‘Boche’
to illustrate his point. The idea of defective concept is successful in the
case of ‘tonk’: Just because it is a defective concept, it is not part of
our language. But ‘Boche’ de facto is part of our language. How is that
possible? As Whiting says about inferentialism: “It is successful in the
case of ‘tonk’ precisely because we want to banish it from the language,
but it is of less help in the case of ‘Boche’ precisely because our language
already contains it” (Whiting 2008, 380). The point is that Whiting does
not see non-harmony of the rules problematic. Quite the opposite, it
explains what is bad about slurring concepts. The real problem is how
can there ever be a defective concept like ‘Boche’ in our language since
they should be banished just because they are defective and all they do is
create contradictions.
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However, I do not agree with Whiting. His characterisation of conser-
vative extension is somewhat inaccurate. The point in non-conservative
extension is not that it produces a contradiction. Rather, you can first
define conservative extension between language L and its extension Lex as
Γ `L A ≡ Γ `ex A
This is enough for the definition of conservative extension. The conse-
quence relation between the original language and the extended language
match. On the basis of this, you can define a non-conservative extension
as
Γ `L A 6≡ Γ `ex A
However, this is not enough to define the non-conservative extension. The
definition simply says that the consequence relation between the origi-
nal language and the extended language do not match. It must be also
stated that the theorems of the original language is a proper subset of the
theorems of the extended language.
To see where exactly Whiting’s characterisation goes wrong reveals a
crucial point about conservative extension and more importantly about
the harmony constraint. ‘Tonk’ is a concept which is apt to produce a
contradiction very quickly but in one very crucial sense that is beside
the point. Strictly speaking, Whiting is right about ‘tonk’ but if one
generalises from ‘tonk’ a general problem with defective concepts, then
you get you get a too strong notion of harmony which just distorts the
debate between inferentialism and referentialism. In next section, I will
give an example of non-harmonious rules which surely does not create a
contradiction but still is non-conservative.
Dummett’s criticism of classical logic
In order to see what harmony is about, it might be useful to run the core
points of Dummett’s argument against classical logic (CL). The problem
with CL, according to Dummett, is that the rules for negation are not







The rule says that if A leads (with some unspecified proof procedure in-
dicated by the dots) to absurdity (⊥), then infer ¬A from that. But after
this, IL and CL go their separate ways. The intuitionistic elimination and
the classical elimination rules are
IL-¬-E: A ¬A⊥ CL-¬-E:
¬¬A
A
According to Dummett, only IL-¬-E is harmonious in respect to ¬-I. In
the inferentialist frame, an argument carries the justification or proof of
the premises to the conclusion but in CL-¬-E29 this does not happen.
An assertion of ¬¬A contains (according to the introduction rule) the
evidence that it is consistent to assert A. However, the evidence for the
consistency of A is not yet a proof for A. The point is that proof or warrant
justifies every step of in the inference. If we take the rules for conjunction









The introduction of the conjunction is ultimately justified with the premise
sets Γ and ∆ and the proof of those is carried via A and B to “A ∧ B”. At
the same time, the warrants for Γ and ∆ are necessary and sufficient war-
rant for the assertion of “A ∧ B” but this is not the case with CL-¬-E. The
rule needs the assumption of Bivalence to go through. So when the clas-
sical rule suggests that one can infer A from ¬¬A, it is non-harmonious.
29The rule is also called Double Negation Elimination (DNE) rule.
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Namely, it unpacks more than the introduction rule packs in.
Because of this, the discussion usually expands to a debate about the
nature of truth. For the intuitionists, truth is an epistemically constrained
notion. For the proponent of CL and referentialism, truth is evidence-
transcendent. As far as the inferentialist is concerned, CL-¬-E is not
truth preserving. At the same, CL-¬-E preserves referentialist or realistic
notion of truth. If realism is right about the bivalent nature of truth, then
CL-¬-E does preserve truth.
My point can be put in the following way. CL is an extension of IL.
That is, all theorems (proved sentences) of IL are also theorems of CL
but not the other way round. If it happened that there is a contradiction
between IL and the extended part of CL, that would mean that CL itself
is contradictory; but surely no intuitionist claims that CL is inconsistent.
Rather, the accusation is that CL is a non-conservative extension of IL.
It is produced with a non-harmonious pair of rules, ¬-I and CL-¬-E.30
The analogy between ‘tonk’ and ‘Boche’
One might wonder, as Williamson does, whether ‘tonk’ is a realistic ex-
ample. It is questionable whether ‘tonk’ represents a concept at all. It is
fairly certain that no natural language contains a connective like ‘tonk’.
To borrow Graham Priest’s phrase, it would surely explode the language
to triviality. So at this point, one can ask whether there actually is any
expression which genuinely stands for a concept but whose use is defective
in the sense that the rules are non-harmonious. (Williamson 2009, 139.)
Dummett anticipated this question and answers to it by referring to the
use of slurs:
A simple case would be that of a pejorative term, e.g. ‘Boche’.
30In his classic paper “Truth”, Dummett lays out his criticism of CL on the basis
of the nature of truth (Dummett 1978, 1-14) and continues this attack in his Logical
Basis of Metaphysics (1991). More recent discussions are Crispin Wright’s Truth and
Objectivity (1992) and Neil Tennant’s Anti-realism and Logic (1987) and Taming of the
True (2002). Also Stig Alstrup Rasmussen and Jens Ravnkilde’s “Realism and Logic”
captures well the reasons why truth is important in understanding the debate between
realism and anti-realism (Rasmussen and Ravnkilde 1982, 379-437).
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The condition for applying the term to someone is that he is
of German nationality; the consequences of its application are
that he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other
Europeans. We should envisage the connections in both direc-
tions as sufficiently tight as to be involved in the very mean-
ing of the word: neither could be severed without altering its
meaning. Someone who rejects the word does so because he
does not want to permit a transition from the grounds for ap-
plying the term to the consequences of doing so. The addition
of the term ’Boche’ to a language which did not previously con-
tain it would produce a non-conservative extension, i.e. one in
which certain statements which did not contain the term were
inferable from other statements not containing it which were
not previously inferable. [. . . ] In the case of logical constants
we may regard the introduction rules governing it as the con-
ditions for the assertion of a statement of which it is the main
operator, and the elimination rule as giving the consequences
of such a statement: the demand for a harmony between is
then expressible as the requirement that the additional con-
stant to the language produces a conservative extension of the
language.31 (Dummett 1973, 454-455.)
The upshot is that ‘tonk’ and ‘Boche’ are analogous just in the previous
“weaker” sense. This is exactly why Dummett ties the meaning of slurs,
not only with the meaning of ‘tonk’ but also with the meaning of logical
constant like ‘&’. On the basis of this, Williamson proposes the following
rules for ‘Boche’:
Boche-I: x is German
x is Boche
Boche-E: x is Boche
x is cruel
Here the consequences of asserting “he is a Boche” do not match with
the conditions for that assertion. That seems quite obvious. Boche-E
31I wanted to quote Dummett at length because Dummett’s “analysis” of slurs has
received a lot of attention. This is the ”analysis” in its entirety.
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surely unpacks more than the Boche-I rule packs in.
The invited conclusion is that slurs are the kind of concepts we are
after. The use of slurs represent an actual case for a defective concept and
this defectiveness is seen in the way a xenophobe uses language. More-
over, slurs clearly express concepts. It seems obvious that a xenophobe
uses sentences containing slurs to express complete thoughts. It seems
equally obvious that we find the use of slurs offensive just because we do
understand them, not because the use of slurs is gibberish to us. (e.g.
Boghossian and Williamson 2003, 234.) The badness of slurs seems to
be resting “on inadequate proof-theory” (Williamson 2009, 140). This
claim certainly has a ring of over-intellectualisation but the point is that
the non-harmonious rules of a certain word allow the inference. It is just
that the application of the term ‘Boche’ licences to attribute cruelty to
its target without a single shred of evidence that the target actually is
cruel. According to inferentialism, the meaning of a word is explicated
with the inferential pattern. Hence it is the meaning of the word ‘Boche’
that allows the inference from German to cruelty. This is exactly what
the semantic view is trying to capture. Furthermore, there is another
thesis to pure descriptivism. It is that the meaning of slurs is somehow
‘bad’. Dummett’s view satisfy this thesis too with the claim that inference
patterns governing slurs are non-harmonious.
In the following, Williamson’s objection to the inferentialist’s account
will be examined. Williamson claims that the inferential rules do not
determine the reference of ’Boche’ in such a way that they match the
linguistic evidence concerning the use of slurs. In essence, the challenge
put forward by Williamson is the following:
Determination of reference: Boche-I and Boche-E rules do not match
the use of slurring terms.
The core question here is the exact nature of defectiveness and its conse-
quences.
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2.7.4 Determining the reference
The inferentialist procedure first establishes the inferential rules and then,
on the basis of the rules, assigns reference to the terms in a truth-preserving
way. Williamson’s point is that in the light of this procedure, the badness
of ‘Boche’ becomes dubious.
Assuming that semantics is already in place for a language (via the
previous inferential rules) and someone introduced a new term for this
language, say, expression E. It is then subject to new rules R(E). In this
case and according to the inferentialist outlook, the procedure of fixing
the reference has three possible outcomes. First, If an assignment X as
the reference of E makes R(E) truth preserving (and no other does), then
E refers to X. Second case is this. If many different assignments all make
R(E) truth preserving, then the reference of E is indeterminate between
all these assignments. Third, If no assignment of the reference for E
make R(E) truth preserving, then E does not refer. (Williamson 2009,
143-144 and 2003, 258.) The point that Williamson is trying to make is
that no assignment of reference for ‘Boche’ makes Boche-I and Boche-E
rules truth preserving. From the civilised point of view, every non-cruel
German provides an counterexample to the Boche-I and Boche-E rules.
To emphasise, from the civilised point of view it might seem plausible
that ‘Boche’ does not refer but this is not the point of Boche-I and Boche-
E rules. The point of these rules is to capture the xenophobic way of
thinking. When it comes to xenophobic thinking, Whiting’s point about
Merkel is not effective. According to xenophobes, the mere membership
in a social group warrants derogation. Xenophobes think in the first place
that Merkel is cruel, just because she is German and when ‘Boche’ is
introduced to the language, it provides a very handy way to express this
thought. The upshot is that there are no contradictions or inconsistencies
in xenophobic language before or after the introduction of ‘Boche’.
When you think about the uses of ’Boche’, surely, at least the xeno-
phobes think that the term refers, i.e. xenophobes think that it refers to
someone or to some set of people, namely to the Germans. The real crux
of the discussion is that Williamson goes out show that the rules do not
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accommodate even the xenophobic use. Initial observation is this. Even
the most persistent xenophobe (someone who thinks that all Germans are
cruel) should find the rules unsatisfying. For they do not yield a deter-
minate reference. Even the most persistent xenophobe thinks that the
set of Germans is a subset of cruel people, but not the other way round.
Presumably, xenophobes do not think that the Germans are the only cruel
foreigners. Yet the rules treat the set cruel people and the set of German
people symmetrically. The rules misrepresent the xenophobic mindset:
The rules are truth-preserving in the case the reference is assigned to be
the set of Germans and the rules are truth-preserving when the reference
is assigned to be the set of cruel people. Because of this symmetry be-
tween the rules, they cannot explain why a xenophobe might say things
like:
(61) Charles Manson is as cruel as a Boche but he is not a Boche; he
is American.
This shows that xenophobes do not think that the reference of ‘Boche’
is indeterminate between two sets, the Germans and the cruel people.
Rather, it shows that there is nothing indeterminate in the extension of
‘Boche’ in the xenophobe’s mind. The problem, according to Williamson,
is that “Dummett gives no more weight to one of his rules than to other”
but (61) demonstrates that xenophobes emphasise the introduction rule,
i.e. the tie between being a German and being a ‘Boche’. But even if
Dummett pointed out which rule to emphasize, mere emphasis would not
solve the problem. The problem is that Dummett’s rules do not match
the actual use because they do not provide a determine reference. The
actual use being of course xenophobic use because only xenophobes apply
the slurs.
2.7.5 Dilemma for Dummett
The obvious solution to the problem is to try to accommodate inferen-
tialism to the actual use of language by harmonizing the inferential rules.
We can do this either by assigning the set cruel people as the extension of
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‘Boche’ or the extension of German people. In the first case, we can take
the existing elimination rule and come up with a new introduction rule:
Boche-I*: x is cruel
x is a Boche
Boche-E: x is a Boche
x is cruel
The rules are harmonious but no progress has been made. The rules still
badly misrepresent the extension of ‘Boche’. The rules suggest that even
Charles Manson is a ‘Boche’ because he is cruel. But he is not a ‘Boche’,
he is an American. (Williamson 2009, 145-147.) These rules completely
betray the thought that the target is first and foremost the set of German
people who are more prone to cruelty then your average European.
Let us try the other assignment. In this case, we only take Boche-I
rule and we come up with harmonious a new elimination rule. This time,
the introduction rule stays the same:
Boche-I: x is a German
x is a Boche
Boche-E*: x is a Boche
x is a German
The proposed rules are harmonious and together the rules determine the
set of Germans as the extension of ‘Boche’. The set of Germans makes
the rules truth-preserving. There are two reasons to prefer these rules.
First, the set of Germans is the smallest set that makes Boche-I truth
preserving. Hence the Boche-E’ is the strongest harmonious rule with
Boche-I. Neil Tennant has shown that if the introduction and elimination
rules are thought as meaning specifying rules as the inferentialists think,
then the strongest possible rules should be preffered (Tennant 1987, 94-97;
see also Rumfitt 2000, 789-790). Secondly and more relevantly, although
every non-cruel German is a counterexample to these rules, Williamson
says that all the dictionaries he consulted do define ‘Boche’ in this way.
They define ‘Boche’ as a German but highlight that it is derogatory. So
at least the above rule satisfies lexicographer’s intuition about slurs. Nev-
ertheless, even the most plausible rules are far from satisfying. Although
the rules are now harmonious or, more appropriately, because they are
now harmonious, they fail to explain what is bad about the slurs. Hence,
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Williamson’s point can be presented a dilemma for inferentialism. Either
the rules for ‘Boche’ are harmonious but then the inferentialist cannot ex-
plain what is so bad about slurs or the rules are non-harmonious but this
misrepresents the way xenophobe actually uses language.32 (Williamson
2009, 147.)
2.8 Summary
The foregoing discussion has shown that the truth functional semantic
account does not work. To things are notable. First, the truth functional
semantic view cannot explain the civilised understanding as the discus-
sion about the (Kaplanian) inferential patterns showed. At the same time,
Williamson’s objection to Dummett’s inferentialism shows that the infer-
entialist version of pure descriptivism cannot account for the xenophobic
use.
Secondly, the discussion concentrates too much on vindicating the
civilised intuition that there is something wrong with the meaning of slurs.
As it was noted, slurs divide speakers to two categories, those who apply
slurs and those do who do not apply slurs. The consequence of this dis-
tinction is that the majority of the evidence concerning the use of slurs,
i.e. application of slurs, is xenophobic use. To dismiss the majority of
evidence concerning slurs as confused and mistaken seems like dubious
starting point.
In the following, I will consider only views that allow xenophobes to be
truth speaker, at least sometimes. I do this by embracing so-called moral
corruption, i.e. I discuss only views that adhere to the thesis about the
co-extensionality of the slurring term and the neutral term.
I guess you could phrase the concluding moral by saying that in battle
against racism and xenophobia, you are not doing any favours by under-
estimating your enemy.
32At the moment this will do but inferentialism will be revisited in Chapter 5. I will
develop one more inferentialist proposal which I think captures Dummett’s thought





3.1 Potts’ expressive treatment of slurs
3.1.1 Two analysis for ‘by the way content’
Conjunctive analysis
In ”Sense and Reference”, Frege proposed that the sentence:
(62) Napoleon, who recognised the danger to his right flank, led himself
his guards against the enemy position.
should be analysed as a conjunction of two thoughts:
1. Napoleon recognised the danger to his right flank
2. Napoleon led himself his guards against the enemy position.
Frege’s idea is that both of these claims are asserted simultaneously. He
says:
If the entire sentence is uttered as an assertion, we thereby
simultaneously assert both component sentences. If one of
parts is false, the whole is false. (Frege 1960, 73.)
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This point speaks for a conjunctive analysis as it coheres with the truth
table of conjunction.33
Conventional implicature analysis
The problem with Frege’s analysis is that does not really account for our
intuition about subordinate, “by the way” content. Imagine the following
conversation:
(63) – Napoleon, who is my uncle, will lead the charge himself.
– Yes and he needs to act now.
Here the urgency for the attack is not falsified by the fact that Napoleon
is not the speaker’s uncle. The point is that you can confirm the main
content of the sentence while suspecting the subordinate claim:
(64) Yes, but I doubt that he is your uncle.
This point leads to Christopher Potts’ distinction between at-issue content
and conventional implicature (CI) content. Potts thinks that this kind dis-
tinction also applies to derogatory expressives. Namely, a civilised person
can answer to a slurring utterance
(65) Max is a Frog.
by saying:
(66) Yes, but there is no need to be offensive.
That is, a civilised person can confirm the at-issue content (that Max is
French) but object to the conventionally implicated slurring content. The
most important thing is that the objection does not falsify (65).
It is also important to notice that the expressive content has the same
distinctive properties as CI content. The commonality between general CI
content and expressive content is the independence from truth conditional,
at-issue content.
33This is generally the received view of the passage in ”Sense and Reference”. Frege
sees (62) analogous to complex sentences where the glue can be words like ‘although’
and ‘but’ which are both traditionally equated with conjunction. Furthermore, he
separates (62) from complex sentences where the glue word is ‘because’ which is usually
equated with conditional. (Frege 1960, 73-76.)
95
3.1.2 Central properties of expressives
In his ”Expressive Dimension” (2007, 165-198), Potts discusses the cen-
tral features of expressives.34 It seems that most of the features apply
also to slurs. Furthermore, an important point is that all of the central
features distinguish expressives from the regular truth conditional expres-
sions. According to him, the following four are the central features of
expressives:
1. Independence: Expressive content contributes a dimension of mean-
ing that is separate from the regular descriptive content.
2. Nondisplaceability : Expressives predicate something of the utterance
situation.
3. Perspective dependence: Expressive content is evaluated from a par-
ticular perspective. In general, the perspective is the speaker’s, but
there can be deviations if conditions are right.
4. Descriptive ineffability : Speakers are never fully satisfied when they
paraphrase expressive content using descriptive, i.e., nonexpressive,
terms.
In the following, these features are discussed in detail. I agree with points
1 and 3 with some qualification but I disagree with points 2 and 4. First,
it has to be acknowledged that my disagreement about nondisplaceability
concerns only slurs. I think the most convincing examples Potts gives
for nondisplaceability can be given an alternative analysis. Finally, I will
claim that the independence is just the expression of the thesis that the
slurring term and the neutral term are co-referential, nothing more.
3.1.3 Independence
The independence property states the difference between truth functional
expressions and expressives most explicitly. Potts characterises the prop-
34In The Logic of Conventional Implicatures, Potts hints that a similar set of prop-
erties also attaches to CI content in general (Potts 2005, 153-155).
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erty in the following way: “It says that we can change or remove the
expressive content of a phrase without affecting its descriptive content”
(Potts 2007, 168). In other words, the independence property confirms
that the inference
(67) That damn Kaplan is promoted. Thus, Kaplan was promoted
is valid. Moreover, the sentence
(68) That damn Kaplan is promoted
has dual content. The content breaks down to two components:
1. Descriptive content: Kaplan is promoted.
2. Expressive content: ‘Boo’ Kaplan.
In relation to slurs, the difference is that (68) is a sentence with dual
content and slurs are common nouns with dual content. But at this point,
it is enough to point out that these two contents are independent of each
other. (More will be said about independence below.)
3.1.4 Nondisplaceability
Potts says that expressives cannot be used to report past events. They
cannot be be used to report attitudes or emotions either (expect perhaps in
direct quotation but not in indirect reports). Potts also says that expres-
sives cannot be used to express possibilities, conjectures or suppositions.
“They always tell us something about the utterance situation. This is the
nondisplaceability property”, continues Potts. (2007, 169.) He also gives
illustrations of cases which are infelicitous because of the nondisplaceabil-
ity property:
(69) That bastard Kaplan isn’t late for work. (#He’s is a good guy.)
(70) It is not the case that that bastard Kaplan is late for work. (#He’s
a good guy.)
(71) #If that bastard Kaplan arrives on time, he should be fired for
being so mean.
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(72) Maybe that bastard Kaplan will be late again. (#Then again,
maybe he’s not a bastard.)
Potts says that these sentences involve presupposition holes. This means
that operators cannot cancel or modify the presuppositions triggered by
items in their scope. (Potts 2007, 169-170.)
However, I am a bit suspicious whether the diagnosis of these sentences
is right. It seems to me that (69) and (70) do not have very much to do
with nondisplaceability. The infelicity does not stem from the fact the
expressive utterances are taken away from utterance situation. They do
not report a past event, attitudes or emotions. Neither are they used to
express possibilities or conjectures. I think it is even questionable whether
they express supposition. Kaplan reports that Kripke has pointed out that
the expressive information is not presuppositional. The difficulty to an-
swer ‘yes’ to the question in (73) is that it contains a (false) presupposition
that in the past John has beaten his wife. However, the presuppositional
information can be made explicit with a conditional. Both the affirmative
answer to
(73) Has John stopped beating his wife?
and its negation still presupposes that John has beaten his wife but the
conditional answer
(74) John has stopped beating his wife, if he ever did beat her.
does not contain such presupposition. However, the cancellation of ex-
pressives is more problematic. Observe, the first stab:
(75) #That damn Kaplan was promoted, if I despise him.
is outright infelicitous. The following, however, is an improvement
(76) (#)That bastard Kaplan was promoted, if he is a bastard.
But even that strategy does not work for
(77) That damn Kaplan was promoted.
It seems very difficult to cancel (77) without any kind paraphrasing. But
as we will see below, Potts himself admits that pure expressives are very
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hard to paraphrase. My explanation for this is that with pure expressives,
there is not any descriptive content to paraphrase.
Given the above, I think a much better explanation for (69) and (70)
is that expressives project out from the scope of the truth functional op-
erators. This phenomenon is already discussed earlier. In (69) and (70),
I think it is clear that the truth functional negation just does not apply
to expressives. However, it is not obvious that (71) is infelicitous. Let us
modify it in the following way:
(78) If that bastard Kaplan happens to be on time today, he should be
fired anyway for being so mean.
I think that this sentence perfectly felicitous. It seems that there is better
example of the behaviour of slurs in conditionals. It seems to me that the
point is that even the mentioning of a slurs can be offensive, as in
(79) If Max is a Frog, so is his partner
Here the slur can be offensive even though the sentence containing it, is
not asserted. I believe that this behaviour can be explained with social
aspects of slurs.
3.1.5 Social taboo -analysis
It is held here that the most convincing examples of the alleged nondis-
placeability are (69) and (70) but it is was also claimed that (79)) can be
given a different explanation. Namely, it can be explained through the
social aspects of slurs. Instead of explaining the nondisplaceability with
semantic properties of slurs, the behaviour is explained with social aspects
of slurring of language.
Luvell Andersen and Ernest Lepore propose that slurs are prohibited
words. They are taboo words and as such they cannot even be mentioned.
(Anderson and Lepore 2013a, 38; see also Anderson and Lepore 2013b,
350-363.) Anderson comments their view:
[S]lurs are prohibited words whose occurrences are offensive
[. . . ]. This is a proposal not about the truth values of slurring
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sentences [or about semantics in general]: rather, it is about
the source of a slur’s offense. Prohibitionism helps explain why
offence projects out of the complement of say and quotation,
why it is not challenged by denial, and why the speaker of a
slurred word bears the offense [. . . ] (Langton, Haslanger and
Anderson 2012, 757.)
The taboo status can explain why slurs are offensive even in conditionals
like (79). The instance of ‘Frog’ is offensive even though nothing is asserted
in the sentence. This leaves us with the problem of how to deny slurring
statements, such as
(80) Prince Charles is a Frog.
The question is that how can one deny the false attribution of being French
to Prince Charles and derogation at the same time and also trying to
accommodate the fact that slurs are taboo words. Here is one suggestion
which is actually from tv-series ‘Psych’:
(81) Shawn: Now, let’s saddle up and go talk to this Frog.
Juliet: He’s not French, Shawn, and that term is a slur.
Juliet denies that the target is French and she also points out that the
term used by Shawn is a slur and as such not be used without repeating
the taboo word herself. It is held here that the social surroundings of
slurs, namely the taboo status provides equally good explanation of the
projection behaviour as do their semantics.
I agree with Anderson and Lepore about social status of slurs but I
disagree that this is the whole story of slurs. As I develop my view, my aim
is to supplement this aspect with an explanation why slurs have this status
and that goes beyond social explanation. This is the main difference with
my view and Anderson and Lepore’s view. They claim that their view is
deflationary in the sense that the meaning of word or the word itself has
very little do with the explanation of derogation. (Anderson and Lepore
2013a, 26 and 43.) In distinction, my view aims to reveal genuine and
substantial cognitive differences between the use of the slurring term and
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the neutral term. This goes well beyond the deflationism proposed by
Anderson and Lepore.
3.1.6 Perspective dependence and distancing
At this stage, it seems that only
(82) Maybe that bastard Kaplan will be late again. (#Then again,
maybe he’s not a bastard.)
is infelicitous. As a result it, seems that you cannot incorporate expressives
into conjectures, as Potts argued. It is claimed here that this point relates
to the nature of certain attitudes and how they behave in indirect attitude
reports. Potts starts his discussion with the following belief report:
(83) Sue believes that Ed realises that ultraviolet invigorates the mind.
The most obvious reading of this sentence is that the presuppositional
part produced by ‘realise’ is satisfied by Sue’s beliefs. For example, Ed
does not have to actually realise anything. It is enough that Sue believes
it. However, things are differently in
(84) Sue believes that that bastard Kaplan should be fired. (#I think
he’s a good guy.)
Here it seems that the speaker has the negative attitude towards Kaplan.
that is why the continuation is infelicitous. (Potts 2007, 170-171.) Com-
pare (84) with the following:
(85) Sue believes that Ed realises that ultraviolet invigorates the mind.
(But I don’t think Ed realises anything.)
The contrast between (84) and (85) suggests that when it comes to indirect
speech reports, expressives are perspective dependent. The previous sen-
tence (84) suggests that an expressive like ‘bastard’ depends on speaker’s
perspective. The negative attitude towards Kaplan is attributed more
likely to the speaker rather than to Sue, even when the speaker is just
reporting what Sue said. This is the perspective dependence property.
Potts says: “It is tempting to assume that the perspective encoded in the
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expressive aspects of an utterance is always the speaker’s” (Potts 2007,
170).
Potts considers whether this thought could be challenged. He follows
Peter Lasersohn in the adoption of contextual judge (Lasersohn 2005, 665).
The judge is the agent to whom the evaluative or expressive part of an
utterance is attributed. A contextual judge is
cj for c is an individual, i.e. an element in a contextual tuple consisting
of a speaker, ca; time, ct; a location, cl; and a world, cw.
Given this, Lasersohn discusses many approaches to the perspective aspect
of personal taste. Here is one rejected by Lasersohn:
JfunKw,t,c = the set of things that cj finds fun in world w and time t
Assuming that what is fun depends on the personal taste of an agent in
the context c, then you could say that the above tries to capture that.
However, the above cannot explain the shift in perspective. Consider the
following
(86) John thinks that roller coasters are fun, but Mary thinks that roller
coasters are not fun.
If we take the previous characterisation of the semantic value of fun, we
are stuck with an unresolved disagreement. If we take the above charac-
terisation, context c “is fixed throughout the semantic computation of the
sentence”, says Potts and he continues: “In particular, cj is fixed through-
out the interpretation of [86].” (Potts 2007, 174.) The bottom line is that
in (86) the constraint on ‘fun’ is not good. We can only interpret ‘fun’
from Mary’s perspective (according to context where Mary is cj) or from
John’s perspective (John is cj) but we cannot shift the perspective mid-
way computation which would be natural interpretation: Roller coasters
are fun from John’s perspective but not from Mary’s perspective.
However, things are different with expressives. The perspective does
not shift. The judge cj is the speaker. Potts says:
This is typical of expressives: they do not shift perspective
mid-computation. For this reason, I propose that we hardwire
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the judge argument directly into the denotations of expres-
sives, in the manner suggested by the (rejected) denotation
for fun [. . . ]
Potts concludes that as a pragmatic default, the judge is the speaker.
(Potts 2007, 175.) This is our main thesis concerning the perspective
dependence related to expressives and slurs in particular. In sentences
like
(87) Tom said that those damn conservatives won.
the judge seems to be the speaker as the perspective dependence phe-
nomenon predicts. At least, you can make a weaker claim that it is un-
clear whose attitude is expressed by ‘damn’ (my intuition says that the
attitude is the speaker’s) but even the weaker claim points to perspec-
tive dependence. In normal (non-expressive) indirect attitude reports it
is clear whose attitudes the speaker is reporting but this is not the case
with expressive content. It is the confusion that distinguishes (87) from a
standard indirect report which does not contain an expressive such as
(88) Tom said that snow is white.
Potts has pointed that a speaker can distance herself from the attitude
conveyed by the expressive. This might done in a number of ways. Some-
times the context can do the distancing for the speaker. He presents the
following example:
(89) A CPJ report on Venezuela tells us how problems have ‘escalated’
in Venezuela under Chavez, i.e. the physical attacks against jour-
nalists under previous presidents have ‘escalated’ to Chavez calling
the opposition, which includes the media, names. This is very, very
serious, but I don’t think another coup attempt is called for until
Chavez resorts to dramatic irony or sarcasm. But if that vicious
bastard uses litotes, then there’s no other rational choice than an
immediate invasion. (Potts 2007, 175-176.)
Here a blog writer takes a sarcastic approach to the CPJ report and hence
the attitude expressed by ‘that vicious bastard’ is not considered to be
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the speaker’s. As Potts observes: “writer’s general level of sarcasm is
sufficiently high to shift the content of that vicious bastard away from her
and onto her opponents”35 (Potts, 2007, 175).
Because Hom and May say that the expressive nature of slurs is not
doing any explanatory work, they simply have to deny that slurs escape
the scope of truth functional operators. For this purpose they use the
idea of distancing. Hom and May present a rather famous example of
distancing:
(90) I have nothing against Caucasians. But John, who has, says that
you are the worst honky he knows.36
Here the expressed attitude seems to be John’s. So this seems to suggest
that the perspective is no longer dependent on the speaker. The expressive
content shifts from the utterance situation and seem to be John’s attitude.
In other words, the behaviour is under truth functional control. Showing
that Hom and May may have a point.
Nevertheless, the crucial point is that unless some distancing is done,
the default reading of utterances containing expressives is that the ex-
pressed attitude is the speaker’s and Hom’s and May’s truth conditional
treatment cannot change that. In fact, Potts’ point never was that dis-
tancing explains away perspective dependence as Hom and May take it to
be. Rather, because of perspective dependence, distancing is sometimes
needed especially with pejorative expressives.
At the same time, I think there is notable disanalogy between the
sarcasm of the web blogger and slurs. It seems that the web blogger’s
distancing is successful but it has been commented to me that things
with (90) might not be so successful. Bearing in mind that the sentences
starts with ”I am not a racist but . . . ” which is a very dubious way to
start a xenophobic utterance and as Williamson points out often just adds
hypocrisy to xenophobia. In (90) one might ask why it is so crucial to
35It also needs to be stressed that even in the above quotation the perspective does
not shift midway quotation which was a general feature of perspective dependence.
However, this observation is not so relevant in the following discussion.
36As far as I know, the example first appeared in Philippe Schlenker’s “A plea for
Monsters” (2003, 29-123).
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repeat Bill’s xenophobic word. Surely, there could have other, less of-
fensive, ways to convey the message. In this respect, Potts thinks that
the judge is dependent on contextual parameters. If the judge is not the
speaker, there has been a context-shifting and the distancing has been
successful. Without going into the details of this proposal, I am content
to say that the context-shift may depend on many contextual parameters.
It may even depend on the rhetorical skills of the speaker: a good speaker
may get away with (90) while when some less skilful speaker says it, the
audience might be left with a wonder why the speaker used the slurring
term. At any rate, the point I am trying to make is that with some reser-
vations I accept Hom and May’s point that even with slurs the distancing
is possible although it is much harder then with other expressives. But
this does not change that the default reading is that the attitude is the
speaker’s. To repeat Potts’ point: As a pragmatic default, the judge is
the speaker.
Hom and May do not address the question of default reading of most
expressives. They only appeal to the cases where the distancing is already
done. For example, take again:
(91) I have nothing against Caucasians. But John, who has, says that
you are the worst honky he knows.
and then take away the parts which are responsible for the distancing:
(92) John said that you are the worst honky he knows.
The point here is that the contrast between (98) and
(93) John said that snow is white.
is noticeable and Hom and May cannot explain away the contrast.
3.1.7 Descriptive ineffability
Potts claims that speakers are generally unable to articulate the content
of expressives. That is, expressives in general manifest descriptive ineffa-
bility. He argues for descriptive ineffability with two observations.
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First, Potts himself has interviewed speakers of several languages and
only one expressive was paraphrased in a clear descriptive manner: ‘Bas-
tard’ is a vile and contemptible person. But even ‘bastard’ is not captured
correctly by the paraphrasing, according to Potts. It excludes affectionate
use as in
(94) Here’s to you, you Bastard!
Furthermore,
(95) So my story begins with my X-Box . . . Unfortunately, the bastard
won’t open. This is the problem.
suggests that the paraphrasing incorrectly restricts the use to humans.
For in (95) ‘bastard’ is used to denote X-box which surely is not a human.
Secondly, it has been reported that patients suffering from severe apha-
sia are still able curse and curse well. Presumably in these cases, patients
suffer from diminished ability to process the semantics of natural lan-
guage. That is, they have difficulties understanding and producing the
propositional content of the utterances of natural language but they are
still able to produce expressives and produce them without difficulties.
According to Potts, these two points suggest that ”expressive content
is not propositional, that it is distinct from the meanings we typically
assign to sentences” (Potts 2007, 177). Given this, Potts thinks that we
can ignore the possible propositional content that expressives convey. In-
stead, we can concentrate on the polarity and intensity of an expressive.
Therefore, Potts adopts a treatment of expressives where we can evaluate
the polarity of an expressive, i.e. whether the expressive is positive such
as ‘sir’ or negative such as ‘bastard’. On the other hand, the treatment
allows to measure the intensity of the expressive, i.e. in the case of nega-
tive expressive ‘that bastard Kaplan’, it allows to measure how much the
speaker disrespects Kaplan.
Since speakers cannot paraphrase the content of expressives, it is left
out in the treatment of expressives altogether. This has a far reaching
consequence concerning slurs. According to Potts, slurs have dual content:
descriptive and expressive. For example, the content of
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(96) Max is a Frog.
breaks down to two parts:
Descriptive: Max is French.
Expressive: ‘Boo’ French
That is all there is to slurs. There is no room for stereotypes because,
presumably, the speakers are unable to paraphrase the stereotypical con-
tent correctly. Thereby, there is a contrast between Potts’ view and Hom
and May’s view according to which the stereotypes have a central role in
the behaviour of slurs.
My objection to Potts is related to the expressive content concerning
slurs. As a preliminary point, I should say that I am very much willing
to go along with Potts concerning pure expressives, like ‘bastard’, ‘sir’
or ‘fucker’. Indeed, I already consented in Chapter 2 that ‘fucker’ might
be a pure expressive in the sense that it just conveys the speaker’s ‘boo’
attitude towards the target. Nevertheless, the key point of Chapter 2
was to establish that slurs are not pure expressives. To use Hedger’s
contrast, they are more like ‘asshole’ and all sides seem to agree that
the descriptive content of an ‘asshole’ is that the target is a disagreeable
person. Moreover, I do not think that Potts’ points about descriptive
ineffability apply here. If someone uses it, then it is safe to assume that
the speaker thinks that the target is a disagreeable person and to apply
it to X-box would seem strange.
Putting Hedger’s diagnosis aside now, the view we are building in a
moment is a divergent view from Potts. It has been already established
that Potts thinks that (102) breaks down to two parts:
Descriptive: Max is French.
Expressive: ’Boo’ French
An important point is that the content described under the heading ’de-
scriptive’ is the semantic content of ‘Frog’ which means that ‘Frog’ and
107
‘French’ are co-extensional. This fact is used to explain the inferential
pattern in the next chapter.
In addition to this, it will be argued that slurs come with stereotypes
(contra Potts). But this stereotypical information need not be semanti-
cally relevant (contra Hom and May). The stereotypical information in
(96) is something like ”Max (being French) is vulgar” or ”Max (being
French) slurps red wine all the time”.
3.1.8 Jeshion: priority to attitudes
Just like Potts, Robin Jeshion thinks that stereotypes do not contribute
to derogation of slurs. The main source of derogation is just a negative
attitude towards the target. According to her, xenophobes just do not
care about stereotypes and so the negative attitude has an explanatory
priority over stereotypes. She writes:
[I]ntuitions [about stereotypes] may be overturned. Someone
who finds homosexuality repulsive and homosexuals worthy
of contempt, yet possesses no knowledge whatsoever of any
stereotypes associated with homosexuality [. . . ] could call
someone “queer” or “faggot” while manifesting complete lin-
guistic competence. Upon being informed of the stereotypes
that, let us assume, are activated in the minds of hearers, the
speaker might be appalled. She could coherently avow “I dis-
dain those queers; anyone who would do that is sick. But I do
not endorse those as the right ways of thinking about queers.
I have no idea who does it, what they are like, and I don’t
care. I just think those queers should be locked up.” This ex-
ample is not anomalous. Much racism and bigotry is rooted
simply in finding others “different” – often because of physical
characteristics. (Jeshion 2013, 322.)
First, Jeshion says that her example is not anomalous but I disagree.
Consider a bunch of, say, white supremacists who sit down and discuss
why they hate immigrants. All of them share some negative stories about
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why immigrants are worthy of their contempt but one racist does not want
to hear any of it and he says: “I have no idea what they are like, and I
don’t care. I just hate them”, just before storming out of the meeting. I
would say that this is highly anomalous behaviour. I would say that when
people are given the opportunity to get justification for their beliefs and
attitudes, they very much take it. Xenophobia is not an exception.
Secondly and more importantly, I agree that much of racism and big-
otry is rooted in finding others different but in that case Jeshion’s example
is a bit off. The point, I assume, is that the xenophobic speaker does not
find the target different, she just does not like the target. My point is
that why then would she dislike the target. There must be some kind of
cue that triggers xenophobia and also rationalises xenophobia. The point
is contra Jeshion that the root of xenophobia is not just an attitude, pure
and simple, but xenophobia is rooted in finding others different. Further-
more and contra Potts, speakers can generally express this the difference
linguistically. The difference is not descriptively ineffable. It can be very
idiosyncratic but still explicable. I will continue to develop this idea in
Chapters 5 and 6.
3.1.9 Independence and expansion of semantics
In this Section, I will briefly characterise Potts’ expansion of semantics
and I will detail the contrast with my view. Potts’ semantic story starts
as usual. The semantic types are
1. e and t are descriptive types.
2. If σ and τ are a descriptive types, then 〈σ, τ〉 is a descriptive type
(and σ and τ are variables over descriptive types.)
But then the story gets a new development. Potts adds the following
clauses:
3. tc is a CI type.
4. If σ is a descriptive type, then 〈σ, τ c〉 is a CI type (and τ c is a variable
over CI types).
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As Eric McCready points out, the independence is achieved by making
sure that there are not any truth functional operations over CI types:
CI types are distinct: they are always of the form 〈σ, τ c〉 , func-
tions taking at-issue typed objects as input and outputting
CI-typed objects. There is no mechanism for producing types
that take CI-typed objects as input. This, according to Potts,
is the reason that conventionally implicated content is inde-
pendent of at-issue operators: there simply are no operators
over CI content. (McCready 2010, 12.)
Just because CI types can never appear as input, there are no truth func-
tional operations over CI types and the independence is thus achieved.
In contrast as I will develop my view, I will base my conception of
independence solely on the co-extensionality thesis. Since the pair
(97) Max is a Frog.
(98) Max is French.
is truth conditionally equivalent, derogation has to be regarded as inde-
pendent concerning the truth conditions.
3.2 McCready and dispute about
stereotypes
McCready starts his discussion of stereotypes with Dummett’s formula-
tion of ‘Boche’ as ‘barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other Eu-
ropeans’. McCready rejects this formulation because he thinks that this
not certainly correct of the current slurs he knows. This objection implies
that McCready has a rather idiosyncratic view of stereotypes. He seems
to think that all slurs must come with the same stereotype which is cer-
tainly not the case. McCready moves on to another proposal made by
Mark Richard. McCready says:
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Richard [. . . ] describes the expressive part of the content of
pejoratives as that an individual is bad by virtue of member-
ship in a particular group; in this case, the individual picked
out by the pronoun is bad by virtue of being a German.37
McCready goes on to say: “This is closer, but still cannot be correct”.
(McCready 2010, 8.) According to him, Richard’s idea cannot be right
because in sentences like
(99) a. He might be a Boche.
b. Is he a Boche?
there is no implication that the individual is bad. Rather, the speaker
thinks that Germans in general are bad. McCready’s point is that the
slurring content is not truth functional. Rather it is conventionally implied
and this implicature is ‘boo’ Germans (in general). From this McCready
concludes that the dual content of ‘Boche’ is the Germans in general and
what he calls conventionally implicated or expressive (CIE) content. He
characterises the behaviour of the two in the following way. First, he
describes the descriptive content: slurs like ‘Boche’ behave more or less
in terms of their basic meaning. That is, ‘Boche’ refers to Germans in
general. But slurs differ in degree of approbation assigned to the group
under discussion. My interpretation from this that CIE content is just the
’boo’ and as McCready points out the intensity of the ’boo’ is different
with different slurs. For example, many current slurs are much more
intense than the outdated slurs like ‘Boche’.
McCready’s further discussion gives support to my interpretation. In
a footnote, McCready reports that the reviewer of McCready’s paper chal-
lenges McCready’s thought with two examples:
37The part McCready is commenting is this:
A word is a slur when it is a conventional means to express strong negative
attitudes towards members of a group, attitudes in some sense grounded
in nothing more than membership in the group. A slur on Asians, for
example, is a word which speakers know (and as competent speakers are
expected to know) is used to insult and display contempt for Asians merely
because that is what they are. (Richard 2008, 12.)
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(100) a. He’s German but at least he’s not a Kraut.
b. He’s a Boche but at least he isn’t a Kraut as well.
The point in these examples is that the speaker seems to think that there
is a real difference between ‘German’ and ‘Kraut’ in (100a) and between
‘Boche’ and ‘Kraut’ in (100b). This difference is very difficult to explain in
terms of the expressive content, i.e. in terms of the ‘boo’. In his response,
McCready ultimately dismisses these as infelicitous after consulting some
speakers (including himself). However, he consents that if these were
indeed felicitous, the examples would show that
there is some content present in the pejoratives in addition
to the CIE content which distinguishes the two properties;
perhaps it is even the case that some of the CIE content has
been reanalyzed as at-issue (McCready 2010, 22).
This is somewhat the option I am taking seriously in the following. I
think that (100a) and (100b) are felicitous and they deserve an explana-
tion. Furthermore, I think that McCready is on the right track about the
nature of the explanation. I think that they can be explained with further
stereotypical information which is on the basis of the ’boo’. Hence, I am
giving the explanatory priority to stereotypes over the attitude. However,
I need to make a qualification. I do not think that the stereotype is part
of descriptive content (at-issue) content, as McCready suggests. I think
it is information that attaches to slurs but it is not part of the semantic
content. The semantic content is exhaustively explained with the target.
3.3 Summary
Potts spells out derogation with conventional implicature. With this strat-
egy, slurs are not only on a par with expressives like ‘bastard’ but also with
information which I called “by the way content”. Concerning expressives,
Potts introduces four distinguishing properties. They are
1. Independence: Expressive content contributes a dimension of mean-
ing that is separate from the regular descriptive content.
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2. Nondisplaceability : Expressives predicate something of the utterance
situation.
3. Perspective dependence: Expressive content is evaluated from a par-
ticular perspective. In general, the perspective is the speaker’s, but
there can be deviations if conditions are right.
4. Descriptive ineffability : Speakers are never fully satisfied when they
paraphrase expressive content using descriptive, i.e., non-expressive,
terms.
These, of course, apply to all expressives but Potts holds that ethnic
slurs are a subset of expressives so they do apply also to slurs. It is
just that with slurs, the expressive content is derogatory ‘boo’ attitude.
In the course of the discussion, I claimed that only independence and
perspective dependence are plausible when the evidence concerning the
expressive nature is carefully examined. Either there is an alternative
analysis for the remaining properties (nondisplaceability) or they are just
denied, plain and simple (descriptive ineffability).
Potts claims that independence property shows that there has to be a
separate expressive dimension to meaning, in addition to truth functional
dimension. I admit that derogation is independent concerning the truth
functional dimension. However, this does not yet show that there is an
additional dimensional to meaning. Because I am committed to the co-
extensionality thesis, I do have to say that derogation is independent from
the truth functional aspect. Otherwise, the neutral term would derogatory
too. In relation to nondisplacebility, I showed that derogation can also be
part of ‘social etiquette’.38 Andersen and LePore argue that the social
aspect of the use of slurs explains derogation entirely. I agree that the
social aspect is an important point but I disagree that the social aspect
explains derogation entirely. Rather, it is more likely that the social ban
on certain words is a consequence of some features of the words. Just like
expressivism, I claim that there is a ‘deeper’ feature that explains deroga-
tion but instead of arguing that the feature responsible for derogation is
38As Mike Martin put it in London-Berkeley Graduate meeting in May 2016.
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part of the meaning, I say that the feature is part of epistemic profile of
the term.
I also discussed Potts’ descriptive ineffability. I did not find his ar-
guments convincing and neither did I find Jeshion’s argument convincing
regarding the descriptive ineffability of slurs.
Finally, I discussed McCready’s arguments for ‘boo’ attitude (and ar-
guments against stereotype) but did not find them convincing or rather
more accurately I want to take the route that McCready rejected. In con-
trast to McCready, I think that (100a) and (100b) are felicitous and they





4.1 Varieties of moderate descriptivism
In this chapter, we will move on to moderate descriptivism. This move is
a response to the criticism moderate expressivism received in the previous
chapter. The main point is that stereotypes do play a part in deroga-
tion. That is the difference between moderate expressivism and moderate
descriptivism.
First, I will examine Timothy Williamson’s account which is a ver-
sion of conventional implicature strategy. So far, we have only seen
Williamson’s criticism of Dummett’s proposal but in this chapter we will
see his positive proposal. It differs from the previous implicature strategy
in one important respect. In this version, the implicature explicates the
role of stereotypes. The previous version explicitly disregarded the role of
stereotypes.
We will then move on to Stefano Predelli’s work. His work is based on
ideas Kaplan has presented in numerous versions of his talk “Ouch and
Oops”.39 In his talk, Kaplan raises numerous apt points about expressives
39As he has given this talk many times, there are many transcriptions of the talk.
I am here relying on version which was transcribed by Elizabeth Coppock. The talk
was a Howison Lecture in Philosophy, delivered at Berkeley.
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such as ‘ouch’ and ‘oops’. He also discusses pejorative expressives, such
as ‘Damn Kaplan’. I will first discuss the relevant points in detail and
then continue to discuss Stefano Predelli’s treatment of expressives and
especially his treatment of slurs. Predelli brings forth a logic of expressives
which not only incorporates some of the ideas Kaplan presents in “Ouch
and Oops” but it also develops sometimes sketchy ingredients in Kaplan’s
paper in a detailed manner.40
At the end of the chapter, I will begin to outline my contrast with
moderate descriptivism. Although moderate descriptivism acknowledges
the same ingredients as I do, there is some differences. The main dif-
ference is that moderate descriptivism concentrates solely on language.
Whereas, I want to incorporate xenophobic beliefs to my view of slurs.
This difference will be detailed in the next chapter.
4.2 Williamson and conventional implica-
ture
The key point in Williamson’s account is that it acknowledges that the
slurring content is CI content but at the same time Williamson’s account
tries to accommodate McCready’s remark that there might be something
descriptive about the slurring content.
Williamson takes the lexicographer’s account as his starting point.
‘Boche’ means German but it is a derogatory expression. That is, he sub-
scribes to the co-extensionality thesis. Frege distinguished the sense and
the reference from the tone of an expression. The sense of an expression
determines the reference. For Dummett, the sense is explained with the
inferential patterns of an expression. Williamson thinks that the sense of
an expression is the intension of an expression. It is a function that assigns
the reference of an expression (across the possible worlds). According to
Frege, the tone of an expression is something that does not alter the mean-
40This should not be taken as criticism or dismissal of Kaplan. It is just that un-
published manuscripts often are sketchy.
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ing. ‘Walk’, ‘stroll’ and ‘saunter’ all mean the same, i.e. they have the
same sense but they differ in tone. A pejorative term ‘cur’ has the same
sense as ‘dog’. (Frege 1980, 140; see also Dummett 1973, 82-90; Neale
1999; Predelli 2013, 96-97.) According to Williamson, just like the terms
‘dog’ and ‘cur’, ‘Boche’ and ‘German’ differ in their Fregean tone. Any
competent speaker would then know that both sentences “Goethe was a
German” and “Goethe was a Boche” have the same truth value. So on
Williamson’s view, truth conditionally, there is nothing bad about slurs.
If there was, it would mean that there is something bad in the neutral
term since they have the same truth conditions. Frege gives an example
of
(101) that dog howled the whole night.
(102) that cur howled the whole night.
and he says of the pair:
[W]hilst the word ‘dog’ is neutral as between having pleasant
or unpleasant associations, the word ’cur’ certainly has un-
pleasant rather than pleasant association and puts us rather
in mind of a dog with a somewhat unkempt appearance. Even
if it is grossly unfair to the dog to think of it in this way, we
cannot say this makes [102] false. True, anyone who utters
this sentence speaks pejoratively, but this is not part of the
thought expressed. (Frege 1979, 140.)
Williamson agrees with this. The badness of slurs cannot be explained
with truth conditions as Hom and May tried to do. The difference between
‘German’ and ‘Boche’ is not in the truth conditions. Their contribution to
the truth conditions is the same, even if it is grossly unfair to the Germans
to think of them in a derogatory way, as Frege puts it. At the same time,
Williamson wants to honour Dummett’s insight that ‘Boche’ associates
cruelty with the Germans. Williamson also notes that Frege’s notion
of tone is, as such, too vague to serve as an explication of derogation.
Williamson characterises the problem in the following way:
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What needs explaining is this. Competent English speakers
know, or are in a position to know, that ‘German’ and ‘Boche’
have the same reference, and therefore that ‘Lessing was a Ger-
man’ and ‘Lessing was a Boche’ have the same truth-value. If
educated, such speakers know, or are in a position to know,
that both sentences are true. Nevertheless, although such
speakers are willing to assert ‘Lessing was a German,’ they
are not willing to assert ‘Lessing was a Boche,’ even on reflec-
tion, unless they are xenophobes. I know that ‘Lessing was a
Boche’ is true, but I refuse to assert ‘Lessing was a Boche.’
Why? (Williamson 2009, 149.)
Williamson goes on to outline his initial answer: “[T]o assert ‘Lessing was
a Boche’ would be to imply that Germans are cruel, and I do not want to
imply that, because the implication is both false and abusive” (Williamson
2009, 149). Williamson introduces the Gricean conventional implicature
to elaborate the initial response. A classic example of implicature is words
like ‘and’ and ‘but’. They have the same truth conditional meaning which
in this case means that they share the same truth table. Yet they imply
different things in (103) and (104)
(103) Mary is ambitious and honest.
(104) Mary is ambitious but honest.
(104) implies that ambitious people are not honest in general but (103)
has no such implication. The crucial point is that since ‘and’ and ‘but’
share the same truth table, the sentences have the same truth conditions.
In a similar sense, the false implication does not falsify the assertion
(105) Goethe was a Boche.
Hence, the slurring implicature is not a logical consequence of (105).
Rather, the thought that Germans are cruel is a conventional implica-
ture of (105). While being truth-conditionally equivalent, (105) and
(106) Goethe was German.
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differ in their conventional implicature. Conventional implicature is dif-
ferent from conversational implicature (which Hom introduced) in that
conventional implicature is detachable: it can differ between two truth-
conditionally equivalent sentences. But it is not cancellable, someone who
says
(107) Goethe was a Boche but I do not mean to imply that all Germans
are cruel.
merely adds hypocrisy to xenophobia. In (107), the implication produced
by the term ‘Boche’ is exactly what the speaker is trying to deny: all
Germans are cruel. Conversational implicatures are, vice versa, easily
cancellable but not detachable. If someone says
(108) She is either in Paris or London.
the maxims of conversation produce the implication that the speaker does
not know which city she is in. But this can be cancelled by adding
(109) I know which city she is in, but I am not going to tell you.41
According to Williamson, a slurring conventional implicature is based on
Putnam’s idea of stereotype. Even though the difference between ‘Boche’
and ‘German’ is “truth conditionally irrelevant”, Williamson thinks, along
with Putnam that the stereotype influences the competency of a speaker:
In the case of ‘Boche,’ one might say, in Putnam’s terminology,
that cruelty is part of its associated stereotype; a stereotypical
Boche is cruel. Putnam allows that stereotypes may be in-
accurate; perhaps ferocity is part of the stereotype associated
with the natural kind term ‘gorilla,’ although really gorillas
are gentle. On his view, the stereotype for a word plays no
direct role in determining its reference, but to be competent
41Similarly, in relation to Hom, if a speaker says that the dog is on the fucking couch,
the conversational implicature is that the speaker is annoyed with this. So if someone
responds to this by saying “Right and you think it is annoying”, the speaker can cancel
the implicature by saying “No, literally the dog is on the couch where questionable sex
occurs”.
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with the word one must have the stereotype (Williamson 2009,
153).
As a consequence, Williamson thinks that the conventional implicature
is, in a broad sense, a part of the meaning of the word. It is a part of
the meaning because if a speaker does not know the stereotype, a speaker
does not fully understand the word.
At this stage, two points are important. First, the implicature is not
just about speaker’s beliefs. Surely, if someone uses ‘Boche’, it can very
well be true that the speaker believes that Germans are cruel. When some-
one uses the term ‘Boche’, it is legitimate to ask the speaker to withdraw
the anti-German implication. But is it so easy to ask the speaker to with-
draw the implication that the speaker has that belief? As Williamson says:
“The false implicature is that Germans are cruel, not that the speaker be-
lieves that [. . . ]” (Williamson 2009, 152). The belief condition is just a
by-product of the implication that Germans are cruel. Secondly, the false
implication in (105) is not just that Goethe was cruel. If this was the case,
then there would be no problem in asserting
(110) Himmler was a Boche.
because the implication that Himmler was cruel is very well known to true.
The issue is that the application of ‘Boche’ always has the implication that
all Germans are cruel. (Williamson 2009, 149-152.) I will return to these
points after the introduction of Predelli’s work.
4.3 Kaplan on expressives
4.3.1 Two traditions
In his “Ouch and Oops”, Kaplan distinguishes between two “great tradi-
tions of semantic theory. On the one hand, there is the “formalist tradi-
tion” which includes Russell, Tarski, Carnap and Kripke. On the other
hand, there is the “anti-formalist” tradition which includes Wittgenstein,
Strawson, Austin and Grice. Kaplan says that the traditions had very dif-
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ferent views on how language should be approached. The formalists stud-
ied mostly idealised languages and the anti-formalists focussed on natural
language and especially on context-sensitivity of natural language. “It’s
from Wittgenstein that the slogan ’meaning is use’ is derived”, continues
Kaplan. (Kaplan ms.) Kaplan’s point in bringing up this distinction is to
show that he himself was trained in the formalist tradition and he thought
that the ‘meaning is use’ slogan was just an excuse to avoid rigorous study
of logical theory.42 However, when he started to take interest in expres-
sives, he changed his mind and thought that maybe the anti-formalists
have a point, at least to certain extent. This point became apparent in re-
lation to his ”Demonstratives” (1977) in which he explored the semantics
of indexicals. He says
I began to see the semantics of indexicals as having greater
affinities with the semantics (or potential semantics) of ep-
ithets, diminutives, interjections, nicknames, ethnic slurring
terms, and the like than than with the paradigm of meaning-
fulness, things like fortnight and feral and so on – the language
of science. (Kaplan ms.)
To his mind, the problem was that there was a whole host of expressions,
i.e. expressives which the formalist tradition had ignored. Kaplan started
to explore the difference between semantics of meanings and semantics
of use. Semantics of meanings applies to words like ‘fortnight’ and ‘feral’
and semantics of use applies to expressives and interjections and such.
The general method for expressives is the following. Instead of asking
what, say, ‘goodbye’ means, it should be asked under what conditions the
expressions is correctly and accurately used. In the following, the division
42The distinction is not entirely accurate. The slogan ’meaning is use’ inspired also
the inferantialists and resulted an interest in highly formal proof theory. As we seen in
the previous chapter, proof theory studies first and foremost the rules of inferences. It
is thought that the inferential rules of natural language encapsulate use of language.
This route has been taken by Dag Prawitz, Michael Dummett and their followers such
as Neil Tennant and Go¨ran Sundholm (see e.g. Pravitz 1973, 225-250; 2006, 507-
524; Dummett 1991 and Tennant 2002). However, this does not change the usefulness
Kaplan’s simplified distinction. His point is that when it comes to expressives, the two
great traditions come closer together, as we will see below.
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of labour is the following. First, we will take a brief excursion to Kaplan’s
ideas. The idea is to get acquainted with some of the terminology. After
that, I will proceed to Predelli in the next Section. I will follow his plan
in a (sometimes painfully) detailed manner because I will continue the
dialogue with Predelli in the next chapter.
4.3.2 Truth and logical validity
Although Kaplan’s ideas about logical validity and truth conditions of
sentences containing expressives is already well established, here is a brief
recapitulation. Kaplan’s idea is that while truth is immune to epithetical
colour, logic is not. The case about
(111) That damn Kaplan was promoted / Kaplan was promoted
points to that direction. Even though the sentences are truth conditionally
equivalent, they are behave differently in inferences. That is why Kaplan
concludes that logical validity is not based on truth but on information
delimitation: “For a semantic argument to be valid, there must be no
information in the conclusion that is not already in the premises”, says
Kaplan. (Kaplan ms.) The inference from
(112) Kaplan was promoted
to
(113) That damn Kaplan was promoted
is invalid just because it adds a bit of information halfway through the
inference. Namely, the information about the contemptuous attitude.
4.3.3 Expressive information
Informational equivalence
Let us look what Kaplan says about the semantic information of interjec-
tions like ‘oops’ and ‘ouch’. On the basis these cases, Kaplan comes to
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distinguish between subjective expression and objective expression. Ka-
plan thinks that ‘ouch’ is informationally equivalent to ‘I am in pain’ even
though
[t]he former is a single word, an interjection, an expressive; it
lacks a truth value and does not syntactically combine with
other expressions in ways in which sentences do. The latter,
the sentence I am in pain, is a sentence, it has a truth value,
and it does combine in all the old familiar ways, with negation
and conditionalization, and so on. But at least according to
the present representation, the information, the semantic in-
formation in ouch is identical with the semantic information
in I am in pain, so we may come to the conclusion that ouch
and I am in pain are [. . . ] informationally equivalent. (Kaplan
ms.)
Kaplan says that the way it is put above seems to be reduction ad absur-
dum of the view he is developing. He says that interjection like ‘ouch’ is
not truth functional but now he seems to be saying that it is equivalent
with an expression that very much is truth functional. Kaplan dodges this
reduction by saying that on his analysis, the differences between the inter-
jection ‘ouch’ and the informationally equivalent sentence have to do with
syntax, rather than semantics. “The information they convey is the same,
but they convey it through different modes of expression”, says Kaplan.
(Kaplan ms.) Indeed, the idea that the semantic information of an expres-
sive can be framed in a truth conditional way will become highly relevant.
It will be relevant in relation to Predelli’s notion of expressive witness
which spells out the stereotypical information of a slur. You might say
that an expressive witness is a way to decode the stereotypical information
truth conditionally.
When we move on to discuss ‘oops’, we can see that there are similari-
ties but there are also differences. To begin with the similarities, ‘oops’ is
a interjection just like ‘ouch’. It has a truth functional counterpart which
conveys the same semantic information. The counterpart is something
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like ‘I have just observed a minor mishap’. “So here again we have in-
formational equivalence between an expressive intersection and a purely
descriptive sentence”, kaplan concludes. (Kaplan ms.)
Subjective and objective expressives
Most notable difference between ‘ouch’ and ‘oops’ is that ‘ouch’ is based
on a state of the speaker while ‘oops’ is not based on a privileged access
to the states of affairs. We then have the following distinction:
Subjective expressive expresses a state of a speaker.
Objective expressive expresses a state of external world.
The idea is that I may have a privileged access to my pain. But when I
believe that I have witnessed a minor mishap, I certainly do not have a
privileged access to the facts about the mishap. Given this distinction,
Kaplan raises a very interesting question concerning the nature of infor-
mation that the derogatory epithets like slurs contain. Is that information
objective or subjective? Namely, is that is the target actually worthy of
the contemptuous attitude or is the slurring information just about the
speaker’s attitude? Kaplan himself thinks that with slurs that the correct
notion of expressive information is subjective. However, I do not think
that this is an exhaustive answer to the question and we will return to
this question below.
4.3.4 Rules of use for expressives
The idea is that rules of meaning yield truth values for sentences. But
since expressives are not truth functional, they are correct or incorrect in
terms of use. That is, there are rules of use for expressives. The point
is that the expressive content plays a part in determining the rules of
use. Let us first review the correct use of ‘ouch’. The rule of use for
‘ouch’ is that a speaker utters ‘ouch’ when the speaker feel sudden pain.
It is incorrect when the speaker does not feel pain. The speaker might be
faking it in order to get attention and sympathy. Here we have then the
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rule for correct use of ‘ouch’ and an example of a situation when the rule
is broken, an example of incorrect use of ‘ouch’. Analogously, the rule for
‘oops’ is something like: ‘oops’ is correctly uttered just when the speaker
witnesses a minor mishap. It would incorrect to utter ‘oops’ if there was
not a minor mishap. Kaplan gives an example of a situation where the
speaker sees a someone breaking a glass and the speaker says ‘oops’ but
it turns out that the person breaking the glass is an actor doing a film.
So it really isn’t a minor mishap but done intentionally. This would the
be an incorrect use of ‘oops’.
Now we can explicitly state what the rules of meaning are and what the
rules of use are. The rules of meaning applies to descriptive expressions
and rules of use apply to expressives. So we have the following conditions:
An expression is descriptively correct (i.e. true) if what it describes is
the case.
An expression is expressively correct if what it expresses or displays is
the case.
’Ouch’ and ’oops’ are both pure expressives. So they do not have truth
conditions at all. They are evaluated purely on the basis of rules of use.
What about expressions with dual content like slurs which are partly de-
scriptive, partly expressive? First, let us begin with Kaplan’s observation:
I think it is (or should be) uncontroversial that expressions
of these kind have a stable, conventional meaning, or perhaps
better, a stable, conventional use; we say hello when we meet,
goodbye when we part. One who used these expressions in
the opposite way would be making a linguistic error, an error
on a part with using fortnight to mean a period of one week.
Similarly, the word honkey is a derogatory term for caucasians,
and anyone who claims to be using it in a non-derogatory sense
is also making a linguistic error [. . . ]. (Kaplan ms.)
So a slurring expression has the same truth conditions as the neutral coun-
terpart and furthermore there are rules of use for slurs. The expression
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should be uttered only if the speaker has an unfavourable attitude towards
the target. That is, in addition to the descriptive content, slurs convey a
contemptuous attitude towards the target and if the attitude is missing,
the use is incorrect. In this sense then, lovely old lady from Croydon who
uses the word ‘Frog’ uses it incorrectly. She is lovely and she has nothing
against the French. It is just that she has always used this term. Just
because of this, her use is incorrect.
4.3.5 Semantics of expressives
Kaplan outlines a semantic approach for the treatment of expressives.
According to him, we can set up a model-theoretic framework as repre-
senting the semantic information by looking at the contexts in which the
expression is used correctly.
Kaplan uses ‘ouch’ as an example. The content of ‘ouch’ is that the
speaker is in pain. In this case, the semantic information of the utterance
is represented by a set of contexts in which the expressive is correctly used.
The correct contexts are those in which the speaker actually is in pain, not
just faking it. “That set of contexts represents the semantic information
contained in the word ouch”, says Kaplan (Kaplan ms.) These points
are very important considering Predelli’s treatment of slurs. In fact, you
might say that this is the corner stone of Predelli’s view.
4.4 Predelli on slurs
4.4.1 Introduction
Predelli’s logic of expressives utilises many of Kaplan’s ideas and also
develops the ideas in great detail. Most importantly, Predelli’s logic for
expressives and derogatory expressions aims to do justice for Kaplan’s
insight about the inferential patterns of slurs.
My exposition relies mainly on his “From the Expressive to the Deroga-
tory: On the semantic Role for Non-Truth-Conditional Meaning” (Predelli
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2010, 164-185). However in his Meaning without Truth (2013, see espe-
cially chapters 6 and 7), Predelli brings forth even more detailed exposition
of the logic of expressives. For the purposes here, the less detailed expo-
sition will do just fine. Some details are picked from the more detailed
work.
First, we can see some aspects of Predelli’s logic of expressives in re-
lation to sentential prefixes like ‘alas’ and ‘hurray’ and then we will move
on to sub-sentential expressives such as ‘damn’ as in ‘that damn Kaplan’.
Finally, we will move on to derogatory expressives and the aspects related
to slurs have our special attention. After the logic of slurs is ready, we will
discuss Predelli’s motivation for his decisions and the linguistic evidence
backing his decisions.
4.4.2 Truth conditional semantics
Character and context
According to Predelli, the following statements
(114) Alas, Kaplan is promoted.
(115) Hurray, Kaplan is promoted.
(116) Kaplan is promoted.
are truth conditionally equivalent. Let us now quickly see the reasons
behind this because those reasons will play a part in the discussion later.
In simple formalized languages, you can do semantics by assigning
constant values to subsentential expression, such as singular terms and
predicates. To put very crudely, from the semantic values of names and
predicates, you can then figure out the semantic values of more complex
expressions such as sentences.
However when dealing with natural language, you will inevitably en-
counter the context-dependent nature of natural language. This observa-
tion is especially acute with indexicals, such as ‘I’. The basic idea is that
semantic values are assigned with respect to certain parameters. In the
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case of indexicals, the appropriate parameter is the context of utterance.
A context c then is a n-tuple, formally represented as
c = 〈ca, cl, ct, cw〉.
That is, a context is a quadruple of an agent (i.e. a speaker), a; a location,
l ; a time, t ; and a possible world, w. (Predelli 2013, 6-7.)
Given this, the truth conditional aspects of meaning depends on the
notion of character of the simple expressions (i.e. names and predicates).
It is a function from a context to a semantic value (Predelli 2010, 165
and Kaplan 1977, 505-507). In sentences (114) to (116), the truth condi-
tionally relevant aspects are relatively simple. For instance, ‘Kaplan’ can
be represented as a constant function which yields Kaplan as a semantic
value of the name in every context. Since it is a constant function, there
is no real context dependence here. Things are, however, different with
indexicals such as ‘I’. It can represented as a function which yields the
agent (the speaker) of c as the semantic value of the expression in any
given context. Hence, the semantic value of ‘I’ depends on the context of
the utterance. In a context where I say ‘I’, the character of ‘I’ yields me
as the semantic value of the expression and in a context where Kaplan
says it, the semantic value is Kaplan.
Character indistinguishability
The point here is that truth conditionally (114) to (116) are equivalent.
All sentences turn out to be true with respect to context c if and if only,
(constant) semantic value of ‘Kaplan’ is, in fact, promoted in cw, at time
ct (Predelli 2010, 165.) So the semantic value for all sentences from (114)
to (116) is
Jpromoted(Kaplan)Kc,w,t = T iff JKaplanKc,w,t ∈ JpromotedKc,w,t.
In another words, the truth conditional structure of (114) to (116) is the
same (See Predelli 2013, 6-10.) As Predelli points out:
[F]or any S, ‘hurray S’, ‘alas S’ are true with respect c iff S is.
It follows that ‘hurray’ and ‘alas’ share their character, namely
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the non-indexical character which, given any context c, yields
the identity function on truth-values. (Predelli 2010, 166.)
That means that the sentences from (114) to (116) are character indistin-
guishable. (See also Predelli 2005, 8-39.)
4.4.3 Logic for sentential expressives
Meaning and use
The statements from (114) to (116) are truth conditionally equivalent.
However according to Predelli, they do differ in meaning. There is an
especially strong contrast between (114) and (115). Predelli says that his
aim is “that of sketching an apparatus suitable for the analysis of the
characteristic aspects of the meaning of expressive prefixes such as ‘alas’
or ‘hurray’” (Predelli 2010, 164). Let us call a sentence containing an
expressive an expressive sentence. That is, a sentence with an expressive
prefix is denoted with ’ex T ’ while T is sentence which does not contain
expressive. Let us call non-expressive sentence simple sentence.
As Kaplan pointed out, the treatment of the meaning of expressives
can be seen as an extension of truth conditional treatment of meaning.
Predelli takes this point seriously. He says that, in addition to the truth
conditional aspects of language, the use of language can be represented as
expression-context pairs (instead of context-semantic value pair). In the
case of “Kaplan is promoted”, my use of the sentence (today the 18th of
Oct) is representable in terms of (116) and of a context c containing me
as an agent, the actual world and 18th of October as its parameters. The
pair is then 〈(116), c〉. From this it follows that the use is true iff (116) is
evaluated as truec (true is context c). To put it in another words, the use
is true iff Kaplan is promoted on 18th of October. The expression-context
pair 〈e, c〉 is then a representation of a possible use of e. At the same
time, it is a proper subclass of the class of C of contexts. Let us call this
class CU(e) of contexts of use for e. The class of use for e is subclass of the
class C of contexts because, according to the developed framework, “all
instances of language use are representable as expression-context pairs”
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but the converse does not hold (Predelli 2010, 166). For example, if the
pair consists an expression and a context c is such that nobody ever speaks
in the possible world of c, then the pair is not a representation of any use
of e. The definition for CU(e) is
CU(e) = {c ∈ C: Ke(c)}
where Ke(c) is an appropriate condition on contexts, i.e. use contraint for
e. Remember that Kaplan thought that for some expressions the slogan
‘meaning is use’ is correct. In similar manner, what should be now clear is
that Predelli thinks that meaning of sentences (114) to (116) imposes at
least some of the constraints on use, in contrast to purely extra-semantic
properties. It seems clear that speaker of (114) is expressing his or her
dissatisfaction about the fact that Kaplan is promoted. Vice versa, there is
something wrong with the use if the speaker of (114) is in fact enthusiastic
about Kaplan’s promotion. In Predelli’s terms, this constitutes defective
use. The non-defective uses of (114) are then a class NU(114) of contexts.
Defined preliminarily as
NU(114) = {c ∈ CU(114): at cw and ct, ca is unhappy about Pc}
Pc is the (truth conditional) content expressed by (114) (or in fact with
(116) in this case) with respect to c. In other words, (114) is used non-
defectively only by speakers who are unhappy about Kaplan’s promotion
in context c.
Now we are finally ready to spell out the distinction between (114) and
(115). The non-defective contexts for (114) are distinct from (115):
NU(115) = {c ∈ CU(115): at cw and ct, ca is happy about Pc}
From these clauses Predelli goes to formulate a general non-defectiveness
clauses for the use of sentences containing expressives:
(i) For any simple sentence S, NU(S) = CU(S).
(ii) For any expressive sentence S of the form ex T, NU(S) = {c ∈ CU(S):
Rex(T, c)}.
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In general, the Rex relationship has an expressive nature. It is a relation
between the agent of c and the content of T in c. For example, in (115) the
agent is unhappy about the thought that is expressed with T. As Predelli
observes, it is very plausible that clauses for the expressively non-defective
uses of (114) and (115) above confirm the conventional meaning of ‘alas’
and ‘hurray’. He says that only linguistically incompetent speakers employ
(115) in the absence of positive attitude towards Kaplan’s promotion. This
observation also confirms the Kaplanian point that the difference between
the meaning of ‘alas’ and ‘hurray’ is undetectable at the truth conditional
level. (Predelli 2010, 167; see also Predelli 2008, 101-104.)
Expressive witness
On the basis of the previous, Predelli draws the conclusion that the mean-
ing of an expressive may not be represented with truth conditions, i.e. in
terms of character, but more likely in terms of expressive constraint. This
is represented as restriction on the class C of contexts. The meaning of
‘alas’ can be represented as a pair 〈id, Ralas〉. Here id is a identity func-
tion on truth values, Ralas is the following expressive constraint: for all
sentences S and context c, Ralas(S, c) iff at cw and ct, ca is unhappy about
the content of S in c. With the help of expressive constraint, it can be
said that in order to be non-defective use in c, the content of S has to be
true and the speaker has to be in right relation to that content. (This
idea is elaborated below.)
The previous defines the class of expressively non-defective uses of
sentences. The definition does this on the basis of two things: by appealing
to the composition of NU(S) and to the non-truth conditional aspects of
expressive prefixes. In this sense then, it makes sense to concentrate on
the class of non-defective contexts (ND) for S :
(i) For any simple sentence S, ND(S) = C.
(ii) For any expressive sentence S of the form ‘ex T ’, ND(S) = {c ∈ C:
Rex(T, c)}
131
This means that c is a non-defective context for (114) iff the speaker in c
is unhappy about Kaplan’s promotion.
Most interesting feature of Predelli’s exposition is the notion of expres-
sive witness. (As we will see below, this notion explicates the connection
between the stereotype and a given slur.) The definition of expressive
witness is the following:
(EXW) A simple sentence W is an expressive witness for a sentence S
iffdef truec(W) iff c ∈ ND(S).
This is to say that for any sentence S of the form ‘ex T ’, W is an expressive
witness for S iff the truth of W is established by Rex. For example,
(117) I am unhappy about Kaplan’s promotion
is an expressive witness for (114): (117) is truec in exactly the same con-
texts where (114) comes out as non-defective. (Predelli 2010, 169; see
also Predelli 2113, 122-124.) We can now tackle the inferential patterns
of expressives.
Expressive validity
According to the truth conditional account, both
(118) Alas, Kaplan is promoted. Therefore, Kaplan is promoted
and
(119) Kaplan is promoted. Therefore, alas, Kaplan is promoted
are valid since, in both arguments, the premise and the conclusion are
truth conditionally equivalent. For Kaplan this shows that validity is not
based truth but on the preservation of semantic information. For Kaplan,
there is only one notion of validity. It is, in fact, important to notice that
Predelli introduces two notions of validity. One is truth conditional validity
and the other is expressive validity. Let us call the former validity and, in
distinction, continue to talk about the latter as expressive validity. The
notion of expressive validity is obviously the one that we are interested
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here. It is not defined in terms of truth preservation but in terms of non-
defectiveness preservation. However, since the valid inference in (118)
requires both, truth preservation and non-defectiveness preservation, we
need a notion that reflects this. So Predelli defines a true non-defective
context in the following way:
(TND) A context is a true non-defective context for S, c ∈ TND(S),
iffdef Truec and c ∈ ND(S).
In order to be a member of a true non-defective context, two things are
required of context c. In the case of (114), c is a member of TND(114) iff
(i) in cw Kaplan is promoted at ct and (ii) in cw and at ct, ca is unhappy
about Kaplan’s promotion. The class of true non-defective context for
simple sentences is the class of c in which the simple sentence S is truec.
This is so regardless of the attitude the speaker might have towards the
events happening in c. Given (TND), expressive validity is as follows:
(EXV) An argument S1 . . . Sm: Sn is expressively valid iffdef TND(S1)
∩ . . .∩ TND(Sm) ⊆ TND(Sn)
From this, it follows
A context c is a true non-defective context for S iff (S ∧ W) is truec.
Here W is an expressive witness for S (as defined in clause for EXW). As a
consequence of the previous clause, we have expressive validity in respect
to expressive witness :
(EVW) An argument is S1 . . . Sm: Sn is expressively valid iff the argu-
ment (S1 ∧ W1) . . . (Sm ∧ Wm) ` (Sn ∧ Wn) is valid.
Here again W1 is an expressive witness for S1. At the same time, we have
expressive validity of argument with a simple conclusion
(EVS) Any valid argument S1 . . . Sm: Sn whose conclusion Sn is simple
is expressively valid.
This is in fact the case in (118) and hence it is, indeed, valid and expres-
sively valid. But while (119) is valid, it is not expressively valid. (Predelli
2010, 171-174; see also 2013, 122-122.)
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Expressive introduction
An interesting feature of Predelli’s logic is that under certain conditions
one can introduce expressives and these are truth conditions. These can
be called expressive introduction steps. These steps need to come out as
valid and expressively valid. Take for instance
(120) Kaplan is promoted and I am unhappy about Kaplan’s promotion.
Therefore, alas, Kaplan is promoted.
Hence we have the general pattern:
(EX-I) S ∧ W
ex(S)
The analogy between the previously discussed introduction rules (for ‘Boche’)
are apparent. Notably, one can see the conjunction of
(121) Kaplan is promoted and I am happy about Kaplan’s promotion
as the conditions for the introduction of ‘alas’. However, the converse
does not hold. This means that there is no corresponding elimination
step for expressive introduction step. Namely, it should be noticed that
expressive validity does not come on top of (truth functional) validity.
It is not ‘validity-plus’ as the Kaplanian terminology might hint. Some
expressively valid arguments are not (truth functionally) valid, as Predelli
shows. For example,
(122) Alas, Kaplan is promoted. Therefore, I am unhappy about Ka-
plan’s promotion
is not (truth functionally) valid, but it is expressively valid. (EVS) is
enough to make the inference expressively valid as the conclusion is a
simple sentence but still truth functional validity fails. As it was noted,
sentences from (114) to (116) are truth conditionally equivalent. Hence
the premise is truec with those contexts in which Kaplan is promoted
and the expressives, ‘alas’ or ‘hurray’ does not contribute to the truth
conditions. However, in some of these contexts ca may not be unhappy
about Kaplan’s promotion. Thereby, the argument is invalid in contexts
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where Kaplan is promoted and the speaker lacks the hostility towards
Kaplan’s promotion. (Predelli 2010, 171-172 and more on the rejection of
expressive validity as ‘validity-plus’ in Predelli 2013, 122-123.)
4.4.4 Logic for subsentential expressives
As we are approaching the logic of slurs (according to Predelli), there
is one more preliminary step concerning expressives to take. Slurs are
obviously not sentential prefixes:
(123) #Frog, Max is promoted
is just ill-grammatical. Slurs are then closer to subsentential expressives,
such as
(124) That damn Kaplan is promoted
Although these might seem like trivial and obvious observations, they are
a good place to start the discussion about non-sentential expressives. The
following observation might seem like an obvious one too. The expressive
statements
(125) a. Damn, Kaplan is promoted
b. That damn Kaplan is promoted
have different witnesses. The corresponding witnesses are
(126) a. I am unhappy about Kaplan’s promotion
b. I have an unfavourable attitude towards Kaplan.
So in (125a) the unhappy attitude is towards the content expressed by
the whole sentence. But the speaker might not have anything against
Kaplan personally. Maybe the speaker ran for the same promotion and is
disappointed that she did not get the promotion. Whereas in (125b), the
speaker may have nothing in stake in the promotion procedures. Rather,
she has an axe to grind with Kaplan personally (with the semantic value
of ‘Kaplan’) and (125b) expresses that. As a consequence we have the
following valid and expressively valid inferences:
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(127) a. That damn Kaplan is promoted. Thus, Kaplan is promoted.
[by EVS]
b. Kaplan is promoted and I have an unfavourable attitude to
towards Kaplan. Thus, that damn Kaplan is promoted.
[by EXW]
The point here is that the unfavourable attitude is directed at an object,
i.e. towards the semantic value of a proper name. Predelli says that this
can be extended to the case of general terms as in:
(128) Those damn conservatives won
which entails
(129) The Conservatives won
and (128) is expressively entailed by
(130) The Conservatives won and I have unfavourable attitude towards
the conservatives.
The pejorative attitude is directed towards the semantic value of the gen-
eral term as is the case with slurs. However, one more observation about
expressives is needed and I think this a key point. The sentence
(131) The stupid Prime Minister is re-elected
is ambiguous between an expressive and an non-expressive reading. The
non-expressive reading is apt in a slightly weird situation where there is
more than one Prime Minister. In this case, (131) is a good answer to the
question “Which Prime Minister is re-elected?”. This reading entails
(132) The Prime minister is stupid.
In contrast, the expressive reading “bear no truth conditional relation
to the Prime Minister’s intelligence or lack thereof”, says Predelli. The
expressive reading is (truth conditionally) equivalent to
(133) The prime minister is re-elected,
plain and simple. At the same time, it is non-defective only in contexts in
which the agent thinks that the Prime Minister is stupid. (Predelli 2010,
176.)
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4.4.5 Logic of slurs
Expressive analysis or extensional target analysis
Finally, we are in a position to evaluate the right logic for slurs, at least
according to Predelli. He says that the same distinction as above in (131)
applies to the following:
(134) Those stupid communists are re-elected.
This statement has two readings just like (131). The point in bringing
this up is that slurs seem to be very similar. They are general terms just
as ‘communists’ is. So let’s take a pejorative expression such as ‘cur’ and
consider the following:
(135) That is a cur.
Predelli says that the Oxford English Dictonary defines ’cur’ as a dog
that is worthless and low-bred. Furthermore, the expression is always
comptemptuous. (Predelli 2013, 97-98). Given the above, we have two
choices to analyse the sentence: non-expressive and expressive treatment.
According to the non-expressive treatment, (135) is false if it is directed
towards a dog which is fine example of its breed. On the expressive read-
ing the sentence is true but defective if the speaker does not think that the
dog indeed is low-bred and worthless. Let us now assume for a moment
that, pace Kaplan, the nature of the expressive content is subjective. The
point is that according to extensional target analysis, i.e. truth conditional
account, the extension of ’cur’ is a subset of dogs. Namely a subset of dogs
which are worthless and low-bred. Assume that N is a pejorative expres-
sion with a structure PEJ(n) where n is the neutral expression and PEJ
turns it into a pejorative expression.43 And let extc(e) be the extension of
e with respect to c. Furthermore, let sentence SN contain the pejorative
expression N. Finally, let neg stand for some negative connotation, such as
low-bred or lazy. We then have the following divergence in the extension
between the non-expressive reading and expressive reading:
43The structure is very similar to Hom and May’s version of PEJ, but Predelli’s
version does not take the original set to an empty set but to an actual subset of the
original set, depending on what neg stands for.
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(NER) extc(N ) ⊂ extc(n) and ND(SN) = C
(EXR) extc(N ) = extc(n), and c ∈ ND(SN) only if ca regards x in neg
way.
On the one hand in (NER), the extension of the pejorative term is a proper
subset of the neutral term and the non-defective context for the use of Sn
is simply the set of contexts C (simple sentences are trivially non-defective
and SN is simple sentence according to non-expressive reading). On the
other hand according to the expressive reading, the extension of N is
the same as the extension of n. In other words, N and n are character
indistinguishable. However, the use of SN , which contains the pejorative
expression, is non-defective only if the agent in c regards the semantic
value of N in some negative way.
An important point can be made by comparing (NER) to Hom and
May’s PEJ. One of the problems with Hom and May’s PEJ was that
all its uses came out as false which just is not plausible in the face of
linguistic evidence. So let now see if (NER) makes any improvement to
this situation. It seems to me that (NER) might be a correct analysis for
pejorative expressions like ‘cur’.44 When someone says (135), it might be
appropriate to response that
(136) No, that is not a cur. It is a fine example of its breed,
if indeed the dog actually is a well-behaving and beautiful dog. But I do
not think it is the right analysis for slurs. If the criticism towards Hom
and May is taken at face value then in one sense the extensional target
analysis is a better suggestion than Hom and May’s original proposal but
in one sense it is worse than Hom and May’s proposal. It is better because
the slurring sentence:
(137) Max is a Frog.
comes out true sometimes. It is true when Max actually is a member of a
subset of French people, i.e. a member of a set of those French who also
44More on the analysis of ‘cur’ and similar expressives in the next chapter.
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have vulgar manners. However, this is also problematic as we will have
difficulties in explaining derogation. Given the above the analysis, when
someone points to a French person with vulgar manners and says
(138) He is a Frog,
there is nothing a civilised person can object to. The xenophobic speaker
is absolutely right. The analysis at hand, so to speak, blurs the distinction
between
(139) That bastard stole my car.
(140) That Frog stole my car.
The point is that, according to the analysis, there are appropriate uses
of slurs, just like there are appropriate uses of ‘bastard’. However follow-
ing Williamson’s example, the following two sentences should be equally
offensive:
(141) a. Goethe is a Boche.
b. Himmler is a Boche.
Even though (141b) might seem to be appropriate because Himmler indeed
was German and a very cruel man, Williamson points out: “the use of the
word generates the xenophobic implicature, irrespectively of its position
in the sentence”. (Williamson 2009, 151 and see also Predelli 2010, 179.)
Not only is this problematic for a civilised speaker wanting to object to
a xenophobic utterance, but it is also problematic as a representation of
xenophobic speech:
In general, the use of derogatory slur does not merely attribute
undesirable features to a certain individual who happens to a
member of an ethnic group, but involves a certain negative
connotation of that individual as a member of that group.
(Predelli 2010, 179.)
In this sense then, it would seem that the expressive reading somewhere
along the lines of (EXR) is more appropriate analysis of slurs. Further-
more, Predelli modifies (EXR) to accommodate the idea of slurring sen-
tences as generic statements. He says that non-defectiveness could be
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derivable on the basis of the speaker’s attitude towards certain individu-
als. This idea, again, could be cashed out as a typical members of ethnic
group. (Predelli 2010, 180.) This adding gives the slurring utterance a
generic flavour.
Expressive analysis: subjective or objective information?
Kaplan considered two ways the expressive information can be construed.
It is very likely that ‘ouch’ conveys subjective information and it is equally
likely that ‘oops’ conveys objective information. Predelli then picks up this
idea and discusses this in relation to slurs. We have been assuming them
preliminarily as expressions of subjective information. Predelli’s work here
is again helpful as you can carve out the difference in terms of witnesses
and expressive introduction. According to the subjective reading, the
conditions for the introduction of
(142) Max is a Frog.
are
(143) Max is French and I regard him as vulgar.
We then have the Subjective Information Introduction for ’Frog’:
(Frog-SI)
Max is French ∧ I regard him as vulgar
Max is a Frog
In contrast, the conditions for ’Frog’ introduction according to objective
reading are
(144) Max is French and Max is vulgar.
On the basis of this, the Objective Information Introduction for ’Frog’ is
(Frog-OI)
Max is French ∧ Max is vulgar
Max is a Frog
Given the generic formulation above and given EXR, the formulation of
the extension of the expressive reading, we can now formulate the respec-
tive constraint on subjective and objective reading. Let d be a derogatory
common noun, then the constraint for subjective reading is
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(SUC) In Cw and at ct, ca regards typical member of extc(d) as neg.
The corresponding objective constraint is
(OBC) In cw and at ct, every typical member of extc(d) is neg.
So the question is which one of these constraints applies to slurs. Predelli
himself is quite unequivocal: “my sympathies fall within the subjectivist”.
His reason for this that according to the framework he developed, OBC
entails that xenophobic slurs ”may never be employed non-defectively”
(Predelli 2010, 180).
Xenophobes as competent speakers
The previous is simply an observation about the use of language, not
so much a moral stand against xenophobia. For surely, there are non-
defective uses of slurs. Needless to say, racist and xenophobic remarks
stem out of ignorance and they are definitely unpleasant but they hardly
linguistically defective. As Predelli accurately notes:
For one thing, racist and xenophobic attitudes are empirically
incorrect: there is no conceptual (and, more importantly, no
meaning-encoded) difficulty in supposing that membership in
an ethnic or national group provides satisfactory motivation
for a hostile attitude (Predelli 2010, 180).
This statement is directly at odds with Hom and May’s proposal. Ac-
cording to Hom and May, the xenophobic beliefs make the xenophobes,
at least partially, incompetent speakers because they attach wrong truth
conditions to their slurring statements. Predelli denies this. Xenophobia
does not diminish linguistic competency and xenophobes do attach the
right truth conditions to their slurring statements. With slurring terms
xenophobes are able to express their hostile attitude accurately.
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4.4.6 Analysis of language and analysis of xenopho-
bia
All of the views introduced in this chapter agree that the phenomenon
of slurring should be approached through language. Williamson says this
most explicitly. For him, the use of slurs is an linguistic phenomenon.
Williamson says:
The implicature that ‘Boche’ carries is not merely about the
speaker’s psychological state. In particular, what is implicated
is not merely that the speaker believes that Germans are cruel
[. . . ] Perhaps the use of ‘Boche’ does also carry the additional
implicature that the speaker believes that Germans are cruel,
since a linguistically competent speaker who uses ‘Boche’ with-
out believing that Germans are cruel is being insincere; but
such a belief condition would be a by-product of the simple
implicature that Germans are cruel, combined with the con-
versational norm of sincerity; it is not the source of what is
most objectionable in the use of ‘Boche’. (Williamson 2009,
151-152.)
Here Williamson explicitly contrasts two stands on slurs. The linguistic
approach and what might be called an epistemic approach, according to
which the slurring terms first and foremost reveal something about the
speaker’s beliefs. For Williamson, slurs do reveal something about the
speaker’s psychological states but only derivatively and with the help of
other linguistic conventions, that is to say in a by-product manner. Kaplan
has a similar thought. He explains his project towards the end of “Ouch
and Oops”:
I hope my analysis will help us to see that although there may
be profound epistemological insights that relate to the connec-
tion between the descriptive I am in pain and the expressive
ouch, there is also a purely semantic explanation of the connec-
tion, and explanation that makes it exactly analogous to the
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connection between oops and I have observed a minor mishap,
a case that is free of epistemological considerations. And here,
I continue my long-term project of trying to unmask semanti-
cal truths in epistemological clothing. (Kaplan ms, 18.)
Both of the quotations provide a good starting point to distinguish my
project from Kaplan’s and Williamson’s projects. Kaplan says that his
treatment of expressives is part of his ongoing project to show that some
seemingly deep epistemological insight can, in fact, have a semantic ex-
planation. That is, those epistemological truths turn out be truths about
language and its use. In this way, some seemingly deep epistemological
truths are explained away. In contrast to this, I want to keep an open
eye for the possibility that that the use of slurring words and the use of
neutral words reflect genuine epistemic differences.
Finally, Predelli has already given the reason for this stance. He said
that racist and xenophobic attitudes are empirically incorrect but that
does not make xenophobes incompetent users of language. I want to test
the conjecture that a view on slurs can take on board the special features
of xenophobia, such as empirical incorrectness. Because I want to hold
on to Predelli’s claim that xenophobes are competent speakers, the first
step in this project is to admit that the epistemic features of xenophobia
are not reflected semantically. (Of course, the notion of semantics needs
to be specified and it will be done in the next chapter.) In this sense, my
aim is the exact opposite to Kaplan’s.
4.5 Summary
In the two previous chapters, I have discussed two moderate approaches.
They both have commonalities. They both adhere to the co-extensionality
thesis. This has major consequences. It rules out the possibility that
derogation can be spelled out truth functionality but more importantly
it, gives us a handle on the understanding of slurs. The views also agree
that the most important thing with slurs and expressives in general is the
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linguistic mechanism that enables to express them non-truth functionally.
Williamson express this view very explicitly.
Even though the methodologies are very different between the moder-
ate views, the goal is the same: to spell out derogation without interfering
with the descriptive content. However, the slight variations become im-
portant in the next chapter. So it is useful to stress the methodological
differences. Moderate expressivists and Williamson rely on conventional
implicature but even within the conventional implicature strategies there
are differences. Potts holds that the implicature is just the negative at-
titude but Williamson bases his notion of implicature on the streotype.
However, the main features of the strategy are the same. Both views hold
that conventional implicature does not interfere with the main content of
the sentence. Potts holds that the CI content in
(145) Napoleon, my uncle, will lead the charge himself.
is the assertion about Napoleon’s strategy. If someone responds to this by
saying:
(146) Yes and he needs to act now!
the urgency for the action is not mitigated even if it turns out that
Napoleon is not the speaker’s uncle. The same holds for expressive pejo-
ratives according to Potts. The sentence
(147) Max is a Frog.
is not falsified if the speaker does not have an contemptuous attitude
toward the Max. In similar spirit, Williamson thinks that false implicature
(148) French are vulgar.
does not falsify (147). It is true iff Max is French.
In the end, you might ask whether Kaplan’s and Predelli’s view is true
expansion of semantics. It is an expansion in the sense that Kaplan and
Predelli hold that derogation is semantic even though they both subscribe
to the co-extensionality thesis. That is, derogation is part of the mean-
ing, even though it does not affect the truth conditions. So there must
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be something non-truth conditional to meaning. However, there is a big
difference to Potts’ strategy. Potts introduces new types to expand the
semantics but Kaplan and Predelli do not do anything like that. Kaplan’s
insight is that the expressive dimension can be exposed within the existing
model-theoretic framework. Since ‘ouch’ and “I am in pain” are informa-
tional equivalents, the correct use of ‘ouch’ can be spelled out with the
truth of “I am in pain”. Predelli utilises this idea in his work. Specifi-
cally, Predelli proposes that correct use (or non-defective use, in Predelli’s
terms) can be explicated in terms of truth of the description of the agent’s
attitude. In other words, derogation can be spelled out as a equivalence
between correct use of a slurring expression and the truth of the expres-
sive witness for the slur. The bottom line is that there is no need for





In the previous chapters, I have expressed my sympathies and also my
discontent with the other views. From pure views I take the point that
the use of slurs involves a mistake but I disagree that the mistake affects
the meaning of slurs. From moderate views I take the co-extensionality
thesis. This explains the understanding of slurs and the inferences that ac-
company the understanding but my affiliation with moderate views stops
there. I do not subscribe to the expansion of semantics.
My major issue with moderate views is that they see the use of slurs
solely as a linguistic issue. In fact, this disagreement distinguishes generic
descriptivism from all of the other views discussed so far. The previous
views have claimed that derogation is at least partly a semantic issue.
In contrast, generic descriptivism holds that derogation is not a semantic
issue. This claim follows from two central claims of generic descriptivism.
First, I think that the slurring term and the neutral term are co-referential.
Secondly, I think that truth conditions are an exhaustive explanation of
the meaning of slurs. From this it follows that the derogatory feature
does not affect the meaning of slurring words. Rather, derogation is an
epistemic issue. Having said this, my methodological sympathies lie with
moderate views. Particularly, I want to use the idea of explicating correct
use truth conditionally as Predelli does. Compared to Potts’ view, I find
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Predelli’s view particularly fruitful because, with his account, derogation
can be spelled out explicitly as a condition for use.
Because I claim that derogation is epistemic rather than semantic, my
motivations for the condition for correct use is different from Predelli’s.
His idea is that the expressive witness reveals the conventional semantic
profile of a slur. In contrast, I think that the condition for correct use
stems from epistemic features of a given slur. The basic four claims of
generic descriptivism are as follows:
1. Derogation is epistemic:
(a) The information a slurring term subsumes is xenophobic.
(b) This information is responsible for derogation because the in-
formation is negative and unwarranted.
Here the key point comes from originalism. Even though originalism is
first and foremost a theory of non-linguistic concepts, I think original-
ism still offers insights which can be applied to linguistic expressions too.
Originalism severs the ties between the epistemic features of a concept
and the semantic aspect of a concept. Thereby, the information that a
slur contains does not have any semantic consequences. Another point is
that the information attached to slurs is not only negative which seems
obvious but it is also epistemically unwarranted.
2. It is conventionally recognised that slurs are non-neutral words. The
non-neutrality stems from a conventional relation between the term
and the target.
In the following, I will differentiate non-neutral words like slurs from neu-
tral words like ‘London’. I will also distinguish between a specific relation
between a speaker and a target and a general relation between a (slurring)
term and a target. Derogation is based on the latter. As I will explain,
this accounts for the autonomy of derogation.
3. Derogation constrains the correct use of slurs, highlighted by the
equivalence:
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The use of a slur is correct iff the speaker has negative beliefs
towards the target.
This equivalence is essential in spelling out derogation. The equivalence
owes much to Predelli’s idea that the correctness is explained in terms of
truth (or falsity) of the attitude description. The difference is that for
Predelli the correctness stems from the conventional semantic profile of a
slur but on my account derogation is part of the conventional epistemic
profile. However, I must admit that my task is much harder because the
whole idea of a conventional epistemic profile is somewhat unconventional.
It is a natural thought that whatever affects the use of a word is part of
its meaning. In the Introduction, I distinguished two different takes on
semantics and, respectively, two ways to view meaning. The aim of my
project is to come up with a view on derogation that does not affect any
of the mentioned takes on semantics, truth conditional or expanded. As a
result, it is fair to say that on my view derogation does not affect meaning
at all. I claim that there are extra-semantic features that can affect the use
of words.45 This is the case with non-neutral words. I will defend my view
with a two-fold strategy. First, I will lay out my view as convincingly as
possible so that the idea that some epistemic features affect use becomes
plausible or even natural. At the second stage, I will put on my “Lewisian
salesman’s hat” and try to convince that generic descriptivism is worth
the consideration because of its fruitful consequences. My idea is that the
epistemic account incorporates the generic nature of xenophobia to slurs.
This is integral to my claim that slurs subsume negative and unwarranted
information. Here it is useful to point out that the information is not just
mistaken but unwarranted. We all make mistakes. So a mistake cannot
explain the offensive nature of slurs. Whereas, the unwarrantedness can,
at least partly. In general, xenophobes are lazy cognisers. They attribute
in an unjustified way negative properties to the target. This point can
45I owe much of this formulation to Adam Bradley who commented my paper in
London-Berkeley Graduate meeting in May 2016. Bradley’s comments helped me to
formulate the distinction with expressivism and also helped me to appreciate the dif-
ficulties in my task.
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also explain why civilised people are reluctant to use slurs.46
4. Slurs reflect genuine cognitive differences in comparison to the neu-
tral terms. This claim has two notable consequences:
(a) Even though it seems that slurs express attitudes, more com-
prehensive understanding of slurs is achieved if we view slurs
as expressing beliefs (even if highly subjective beliefs).
(b) The substitution principle between the slurs and their neutral
counterparts fails.
4.(a) and 4.(b) are related to the consequences of my view. Because I am
claiming that derogation is due to the epistemic features, it is only natural
to highlight that slurs express beliefs, not just attitudes. At the same
time, I am allowing the failure of the substitution principle. Initially, this
might seem contradictory because I have repeatedly stated my adherence
to the co-extensionality thesis. However, this contradiction is resolved
with my affiliation with originalism. Originalists, Mark Sainsbury and
Michael Tye argue that a truth-preserving substitution principle can fail
even with sentences like:
(149) a. Nobody doubts that Greeks are Greeks.
b. Nobody doubts that Greeks are Hellenes.
((a) is true while (b) need not to be true) but their essential point is that
the failure of substitution is not a semantic problem (since ‘Greeks’ and
‘Hellenes’ are co-referential and that is all there is to say about semantics
of the terms). Rather, the failure is due to epistemic properties of two
distinct concepts. The main idea is that even if the semantic content is
the same, the mere use different concepts (i.e. the use of different vehicles
or containers of the same semantic content) can lead to genuine cognitive
differences which again can lead to different truth values. (Sainsbury and
Tye 2012, 76-79; see also 2011, 115-121; for more on Sainsbury, see Textor
46I owe this point to Rowan Mellor who clarified the distinction between mistake
and unwarrantedness in London-Berkeley Graduate meeting.
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2010, 105-118.) Similarly, my point is that the failure of the substitu-
tion principle between two co-referential terms relates to the differences
between the civilised and the xenophobic cognition. This claim brings a
contrast with moderate views as all moderate views hold on to the sub-
stitution principle.
5.2 Inferentialism revisited
Before we go on to lay out generic descriptivism, there are two preliminary
points to be made. First we are going to revisit Dummett’s inferentialism
and then the affiliation with originalism is explored in detail.
I think there is an idea worth saving in Dummett’s inferentialism. The
idea is that it is the term ‘Boche’ that allows the inference from German
to cruelty. Thereby, ‘Boche’ by-passes the usual methods for justifying
your assertion. In general, the entitlement to say that someone is cruel
comes from the evidence for the cruelty of that person. This is not the case
with ‘Boche’. It is the meaning of ‘Boche’ that licences the attribution of
cruelty, not the evidence.
Williamson leaves out one option concerning the inferential rules for
‘Boche’. To introduce this possibility, let us start from the beginning. On
the one hand, the inferential rules for conjunction are
&-I: A B
A & B
&-E(1): A & B
A
&-E(2): A & B
B
These rules are harmonious because the consequences of the elimination
rule matches the conditions for asserting “A & B”. On the other hand,









The reason why CL-¬-E is non-harmonious in respect to ¬-I is that it
unpacks the conditions for the assertion of ¬A and more. The emphasis
is on the word ‘more’ because that is responsible for the non-conservative
extension. Williamson’s reconstruction of the rules for ‘Boche’ does not
quite capture this idea. The original Boche-E does not satisfy the idea
that a non-harmonious elimination rule unpacks the conditions for the in-
troduction of the term and more. When it comes to Boche-E rule, the
emphasis is on unpacking the conditions for the introduction of the term
because Boche-E does not do that. Williamson’s original rules are
Boche-I: x is German
x is a Boche
Boche-E: x is a Boche
x is cruel
Boche-E rule does not fulfil the idea that you can go back to the starting
point. Instead of the starting point you get something very different. To
honour the idea that with a non-harmonious elimination rule you get the
conditions for the introduction and more, we might formulate the elimi-
nation rules in the spirit of rules for conjunction:
Boche-I: x is German
x is a Boche
Boche-E(1): x is a Boche
x is German
Boche-E(2): x is a Boche
x is cruel
Here we have a two-part elimination rule which not only get you back
to where you started (x is German) but also gives you something ex-
tra (x is cruel). I think this represents Dummett’s thought better than
Williamson’s original rules. (Even though Williamson’s proposal captures
perfectly the thought Dummett expressed in the quotation, it does not
capture the general outline of Dummett’s argument against CL.)
Williamson actually proposes something very similar in “Blind Reason-
ing”. He says that you might suppose that “‘Boche’ refers to a conjunctive
property of being both cruel and German” (Boghossian and Williamson
2003, 260). The problem with the original rules is that the determina-
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tion of reference is indeterminate between the set of German people and
the set of cruel people but this does not capture the xenophobic think-
ing. Xenophobes do not think that Charles Manson is a ‘Boche’ because
he is cruel. ‘Boche’ is first and foremost German, not any cruel for-
eigner. Xenophobes do not think that ‘Boche’ is indeterminate in this
way. Williamson says that the conjunctive proposal has the advantage
that it counts “Nero was a Boche” as false and “Nero was not a Boche”
as true. However, Williamson claims that the conjunctive rules are dis-
advantageous “since it counts ‘Lessing was a Boche’ literally false and
‘Lessing was not a Boche’ as literally true” (Boghossian and Williamson
2003, 261). This claim suggests that Williamson is assuming two things.
First, it seems that Williamson is assuming that the exact form of the
rules is:
Boche-I(C): x is German & x is cruel
x is a Boche
Boche-E(C): x is a Boche
x is German & x is cruel
The second assumption is that both xenophobes and civilised people agree
that Lessing is not cruel; therefore Lessing cannot be a ‘Boche’ according
to Boche-I(C) and -E(C) rules. I agree that the conjunctive rules are far
from satisfying. The problem is that they tally with Predelli’s extensional
target analysis and that analysis was already ruled out. The extensional
analysis does not capture xenophobic thinking. More importantly, as a
civilised speaker you cannot object to a xenophobic assertion
(150) Himmler was a Boche.
because the xenophobe is right: Himmler was German and cruel just like
the extensional target analysis suggests. The conjunctive rules have the
same problem. They count
(151) Lessing was a Boche.
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as false but count (150) as true. It is for this very reason my proposed
rules (Boche-I, Boche-E(1) and Boche-E(2)) start with “x is German”
and the elimination rules get you back to the starting point but also
give something more. The rules start with someone who is German and
then allows the inference that that person is a ‘Boche’. After that the
elimination rule allows you to go back to the fact that that person is
German but it also smuggles in the idea that that person is cruel (just like
Williamson’s conventional implicature does). For Dummett the inference
is part of the meaning of ‘Boche’. It is the very meaning of ‘Boche’ that
allows the inference from being German to cruelty, not the actual evidence
at hands. Compared to Williamson’s suggestion, I think this is the key
part in Dummett’s suggestion. The meaning of ‘Boche’ allows one to
infer that the target is cruel without any evidence for the cruelty of the
target. On Dummett’s account, it is the unwarranted nature of inferences
involving ‘Boche’ that makes the concept bad.
Concerning the following, there are two notable points. First, Dum-
mett introduces the idea that slurs come with unwarranted information.
I am going to argue that unwarranted information is an essential part of
derogation. Predelli noted that slurs express xenophobia and xenophobia
is no doubt empirically mistaken. I am going to argue that it is not just
a mistake but the unwarranted nature of the information that is partly
responsible for derogation. A simple mistake cannot be offensive as we all
make mistakes. It is more like the epistemic laziness that partly produces
the entitlement to be offended. At the same time, I agree with Williamson
that the stereotype of cruelty is not part of the truth conditional mean-
ing of ‘Boche’ and on my account truth conditional meaning is the only
meaning there is. This means that the task at hands is to explain how
‘Boche’ allows the inference from German to cruelty even if cruelty is not
part of the meaning.
The second point is that Dummett concentrates on xenophobic think-
ing. He is aiming to explicate the xenophobic mindset. Williamson says
that for his approach, it is crucial that language has priority over thought.
Conventional implicature is a feature of language, not thoughts. In con-
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trast to this, I will take it that xenophobic thinking plays a crucial part
in derogation. An important step in detailing both of these points is my
affinities with originalism.
5.3 Originalist view of concepts
5.3.1 Concepts as containers of information
According to Mark Sainsbury and Michael Tye, concepts are not individ-
uated by their referents nor by their sense. They are distinguished by
their origin. The motivation for originalism is that “originalism combines
the best features of Fregean and Millian views” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012,
57). On the one hand, originalism sympathises with the Millian view in
that one can think of objects simply as such. Fregeans think that we can
acquire knowledge of objects only through some property of an object to
which the descriptions refer to. But Millians struggle with the so-called
Fregean data. Since Millians hold that the content of an expression is its
referent, Millians find it hard to explain what the difference is between
co-referring expressions such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. Fregean the-
ory offers the explanation that although they are co-referring, they have
different senses. Originalism, on the other hand, explains the difference
with origin. Since concepts are not individuated by their content but by
their origins, the originalist can say that Hesperus and Phosphorus are
different because they have different origins.47 I agree that origin is one
way to individuate concepts. It seems to me that origin provides a way
distinguish concepts when there are no semantic differences but I am not
too sure about Sainsbury and Tye’s motivations. For one thing, the fact
that originalism allows to ”think of objects simply as such” does not seem
very important. This applies mainly to proper names but it is difficult
to see what the benefit of this view is concerning predicate terms. In a
slurring sentence
47Here I emphasise the earlier point that even though Sainsbury and Tye prefer to
talk about (non-linguistic) concepts, I believe that their point applies also to linguistic
expressions.
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(152) Max is a Frog,
Max is already thought of in a certain way and that, I will claim, is the
whole problem with slurs. On the basis of this point, it seems obvious that
my motivation to go with originalism lies elsewhere. I find two points in
originalism motivating. First, Sainsbury and Tye write:
[C]oncepts are to be individuated by their historical origins,
as opposed to their semantic or epistemic properties. Distinct
concepts have different origins, and may not differ intrinsically.
[. . . ] Individuating concepts in a non-epistemic way makes
them available as independent sources of explanation for epis-
temic features. Individuating concepts in a non-semantic way
shows that the explanation does not rely on semantic prop-
erties of the concepts themselves. (Sainsbury and Tye 2012,
40.)
When they say that concepts are not individuated by semantic means,
Sainsbury and Tye disagree with the Millian view. When they say that
concepts are not individuated by epistemic means, they disagree with the
Fregean view. Concepts are distinguished by their origin. This move
distinguishes any slurring term or concept from its neutral counterpart.
For example, the slur ‘Frog’ has a different origin than the neutral term.
As Sainsbury and Tye say, this yields an independent source of explanation
for epistemic features. In short, the motivating point is that originalism
cuts the ties between the semantic and the epistemic aspects of concept
use. Secondly, despite their disagreement with Millians and Fregeans,
originalism holds a role for both the Millian content and the Fregean
information. Sainsbury says:
Individual concepts subsume information. That is their role:
to enable their possessor to organise information into object-
sized packages [. . . ] In the normal case, a subject subsumes
some information under a [. . . ] concept by entertaining a
thought, concerning the referent of the concept, if any, and
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concerning the properties specified by the information, if any,
that the former possesses the latter. (Sainsbury 2005, 222 and
also 111.)
The function of a concept is to store information about the object it has as
its referent. In the following, I will develop an account that sees derogation
in the information that slurs subsume. This information is stereotypical
information about the target. Furthermore, I agree with originalism that
this information does not have any semantic consequences.
5.3.2 Originalism and understanding
Kripkean and Putnamian stories
Putnam also recognises the importance of both aspects. According to
him, there are two stories to be told about the understanding of names.
Let us call these a Putnamian view and a Kripkean view for simplicity,
even though the Kripkean view might not tally with Kripke’s real view.
Rather, the Kripkean view is Putnam’s interpretation of Kripke’s view.
Putnam says that in the Kripkean view “the key idea is that a person
may use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person even though he has
no true beliefs about X”. Putnam’s take on the Kripkean view is that a
competent speaker only needs to know the referent of the name but she
does not need to have any true beliefs about that referent. (Putnam 1975,
203.)
Putnam distinguishes his own view from the Kripkean view. In “Ref-
erence and Explanation”, Putnam says against his interpretation of the
Kripkean thought:
I do not feel that one should be quite as liberal as Kripke [. . . ]
[U]nless one has some beliefs about the bearer of the name
which are true or approximately true, then it is at best idle to
consider that the name refers to that bearer in one’s idiolect.
(Putnam 1975, 203.)
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According to Putnam, a speaker has to have true beliefs about the bearer
of the name (or approximately true). Putnam exemplifies his position with
an example. He does not see very much point in saying that someone
is referring to Quine when the speaker uses the name ‘Quine’ and the
speaker thinks that ‘Quine’ was a Roman emperor, and that is all the
speaker ‘knows’ about Quine. (Quine 1975, 203.) In such cases, the term
‘Quine’ does not refer to anything in the speaker’s dialect.
In “The Meaning of ‘meaning’”, Putnam switches to talk about stereo-
types instead of true beliefs and, as it was noted earlier, stereotypes can
be inaccurate. Still, Putnam requires that a speaker needs to know a
stereotype of a term in order to master that term. According to his “view
someone who knows what ‘tiger’ means [. . . ] is required to know that
stereotypical tigers are striped”, says Putnam (1975, 250). Stereotypes
have an important role in Putnam’s division of linguistic labour. Roughly,
it divides the linguistic community broadly to experts and consumers48.
A consumer needs to acquire the stereotype of gold, in order to use it.
However, the consumer need not to acquire a method of recognising gold.
That is, the consumer needs to know some conventional facts about gold,
such as it is yellow and shiny. But the speaker need not be able to distin-
guish gold from other similar precious metals. If it was the responsibility
of a competent speaker to recognise gold, then anyone who ever bought
a fake gold necklace would be an incompetent speaker, which seems a
rather odd view. In the task of recognising gold the consumer can rely on
“a special subclass of speakers”, the experts. It is the experts that can
tell the consumer which kind of features are necessary and sufficient for
the membership in the extension of a common name. That is, the experts
tell which facts about gold are important. These features could be called
criteria for a membership. They provide the criteria to recognise if some-
thing is in the extension. A collective body of language use divides the
labour to expert knowledge of the words and to the transmission of that
knowledge to the consumers. (Putnam 1975, 227-228.)
In connection with common names, a crucial notion in the transmission
48The term ‘consumer’ is from Gareth Evans (1982, 377).
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of the knowledge is the stereotype. Stereotypes capture the relevant facts
about the referents of common names but they can be also inaccurate. In
a linguistic community, the method of passing on the meaning of words is
often through descriptions (instead of ostensive definition). The descrip-
tions are then standardised. They provide information about a typical or
a ‘normal’ member of the set which is the reference of a given common
name. Putnam calls these standardised descriptions of stereotypes. He
even says that these stereotypes can be more important than the actual
referent. Sometimes the knowledge about the stereotype is enough for
the understanding of a term. (Putnam 1975, 230.) However, Putnam’s
view should not be equated with the Fregean view. The description does
not fix the reference of a term as Fregeans claim. Rather, in order to
be competent user, the user needs to have beliefs about the stereotypical
member of the kind. In other words, an ordinary user needs to know the
stereotype circulating in the linguistic community.
Liberal originalism
With the two stories, we can see the liberalism of originalism concern-
ing understanding. In a nutshell, it is even more liberal than Putnam’s
interpretation of the Kripkean view. When it comes to stereotypes, origi-
nalism adheres to Putnam’s interpretation of the Kripkean view and when
it comes to the referent, originalism adheres to the Putnamian view. The
upshot is that neither knowledge of the referent nor knowledge of the
stereotype is necessary, according to originalism.
Originalism opposes Putnam’s Kripkean view that the competency
consists in the knowledge of the referent of the concept. Sainsbury and
Tye give us a familiar example: the concept the present king of
France. This concept is empty. There is no object to which it refers
to. So even though a speaker does grasp it, she cannot apply it to any
object (correctly in the Kripkean sense). In the case of empty names, the
speaker is competent even when she cannot apply it any object.
Originalism also opposes to the Fregean view that the competency
consists in a possession of a crucial belief (or a set beliefs) about the
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referent. Again, Sainsbury and Tye give an example. The ‘cognitive
content’ of gold consist of various properties which allow to identify
gold, such as shiny, yellow, malleable. They further say that the Fregean
view holds that these properties are necessary and sufficient conditions for
something being gold. Sainsbury and Tye say that they find it hard to
take this claim seriously. “The features proposed are contingent and not
necessarily known to users of the concept; originalists find no place for
them in a theory of concepts”, they continue (Sainsbury and Tye 2012,
82). Sainsbury and Tye conclude:
A way to highlight the difference between originalism and more
familiar approaches is this: we have no room for a notion of the
“correct” use of a concept (unless this means using a concept
in a true judgment). [. . . ] [F]or originalism there is simply the
question whether a subject uses or does not use a concept on
an occasion. If it is used at all, then it is used ‘correctly’ (as
other theorists conceive this). Whether or not it is used in the
making of a true judgment is another question. (Sainsbury
and Tye 2012, 85.)
This passage makes it clear that Sainsbury and Tye reject any kind of
specification on use, Kripkean, Putnamian or Fregean. In their words, if
a concept is used at all, it is used correctly. It is usually thought that the
ability to use a concept correctly entails the understanding of the corre-
sponding term. If we go with this thought, then originalism is extremely
liberal in attributing understanding of words. It seems that understanding
comes automatically when a speaker is included in the community which
uses the word. There are no other criteria for understanding.
5.3.3 Conservative generic descriptivism
The previous section shows that originalism is extremely liberal in at-
tributing competency to concept users. If a concept is used, it is used
correctly. So presumably mere use of words reflects full understanding
of words. When it comes to the understanding of slurs, I take a step to
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a more conservative direction. In fact, I will make concessions to both
directions, to the Millian direction and to the Putnamiam direction. I
agree with Sainsbury and Tye that speaking truth and competency are
two different things. The falsity of
(153) Prince Charles is a Frog.
does not make the speaker incompetent user of ‘Frog’. However, the lin-
guistic evidence has shown so far that the understanding of slurs can
be explained with the co-extensionality thesis. Furthermore, Williamson
pointed out that even the xenophobic use restricts the application to the
target. A xenophobe might utter:
(154) Charles Manson is cruel like a Boche but he is not a Boche; he is
American.
The plausibility of this utterance confirms that the target is an important
aspect in the understanding of slurs. So if a speaker systematically fol-
lowed the stereotype instead of the target in the application of his slurring
words, it would be difficult to attribute to that speaker a full understand-
ing of her words. Following Williamson’s terminology, it can be said that
there is an asymmetry between the target and the stereotype: Only the
target explains the truth conditional aspect of meaning, the stereotype
does not contribute to this in any way. In other words, truth conditional
semantics of ‘Frog’ is explained by the fact that it applies to the set of
French people.
On the other hand, I agree with Kaplan’s and Predelli’s view that there
are correct and incorrect uses of slurs. If the lovely old lady from Croydon
has nothing against the French but uses the term ‘Frog’ to talk about
the French, then she is using the term incorrectly. I claim that the use
is correct iff the speaker has negative beliefs about the French. Broadly
speaking, the resulting view is Putnamian. The speaker has to know the
contribution of the stereotype of a slur. (This is a rough estimate and it
is specified below.)
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5.4 Epistemic account of slurs
5.4.1 Simple semantics
In the following, there are two things to in keep in mind. First according
to generic descriptivism, derogation can be captured with an epistemic
profile of a slur. derogation is due to the negative information that is
attached to slurs. The current view differs from expressivism in that
generic descriptivism sees derogation as a cognitive matter. In this sense,
slurs may differ from other expressives. Slurs contain negative information
and that information is epistemically unwarranted.
Secondly, I agree with expressivism that derogation is channelled through
conventional features of slurs but I disagree about the nature of these
channels. Expressivism holds that the derogatory part is expressive and
derogation is spelled out in semantics which is designed to handle non-
truth functional semantic information. In contrast, generic descriptivism
says that truth functional semantics is the whole story about the seman-
tics of slurs. Thus, derogation is framed epistemically and this epistemic
framework does not entail anything semantic (as predicted by originalism).
Even though the epistemology of slurs does not influence the conventional
meaning of slurs, it does influence the conventional use of slurs. Generic
descriptivism has at its disposal, at least, some of Predelli’s ideas. Most
notably, generic descriptivism makes use of the idea of a witness.
As a reminder, Predelli introduces the notion of expressive witness.
This notion is important in specifying the non-defective use of slurs. Non-
defective use coincides with contexts where the expressive witness is true.
Hence, Predelli puts forward an equivalence between non-defective use of
an expressive and truth of an expressive witness. Here is a simplified and
general version of the equivalence:
The use is non-defective in context c iff the agent’s attitude description
in context c is true.
The key point is that non-defectiveness or correctness is explained in terms
of truth (or falsity) of the attitude description. For example,
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(155) I am unhappy about Kaplan’s promotion.
is an expressive witness for ‘alas’. In
(156) Alas, Kaplan is promoted,
the use of ‘alas’ is non-defective or correct (in context c) iff (155) is true
(in context c). In the following, I will develop something similar. I will
argue that there indeed is a condition for correct use of slurs but it does
not stem from the semantic profile of slurs. Rather, the condition stems
from the epistemic features of slurs. First, for our purposes a very sim-
ple semantics will do. So let us just say that the relevant categories of
a very basic language are names and predicative expressions (more accu-
rately, n-place predicates but for our purposes one-place predicates are
the most important since slurs are like that). The relevant syntactic rule
of formation is
1. If δ is a one-place predicate and α is a name, then δ(α) is a sentence.
The sentence
(157) Max is a Frog.
is formed on the basis of this rule. The semantic rule that corresponds to
syntactic rule 1 is the following:
1. If δ is a one-place predicate and α is a name, then δ(α) is true iffJαK ∈ JδK
An important point is that the semantic rule imposes (only) that the
semantic values of one-place predicates are sets.49 In conjunction with
the co-extensionality thesis, the semantic clause brings about the following
explanation
(158) “Max is a Frog” is true iff Max is a member of the set of French
people.
49These formulations can be found in any elementary logic textbook but I followed
Introduction to Montague Semantics (Dowty, Wall and Peters 1989, 14-53).
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Because it is argued here that derogation does not affect semantics, generic
descriptivism can do with very crude semantics. A noticeable difference
with Kaplanian view is that there is no room for a character and because
the character is a function from context to semantic value, the notion
of context is somewhat redundant. There is only the actual world as
a relevant point of evaluation. As Sainsbury and Tye note: ”if a [. . . ]
concept lacks a referent with respect to the actual world, any atomic
thought containing it is false” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 49).
5.4.2 Correct use of slurs
Spelling out derogation
The point in generic descriptivism is that the use of slurs display genuine
cognitive difference in comparison to the neutral terms. Conventionally,
slurs subsume negative information while the neutral terms do not. You
can express the very same negative beliefs with a neutral term but when a
speaker uses a slur like ‘Frog’, it is expected that the speaker has negative
beliefs about the target, such as “the French are vulgar”. Since the use
of slurs does not have any semantic consequences, the notion of correct
use is very much connected to the expectations of the audience. When
slurs are used, it creates an expectation that the speaker holds a negative
opinion about the target. If the speaker does not hold a negative view
of the target, the use is incorrect and the neutral term would be more
appropriate.
Following Predelli and on the basis of the foregoing discussion, I pro-
pose to spell out derogation as a condition for correct use. The following
equivalence explicates the connection with derogation and the use of slurs:
The use of a slur is correct iff the speaker has negative beliefs about the
target.
Even though generic descriptivism does not recognise any expansion of
semantics beyond truth, the equivalence utilises not only Kaplan’s idea
that ‘ouch’ and “I am in pain” express the same information but even
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more so it utilises Predelli’s core idea that you can explicate non-defective
(or, in my terms, correct) use in a truth functional manner. That is why
the equivalence holds regardless of the truth value of the utterances. In
(159) Prince Charles is a Frog,
the hearer expects that the speaker has negative beliefs about the French
even when the statement is false. The expectations stem from the notion
of correct use of the term ‘Frog’ but correct use has nothing to do with
truth or falsity of the statement.
There are two explicating points to be made. First point is that, in
the equivalence, I have dropped the part about the unwarranted nature of
the beliefs. This is because in the current state even a xenophobe could
agree with the condition. The reason for the xenophobe’s choice of words
is that she wants to express her negative opinion about the target but she
would hardly agree that her beliefs are unwarranted. Secondly, it should
be emphasised that the equivalence holds in general as in “generally it
is the case that the use of a slur is correct iff the speaker has negative
beliefs about the target”. This sets a limitation on my view. Because the
equivalence does not characterise the meaning of slurs, the equivalence
is not categorical like it is categorical that a bachelor is an unmarried
man. Rather, the equivalence is more analogous to inductive reasoning
like “usually swans are white”. Presumably, the view should have some
exceptions like the in-group use but, in general, the use of a slur is strong
evidence for the fact that the speaker views the target in a negative way.
Furthermore, the hearer’s knowledge of the speaker’s negative beliefs is
based on the stereotypes.50 The second point is further elaborated next.
Nature of derogation
Even though my account follows Predelli in the way derogation is spelled
out, there are some substantial qualifications to be made. To repeat,
the differences stem from the fact that moderate views see slurs primar-
50The point about generality was quite rightly emphasised by Adam Bradley and
Rachel Rudolp.
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ily as linguistic items which express non-truth conditional information.
Whereas, I want to connect the nature of that information to my account.
Namely, I aim to study slurs as expressions of xenophobia. Slurs are
derogatory because they express xenophobic beliefs. Consider the possi-
bility that the use of slurs reflects the speaker’s beliefs about the target.
The expressive witness is based on an appropriate relation between the
speaker and the target. I very much agree that the use of a slur does mark
of a special relationship between the speaker and the target. However, I
aim to come up a view that also recognises that the relationship between
the speaker and the target is a result of xenophobia.
We all have beliefs about the referents of our words. As Sainsbury
and Tye say, the function of a concept is to store information about the
referent. We all have beliefs about London: “London is big”, “London is
cool”, “London is dirty”. Some people may have a negative opinion about
London but an utterance like “I am going to London” does not reflect that.
Sainsbury and Tye make a distinction between a concept and a conception.
Sainsbury and Tye illustrate the situation with an example. They think
that they and the reader share the concept Austin. However, “[i]f you
think that Austin is the music capital of the world and we disagree, we
think a thought that conflicts with yours, and this is again explicable
in terms of our sharing the concept Austin” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012,
21). A conception is often idiosyncratic and hence a conception is not
a part of the (truth conditional) semantic profile of a concept. It is my
contention that the derogatory aspect of slurs stems from the conception
of the target. Observe a preliminary distinction between:
A speaker specific belief about the target
and
A general relation between a term and a target.
Here a speaker specific belief coheres roughly with a conception and a
general relation between a term and a target stems from this. But still a
general relation must be distinguished from speaker’s idiosyncratic beliefs
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about the target as the general relation coheres with the stereotype. Three
interrelated points are notable.
First as Predelli notes, the constraints on the logic of expressives stem
from the conventional meaning of expressives like ‘alas’ and ‘hurray’:
[F]or instance, only linguistically incompetent speakers employ
[‘Hurray, Tony will be re-elected”] (at least non-ironically) in
the absence of a positive attitude towards Tony’s future vic-
tory” (Predelli 2010, 168).
I agree that with some words, the correct use goes beyond its truth condi-
tional semantics. Sometimes there can be a significant consensus regarding
the speakers’ beliefs about a target. This is specifically noticeable with
a slur like ‘Boche’.51 I think it is not a surprise that there was a rather
strong consensus among the French soldiers that their enemy was cruel
and barbarious. War is like that. The consensus was captured with a
new epithet for the Germans. Even now a speaker using the slur ‘Boche’
is expected to have these negative beliefs about the Germans. But these
expectations are not reflected in terms of (truth conditional) meaning.
Rather, the negative beliefs are reflected by the correct use of the word.
Secondly, it is plausible that the xenophobic beliefs can be very idiosyn-
cratic (just like some of my beliefs about London can be idiosyncratic).
So the exact nature of the specific belief state is a speaker-relative notion.
That is why there is a need for a more general formulation which just
states that the use of a given slur indicates that the speaker has negative
and often biased beliefs about the target but the exact nature of the be-
liefs is down to a specific belief state. However, correct use is based on
the general relation between the slur and the target. Respectively, let us
distinguish between
A neutral term which is not associated with a general relation.
and
A non-Neutral term which is associated with a general relation.
51I am using ‘Boche’ as an example because the origin of the slur quite well known.
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Only some words like ethnic slurs are non-neutral because a general non-
neutral relation is associated with them. A neutral word like ‘London’ is
not associated with a general relation, even though most speakers have
beliefs about London. The reason for non-neutrality is the stereotypical
conception of the target. In the xenophobic circles, the stereotypical con-
ception became an integral part of the way the target is viewed and the
use of a slur reflects this. Even if the speaker has very idiosyncratic rea-
sons to use a slur and the speaker is ignorant about the stereotype, the
use of a slur reflects the stereotypical view of the target.
The third point ties the distinctive epistemic nature of derogation to
the notion of correct use. So far, I have argued that the use of a non-
neutral word yields evidence about the epistemic stance of the speaker.
The equivalence reflects this. I also argued that the equivalence holds
generally because the nature of the equivalence is epistemic, not semantic.
In contrast, Williamson and Predelli both hold that a stereotype is a part
of the meaning of a slur. If my view is at all plausible in that the stereotype
of a term coheres with a general relation between a term and a target, then
it might also be plausible that a stereotype of a non-neutral word like a slur
is not part of the (truth conditional) meaning. Rather, it is an epistemic
feature of a slur. To use an analogy, you might say that the fact that the
term ‘eggplant’ is used by the Americans (instead of ‘aubergine’) is close
to what I call an epistemic feature of a term. The fact that ‘eggplant’ is
used by the Americans does tell something about the speaker. Similarly,
the fact that the speaker uses a slur does tell something about the speaker,
namely that the speaker is a xenophobe. But neither facts, the fact that
‘eggplant’ is used by the Americans nor the fact that slurs are used by
xenophobes, are semantic facts.52
Respectively, there are at least three advantages in basing derogation
on the general relationship between the term and the target. First, we can
make sense of the idea that derogation is autonomous. The derogatory
52I owe the analogy between the use of eggplant and slurs to Adan Bradley. I also
need to make clear that he presented some reservations about the analogy. Specifically,
he was sceptical whether the fact that the Americans use the term ‘eggplant’ is a
genuine epistemic feature of the term.
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intentions are based on the speaker specific beliefs and the autonomous
derogation is based on the general relation. Just because we are inter-
ested in the autonomous aspect of derogation, the general relation is more
important to us.
Another advantage is that the current view can explain the connection
between the transmission of xenophobia and slurs. There are slurs which
come with well established stereotypes: a ‘Boche’ is thought to be cruel,
a ‘Frog’ is vulgar. In many cases, the specific belief state and the general
relation coincide but the crucial use is the one where they do not coincide.
Consider a speaker who thinks that ‘Frogs’ are, say, shoplifters and thinks
that that is why ‘Frogs’ deserve the derogatory opinion. It would be hard
to say that the speaker is incompetent, i.e. that the speaker does not know
what ‘Frog’ means. This is exactly why Jeshion’s point is so compelling.
To remind, Jeshion’s point was that a xenophobe does not care about the
stereotype but rather just wants to express his or her negative attitude
towards the target. The use of slurs involve so many idiosyncratic beliefs
that the negative attitude is the only common ground for the use of slurs.
Still, I disagree with Jeshion and I think her example is somewhat implau-
sible. Jeshion’s point is that slurs are based on unarticulated attitudes like
hatred, fear or anger and no stereotype can change this. That is, no pred-
ication of a property (negative or positive) affects the attitude. I find this
implausible. To illustrate the difference between Jeshion’s thought and
mine, two examples can be presented. First, a xenophobic conversation
according to Jeshion:
(160) Jill: I think those Frogs are such shoplifters!
Bill: Oh really, I thought Frogs are usually thought to be vulgar.
Jill: I don’t care what they are like, I just don’t like them!
I still think the example is a bit weird. To me, the following xenophobic
conversation seems much more plausible:
(161) Jill: I think those Frogs are such shoplifters!
Bill: Oh really, I thought Frogs are usually thought to be vulgar.
Jill: I knew it, they are vulgar shoplifters!
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In this example, the idiosyncratic belief is a stepping stone to incorporate
more conventional stereotypes to ‘Frog’. In this sense, the initial belief is
not irrelevant. Neither is the subsequent conventional stereotype. This
slight variation in Jeshion’s point is the reason to go for a very general
relation. At the same time, the general relation captures the core idea of
stereotypes. The use of the non-neutral words require that the speaker
thinks about the target in a negative way. That means that, according
to generic descriptivism, slurs spread xenophobia because they are non-
neutral words. An important point is that slurs spread xenophobia inde-
pendently of anyone’s intentions. When Jill uses the slur ‘Frog’ because
she thinks that the French are shoplifters, the use of the term transmits
the idea that the French are vulgar because that is the stereotype of ‘Frog’.
Finally, the current view is advantageous because the distinction be-
tween speaker’s idiosyncratic beliefs and the general relation between the
term and the target can account for descriptive ineffability. Since the rea-
sons to use a slur can be very idiosyncratic, it may be difficult to recover
the conventional stereotype.
5.4.3 Epistemic failing
In moral philosophy, the expressivist tradition adheres to two claims.
Moral sentences are expressions of attitudes, either ‘boo’ or ‘hurray’, and
as such moral sentences are not truth-apt. There is a similar sentiment
among the views that recognise the expressive dimension of slurs (namely,
among the moderate views). Slurring terms express the inner attitudes
of the speaker and as such are not truth functional. I mainly agree. One
could say that my main disagreement is a disagreement in principle. How-
ever, more substantial differences will come out in the course of the dis-
cussion. In short, it may be that slurs express attitudes which are not
truth-apt. However, there are reasons for these attitudes which are truth-
apt. So regarding slurs, the attitudes can be equated with negative beliefs
and these beliefs are the result of epistemic failing which makes them
unwarranted.
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There are also expressives which are based on good epistemology. Pre-
delli considers which one of the three proposals, subjective expressive,
objective expressive or extensional target hypothesis is the most apt anal-
ysis of slurs. His conclusion is that the subjective analysis seems the most
viable option and it has become clear that I agree. Predelli also considers
which one of the three is the most apt analysis for a pejorative expression
like ‘nag’. Here the intuitions are much hazier. It seems to me that even
the extensional target analysis is not too far off. If a speaker calls some
horse a ‘nag’, it might be for a good reason. She sees that the horse is old,
weak and feeble. So she wants to distinguish that horse from the other
stronger and faster ones. I think this analysis sounds plausible. Whichever
analysis we choose, the point is that the speaker has good evidence for
calling the horse a ‘nag’. The judgement is based on good epistemology.
Laudatives highlight the point even better. Laudatives are expressions
that come with a ‘hurray’. Another horse-related term is ‘steed’ which is
not just a horse but a fine horse. I think it is obvious that when a speaker
refers to a specific strong and fast horse with the word ‘steed’, the speaker
means only that horse. Again, the extensional analysis seems plausible
but more importantly this is a case of good epistemology. I think the
German laudative ‘Knabe’ for a boy deserves a similar analysis. It hardly
is the case that a speaker using a word ‘Knabe’ refers to the set of all male
children. Rather, by referring to a specific boy with the word ‘Knabe’, I
think it is obvious that the speaker wants to distinguish that specific boy
from other, more common male children. Furthermore, the speaker might
have good evidence for this: the boy’s good manners, a good school report
and so on but this is never the case with slurs. The extensional target
analysis was rejected in the case of slurs and I claim that this is because of
the epistemic failing involving slurs. Of course, there can be a epistemic
failing involved in ‘nag’, ‘steed’ and ‘Knabe’. For example, a speaker
might be basing his judgement about a steed on the fact that he is about
to sell the horse and a steed is much more valuable than a nag. This is an
epistemic failing (in a sense of a deception) and I claim that slurs involve
this kind of epistemology. I also claim that derogation is dependent on
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an epistemic failing and the linguistic behaviour of slurs is also influenced
by this epistemic failing. This point does indicate that my dispute with
expressivism is not just terminological but based on substantial difference.
Could it be that the xenophobes are at least sometimes right? Even
if a xenophobe is sometimes right, it is still more likely to be a case of
an epistemic failing than a case of good epistemology. We have already
discussed sentences like:
(162) Himmler is a Boche.
This is a good candidate for good epistemology for a slurring expression.
Let us assume that the speaker is challenged for the use of a slur and he
responds by saying:
(163) Look, I am not saying that all Germans are cruel but Himmler
was German and clearly he was a cruel man. Hence, my remark
is appropriate.
It seems that the speaker is using the term in a divergent way, in a way
that the extensional target hypothesis proposes. The denial of the epis-
temic failing then utilises Kripke’s distinction between speaker’s reference
and semantic reference coupled with the idea of the extensional target hy-
pothesis. The speaker’s reference is based on the speaker’s intentions and
the semantic reference is the actual semantic reference of the term. These
two might not always align. There are numerous examples of this but
they usually concern proper names so they do not illuminate our current
situation so well. (See Kripke 1982, 25 ft. 3 and Lumsden 2010, 297.)
Presumably in (163), the speaker intends to target only a subset of Ger-
mans, namely those who are not only Germans but also cruel. However, it
was already said that even (163) is offensive and this stems from the fact
that when the speaker is referring to Himmler as a ’Boche’, he is directing
his biases toward every German; hence derogation. The upshot is that a
sentence like (163) is not an epistemic failing at all. Rather, the speaker’s
explanation in (163) demonstrates the incompetency of the speaker. The
xenophobe does not know the semantic reference of the term ‘Boche’.
I find this judgement to be harsh. After all, the speaker knows that
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the target of the term is the Germans (albeit, he thinks it targets a subset
of Germans) and the speaker also knows that the term is derogatory.
Linguistically, it would be hair-spitting to say that the xenophobe is an
incompetent speaker. That is why I call this to case a true epistemic
failing. The xenophobe is confusing his claim for a claim like
(164) That bastard stole my car
which can be based on good epistemology. The goodness depends on the
properties of the individual but the epistemology of slurs never depends
on individuals.
Even clearer case is my partially fictional case of ‘Finndevil’53. It is a
slur for Finns and it attributes first and foremost heavy-drinking to Finns.
That is, the target of ’Finndevil’ is the set all Finns and the stereotype
is heavy-drinking. After consulting OECD statistics on alcohol consump-
tion in Europe, I cannot definitively say whether there is some truth to
the stereotype. The alcohol consumption in 2011 was pretty average in
Finland (9.8 litres of pure alcohol) but still a bit closer to the leader of
table, Austria (12.2), than to the bottom of the table, Italy (6.1). In com-
parison, the consumption in the UK was 10.3 litres. However, let us make
this example more clear cut by imagining that the alcohol consumption
in Finland was the highest. It seems to me that this stipulation makes
’Finndevil’ still an epistemic failing. The xenophobes may have true be-
liefs but the methods of reaching those beliefs are unreliable. Gordon W.
Allport has pointed that some stereotypes develop from sharpening and
over-generalisation of facts (Allport 1958, 186). Even if Finns were at the
top of alcohol consumption table, the nature of xenophobia sharpens and
overplays this stereotypes. Moreover, xenophobia sees stereotypes as the
defining or at least a very central feature of the target.54 This point is
elaborated with psychological essentialism in the next chapter.
53The term is a literal translation from the original Swedish term ‘Finnja¨vel’
54David Ludwig made a similar suggestion in Third Barcelona Conference on Gender,
Race, and Sexuality in June 2016.
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5.5 Substitution principle
5.5.1 Appropriateness as a difference?
So far I have been alluding that there might be a substantial difference
between generic descriptivism and moderate views, not just a differences
in the aim. There are several possible candidates for cashing out the dif-
ference. One obvious possibility is that generic descriptivism holds that
the use of slurs is always inappropriate because they are distincly expres-
sion of xenophobia (except in-group use and educational use). Hence, the
difference could be phrased by saying that generic descriptivism can ex-
plain why slurring words are always inappropriate while moderate views
cannot. Generic descriptivism can explain the difference between
(165) That bastard stole my car.
(166) That Frog stole my car.
(165) might be appropriate depending whether the target actually stole
the car or not but (166) is never appropriate. This is because of the nature
of xenophobic information. Xenophobia is based on an epistemic failing.
Generic descriptivism incorporates this point to its explanation of slurs.
Because moderate views do not separate slurs from other expressives, they
cannot explain the above difference. Unfortunately, this line of thought is
confused. It is confused about the aims of moderate views. The crucial
question in moderate views is: How do people express themselves? In
other words, what are the linguistic mechanisms to express your opinions
and also your attitudes? The root of a specific attitude is somewhat irrele-
vant. The only relevant specification is the nature of semantic information
(to use Kaplan’s term). So when a speaker utters:
(167) Hurray, Kaplan was promoted,
the hearer might think that the added ‘hurray’ is appropriate because she
thinks that Kaplan is a very nice guy. When a speaker utters:
(168) That bastard Kaplan was promoted,
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the hearer could think the added ’bastard’ is inappropriate because Kaplan
really is a very nice guy. A proponent of a moderate view can then continue
and say that the appropriateness of
(169) That Frog stole my car.
depends on the appropriateness of xenophobia. When exactly is xenopho-
bia and racism appropriate and justified? The answer to this rhetorical
question highlights why slurs are always inappropriate. The social ap-
propriateness or inappropriateness of a specific attitude is one thing, the
ways to express that attitude is another. So moderate views can account
for the difference between slurs and other expressives.
5.5.2 Character indistinguishability, sameness of
sense and Mates case
To begin to see the real differences, let us recapitulate the following ob-
servation. The character of a simple expression is a function from the
context to the semantic value of an expression. In other words, the char-
acter determines the semantic values of expressions. The semantic value
of a complex expression such as a sentence depends on the semantic value
of its parts. To repeat even more, here is the example again:
Jpromoted(Kaplan)Kc,w,t = T iff JKaplanKc,w,t ∈ JpromotedKc,w,t
where the semantic value (true/false) of the sentence “Kaplan is pro-
moted” depends on the semantic value of the parts of the sentence. Namely,
it is true iff Kaplan is a member of a set ‘x is promoted’ in context c. Both
Kaplan and Predelli claims that the character of any slurring term and
its neutral counterpart is the same. In any given context, the truth condi-
tional contribution of any given slurring term and its neutral counterpart
is the same.
The standard definition of a character is a function from context to
semantic value. However in Meaning without Truth, Predelli mentions a
slight complication which in the end turns out to be trivial. For the sake
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of the present purpose, I think that it is useful to go through this com-
plication. Predelli refers to Kaplan’s distinction between circumstances
and context (Predelli 2013, 5). This produces a two-stage model which
Kaplan illustrates in the following way. A character can be represented as
functions from possible contexts to (propositional) contents and (propo-
sitional) contents as functions from possible circumstances (time-world
pairs) to extensions. This “suggests that we can represent a content by
a function from circumstances of evaluation to an appropriate extension.
Carnap called such functions intensions.” (Kaplan 1989, 501-505.) Predelli
concurs but at the same time admits the awkwardness of the two-stage
model. Especially, since nothing is lost by saying that the character maps
the semantic values (extension) directly (Predelli 2013, 11). This is the
trivial part but the non-trivial part is the following. Since character deter-
mines intension and the characters of slurs and their neutral counterparts
are indistinguishable, it follows that slurs and the neutral counterparts
have the same intension. This is, essentially, Williamson’s claim. Hence,
Predelli and Williamson agree on this point despite the opposite direction:
Predelli reaches this conclusion from the Millian direction and Williamson
from the Fregean direction. The upshot is that since both agree that any
slur and its neutral counterpart share the same sense, the substitution be-
tween these terms is truth preserving. So in the following, the discussion
concerning sameness of sense also applies to character indistinguishability.
Sainsbury and Tye present a general argument against the idea that
there are distinct expressions with the same sense (or intension). They
call it the Mates case, after Benson Mates (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 76-79
and Mates 1952, 111-136). Both Predelli’s and Williamson’s treatment of
slurs feature the sameness of intension. First, there are two preliminary
principles associated with sense (or intension):
(P1) Sentences with the same sense (intension) have the same truth
value.
(P2) If a sentence S1 results from S2 by replacing an expression used in
S1 by one with the same sense (intension), S1 and S2 have the same
sense (intension).
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Sainsbury and Tye’s argument then proceeds in a form of Reductio ad
Absurdum:
1. Suppose distinct expressions e1 and e2 have the same sense.
2. Take any arbitrary sentence S1 containing e1 and let S2 be the result
of substituting e1 (in S1) with e2.




(c) Whoever believes that S1 believes that S1
(d) Whoever believes that S1 believes that S2
(e) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that S1 believes that S1
(f) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that S1 believes that S2
4. 3e is true.
5. So by P1, 3f is true.
6. But 3f is false.
7. Contradiction.
Sainsbury and Tye diagnose that the problem is premise 1 which must
be rejected. Sainsbury and Tye conclude that this a decisive argument
against a general Fregean theory of meaning: no distinct expressions have
the same sense. (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 76-79.) This argument applies
to concepts like Greeks and Hellenes and hence the argument applies
to sentences like (149a) and (149b). Let us see more closely Sainsbury
and Tye’s reasoning. It is a natural thought that if there is a cognitive
difference between two concepts, the difference has to be a result of a
semantic difference. Sainsbury and Tye disagree. They say:
A Fregean datum is that it’s one thing to think that Hesperus
is Hesperus, and another to think that Hesperus is Phospho-
rus; one thing to think that Hesperus is visible, another to
think that Phosphorus is visible. We agree. Different thoughts
are involved, that is, different structures of concepts, since the
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concept Hesperus is distinct from the concept Phosphorus.
We disagree with Fregeans that the difference requires postu-
lating any additional semantic layer.55 (Sainsbury and Tye
2011, 115.)
It could be argued that there are two points to the sameness of sense.
First, if two expression have the same sense, then they mean the same
and, secondly, the consequence of this sameness is the preservation of
truth in substitutions. It seems to me that Sainsbury and Tye agree with
the first point but think that the substitution can fail anyway. Sainsbury
and Tye think that different vehicles or containers (i.e. concepts) for the
same semantic content can lead to differences in cognition. They mention
three reasons:
1. Ignorance: A thinker may be ignorant of the fact that the concepts
she uses have the same content. An example of this kind of case is
an astronomer who does not know that Hesperus and Phosporus
have the same content.
2. Structural differences : Within the cognitive architecture, distinct
concepts can present structural differences which then can lead to
different computational patterns. Sainsbury and Tye use a computer
analogy to illustrate their thought. Distinct concepts can have dif-
ferent “addresses” even if the content is the same.
3. Accuracy : Even though a thinker knows quite well that two con-
cepts have the same content, the thinker may attain a more accu-
rate report of the beliefs of others by using one concept rather than
another.56
On the basis of these differences Sainsbury and Tye think that a thought
involving Hellenes is different from a thought involving Greeks. As
a result, they hold that, under suitable embeddings, the previous three
points can lead to a difference in truth values. (Sainsbury and Tye 2011,
55Emphasis in the quotation is mine.
56The labels for the reasons are mine.
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115-118.) At this point, it could be asked whether the three points could
also affect slurs and their neutral counterparts and if they can, what would
be the “suitable embeddings”. Let us start with the examinations of three
points and their relation to slurs. It seems to me that the first point is
rather trivial concerning slurs. I guess you could imagine communities that
are either ignorant about the slurring term or ignorant about the neutral
term. In these cases, the use of different concepts could affect the truth
values, as Sainsbury and Tye predicted. But here we are concerned with a
competent speaker who is fully aware of both terms and chooses to use one
or the other. However, the second reason in conjunction with accuracy
can lead to differences in truth values. As already said, Sainsbury and Tye
argue that extra-semantic features can influence the identity of a thought.
This goes against the traditional thought. In the traditional framework,
the identity of a thought is a semantic issue. If the constituent senses of
two thoughts are the same, then those thoughts are the same. (P1) and
(P2) reflect this idea. For Sainsbury and Tye, this is not enough for the
sameness of thought. They hold that, in addition to semantic content, the
structure of thoughts has to be the same. They introduce the notion of
isomorphism to explicate the point:
Isomorphism: Thoughts are isomorphic iff they share a complete tree
structure, and their corresponding terminal nodes are concepts with
the same content.
Two related notions are equally important:
Sub-isomorphism: Thoughts are sub-isomorphic iff they share a par-
tial tree structure, and each terminal node either corresponds to a
coreferential concept as the corresponding node in the other, or else
falls under a higher node that is coreferential with a corresponding
terminal node in the other.
Super-isomorphism: Thoughts are super-isomorphic iff they are isomor-
phic and if any two terminal nodes in one contain the same concept
so do the corresponding terminal nodes in the other.
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Sub-isomorphism is weaker than isomorphism and super-isomorphism is
stronger than isomorphism. For Sainsbury and Tye, the thoughts
(170) a. Odysseus is a Hellene.
b. The inventor of the Trojan horse is a Hellene.
are sub-isomorphic. The thoughts involve co-referential concepts but
(170b) has more complex structure. The thoughts
(171) a. Odysseus is a Hellene.
b. Odysseus is a Greek.
are isomorphic. The thoughts have the same content but involve different
concepts at the terminal node. The thoughts
(172) a. The Hellenes are the Hellenes.
b. The Greeks are the Greeks.
are super-isomorphic. The definition of super-isomorphism quarantees
that the pair in (172) is super-isomorphic. For Sainsbury and Tye, only
super-isomorphic thoughts are identical. The crucial point is that only
super-isomorphism preserves truth in every context. Sainsbury and Tye
conclude by pointing out: “In applying originalism [. . . ] especially in
connection with the adequacy of reports of beliefs and other thoughts,
such structural relations play a significant role.” (Sainsbury and Tye 2011,
111-113.)
When considering the suitable embeddings for the difference in truth
values, Sainsbury and Tye’s remark already points to the right direction.
The point is especially poignant when my current aim is considered. The
aim of my project is to reveal the epistemic and cognitive differences be-
hind the use of xenophobic slurs and the use of neutral words. Hence,
on the one hand, the suitable embeddings are reports which characterise
the differences between xenophobic thinking and civilised thinking and,
on the other hand, the issue is the accuracy of these kind of reports. A
xenophobe and a civilised person have both the slurring concept and the
neutral concept and these concepts are containers of information. In the
xenophobic cognition, the information about the French and the ‘Frogs’
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are happily mixed, meaning that a xenophobe can store the same negative
information both under French and Frog. But in the civilised cogni-
tion, there is a clear distinction between the two concepts and a civilised
thinker would never confuse the two “addresses”. The civilised thinker
does not think that the French are vulgar, even though she knows that
that is the common stereotype of ‘Frogs’. This is precisely the reason why
she does not use the slurring term. For this reason, it can be argued that
the following pair has different truth values:
(173) Civilised speakers think that the French are the French.
(174) Civilised speakers think that the French are the Frogs.
It seems to me that the second one is false. In the civilised cognition, the
two containers are not mixed in a way that the xenophobes mix them.
5.5.3 Accuracy and metalinguistic negation
At this point, it could be asked whether accuracy could be dealt in a
non-truth conditional manner. Williamson does anticipate this kind of
question. He says:
It might be objected to Frege’s account that if the words ‘dog’
and ‘cur’ have the same sense, then, on Frege’s own account of
propositional attitude ascriptions, the sentences ‘Mary believes
that every dog is a dog’ and ‘Mary believes that every dog is a
cur’ must have the same truth-value, however much Mary loves
dogs. Mary, a fully competent speaker of English, assents to
‘Every dog is a dog’; will she assent to ‘Every dog is a cur’? If
she agrees that ‘Every dog is a cur’ is true but misleading, we
can surely agree that ‘Mary believes that every dog is a cur’
is also true but misleading. (Williamson 2009, 148).
After this, Williamson cites an example from Kripke. According to Kripke’s
example, natural kind terms ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ are synonymous but a
speaker learns them on different occasions and does not realise that they
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refer to the same kind of plant.57 Williamson goes on to say that, in this
case, the sentences
(175) She believes that every furze is furze
(176) She believes that every furze is gorse
appear to have different truth values. He goes on to argue that this does
not show that ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ are not synonyms. Rather, it puts pres-
sure on the right account of propositional attitude ascriptions. Admit-
tedly, a lot hinges on Williamson’s choice of words as he says that sen-
tences (175) and (176) appear to have different truth values. But if it
is taken that Williamson does admit that the sentences do in fact differ
in truth value, then originalism does provide the right kind of theory. It
accommodates the facts that (175) and (176) differ in truth value and
that ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ are synonymous. Of course in (175) and (176), the
reason for different truth values is ignorance but once the door is opened
to the idea that “furze is furze” and “furze is gorse” are different thoughts,
it becomes more plausible that the accuracy of reports can also lead to
different truth values.
However, there is still one more option to save substitution principle. If
push came to shove, dog-loving Mary could resort to metalinguistic nega-
tion. The hallmark of metalinguistic negation is that it leaves the content
untouched. As Laurence Horn observes, with the metalinguistic negation,
a speaker may reject the pragmatics associated with the register or the
style chosen by another speaker. Horn continues that the items denied
with the metalinguistic negation are matters of delicacy, not matters of
content. The speaker using the metalinguistic negation is not protesting
the truth conditional content but, rather, the style in which the content
was expressed. Horn gives the following examples:
(177) a. I’m not a coloured lady, I’m a proud black woman!
b. He is not rich, he is filthy rich!
57As far as I know, it is Williamson’s idea that furze and gorse are plants as Kripke
does not mention what sort of natural kinds they are (Kripke 1979, 269).
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As we can see, with the metalinguistic negation, one can deny the style or
the choice of words. One can even deny the pronunciation. The key point
is that a speaker using the metalinguistic negation does agree with content.
(Horn 2001, 370-377.) So we could imagine the following discussion:
(178) Jill: Mary, your cur seems happy.
Mary: Yes, but she is no cur, she is a beautiful Border Terrier.
where Mary does agree with the content but disagrees the way it is put
forward. In a similar sense, Predelli discusses Hom’s proposal. Consider:
(179) He is Chinese but he is not a Chink.
Hom thinks that this is an appropriate statement and it is also true of
every Chinese. (Hom 2008, 429.) Given the analysis of PEJ, (179) is
somewhat analogous to a statement:
(180) He is Chinese but he is not a fictional Chinese
which obviously is true of every real Chinese person. Both (179) and (180)
are analysed as a conjunction of two true statements. Expressive treat-
ment, in turn, seems to be in trouble, if (179) is indeed appropriate. On
the one hand given the expressive analysis, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Chink’ share
the same intension and so they have the same semantic value. Thereby,
their truth functional contribution is the same. So the expressive analysis
gets the truth conditions of the latter conjunct wrong. On the other hand,
this should be an appropriate statement but according to the expressive
treatment, the speaker would have an unfavourable attitude towards the
Chinese. The use of ‘Chink’ reflects this, even when it is negated (keep in
mind that the expressive nature of slurs is not truth functional). In this
sense then, (179) “may never be non-defectively uttered by any unpreju-
diced individual” (Predelli 2010, 181). In contrast, consider:
(181) These are bright colours, not bright colors.
I suppose one can imagine a pedantic fan of British English objecting to
American English with (181). It seems obvious enough not to interpret her
words as a contradiction of the form (A & not-A). The key point is that
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a speaker using the metalinguistic negation is not rejecting the brightness
of the colours. According to Predelli, (179) is best analysed as
(182) He is Chinese, not a Chink
which is a textbook example of metalinguistic negation. Another case
that Hom brings forth is the sentence
(183) Institutions that treat Chinese as Chinks are morally depraved.
Hom says that here is a case for pedagogical truth and non-derogatory use
of a slur. (Hom 2008, 429.) Again as such, the expressive treatment seems
to have hard time explaining what is happening here. However, Predelli
notes that surely ‘rabbit’ and ‘bunny’ are extensionally equivalent but still
we have the following:
(184) Institutions that treat rabbits as bunnies are run by childish tree-
huggers.
It seems that Predelli is correct in his observation that (184) has to do
more with the way some words are used. It seems that we have two ways
of accounting for accuracy, truth conditional way and non-truth condi-
tional way. The question is which of these is the right one for slurs. In
the previous, I claimed that slurs present distinctive patterns of thinking,
xenophobic thinking. One of the central features of xenophobia is the
epistemic failing and it is more likely that the slurring container stores
information that is produced with the faulty epistemic methods. On the
basis of this, I think that it is accurate to point out that a sentence like
(174) is in fact false because the slur and its neutral counterpart do have
different epistemic roles, at least in the civilised cognition. Furthermore,
this might not be as dramatic as it first appears. if Sainsbury and Tye
are right then the originalist framework does justice for my interpreta-
tion of Williamson’s point. It satisfies two demands: It treats slurs and
their neutral counterparts as synonymous while assigning the right truth
conditions for (173) and (174).
It seems to me that the resulting view accurately separates the roles
of the xenophobic concepts and the neutral concepts in civilised thinking.
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In this way, the current view does justice for the civilised efforts to hold
on to good epistemic standards when thinking about social kinds.
5.6 Inference patterns
So far, I have considered inference patterns to be the most telling evidence
concerning the use of slurs and I will continue to do so in distinguishing
generic descriptivism from the Kaplanian framework in one very important
respect. According to the Kaplanian view,
(185) Max is a Frog. Thus, Max is French
is valid but
(186) Max is French. Thus, Max is a Frog
is invalid. This is because Kaplan thinks that validity is based on semantic
information and (186) adds information halfway through the inference.
A good deductive practice should not do that. The nature of semantic
information in (186) is expressive. Generic descriptivism does not claim
that the added information is semantic. It holds that, semantically, there
is nothing wrong with slurs. Hence both directions are valid but the
conclusion in (186) is derogatory. While both inferences are valid, civilised
people should not infer along the lines of (186) because it is offensive and
only xenophobes infer that way.
This highlights the distinction between validity, correctness and ap-
propriateness. Think of someone talking about Eric Cantona and a xeno-
phobe goes:
(187) Oh right, that Frog.
According to the Kaplanian account, the utterance is not expressively
valid because it adds semantic information about the negative attitude.
With Predelli’s idea, the invalidity can be explicated. The inference from
(188) to (189) is not valid:
(188) Eric Cantona is French
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(189) Eric Cantona is a Frog
but it can be made expressively and truth conditionally valid with EX-I.
That is, the premise set has to be a conjunction of descriptive content and
expressive witness. Hence, only the inference from (190) to (191) is valid:
(190) Eric Cantona is French (∧ I regard the French as vulgar).
(191) Eric Cantona is a Frog.
In distinction, generic descriptivism does not see anything semantically
wrong with the inference from (188) to (189). However, generic descrip-
tivism holds that (189) is always inappropriate because it is derogatory
and insulting. But even then, derogation is not semantic, at least not in
a truth conditional sense which is the only semantic notion generic de-
scriptivism recognises. This point captures the contrast between generic
descriptivism and Kaplanian approach. Both Kaplan and Predelli hold
that derogation is part of the meaning and hence it is captured with the
expanded notion of validity. I do not think it is part of the semantics.
The crucial difference is that Predelli thinks that only the inference from
(190) to (191) is valid. Whereas I think both inferences, (188) to (189)
and (190) to (191) are valid. The inference from (190) to (191) is on a par
with the inference from (192) to (193):
(192) Snow is white and grass is green.
(193) Snow is white.
On my view, the adding of the attitude does not add anything semantic to
the scheme. On my view, it is just another piece of information just like
that grass is green. Surely, the negative attitude is intimately connected
to the use of slurs. But as intimate as this connection is, it is does not
add anything to the semantics of slurs. So the information does not add
anything to the semantic profile of a slur. However, it does add to the
epistemological considerations concerning the use of slurs.
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5.7 Summary
The motivations behind the central claims of generic descriptivism have
now been laid out. This concludes the first part of my strategy. I intro-
duced the idea that epistemic features can affect the use of an expression
as convincingly as possible. As a summary, I will restate the claims put
forward in the introduction:
1. Derogation is epistemic:
(a) The information a slurring term subsumes is xenophobic.
(b) This information is responsible for derogation because the in-
formation is negative and unwarranted.
2. It is conventionally recognised that slurs are non-neutral words.
Generic descriptivism claims that the non-neutrality stems from a
consensus in a specific belief state which then forms a general rela-
tion between the term and the target.
3. Derogation constrains the correct use of slurs, exemplified by the
equivalence:
The use of a slur is correct iff the speaker has negative beliefs to-
wards the target.
4. Finally, slurs reflect genuine cognitive differences in comparison with
the neutral terms. This claim has two notable consequences:
(a) Even though it seems that slurs express attitudes, a more com-
prehensive understanding of slurs is achieved if we claim that
slurs express beliefs (even if highly subjective beliefs).
(b) The substitution principle between the slurs and their neutral
counterparts fails.
From here on, I will proceed to the second stage of my strategy and argue
for generic descriptivism by laying out its beneficial consequences. An
important part in the justification of generic descriptivism is the nature
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of xenophobia. A central role in the explanation is given to the generic
nature of xenophobic information which is attached to slurs. This account
requires that generics are given a psychological explanation. The explana-
tion of the psychological mechanism hinges on other phenomena, namely
on psychological essentialism which is an integral part of the mechanism.
Psychological essentialism plays also an important role in revealing the
epistemology of xenophobia. The mechanism is also affected by emotions
as a kind of guiding mechanism. It is claimed that emotions guide the
mechanism that produces generics, in the sense that emotions influence





6.1 Generics and xenophobia
6.1.1 Introduction
In this Section, we are going to look at some of the details concerning the
epistemic failing related to slurs. As a preliminary remark, let us make a
distinction between two sentences:
(194) I know some French guys who are not Frogs; they are not vulgar.
(195) I know some Frogs but they are not vulgar.
Although the difference might seem marginal between these sentences,
there is a big difference in my proposed explanation. (194) is explained
with the speaker’s reference. The speaker intends to refer to a subset of
French people with the slurring term. This is not case in (195). The
speaker in (195) understands that ‘Frog’ refers to the set of all French
people and that is why the speaker feels necessary to deny the stereotypical
character in the case of these particular ‘Frogs’. This seems analogous to
a sentence like
(196) Those tigers are not striped.
188
This suggests that the information which slurs subsume is generic infor-
mation. We all know that typically tigers are striped but we also know
that there are some counterexamples to this. Williamson remarks that
the implicature should be understood as a generic sentence like
(197) There is a tendency among Germans to be cruel.
In fact, many people have suggested that slurs have something to do with
generics, one way or the other.58 I very much agree but instead of saying
that slurs produce generics (in a form of generic implicature), I argue
that slurs are based on generics via xenophobic thoughts. That is, the
information which slurs contain is generic. Furthermore, I think that
Williamson’s remark just pinpoints the problem rather than solves it.
In the following, I will lay out Sarah-Jane Leslie’s view of generics.
Leslie argues that there are two ways to approach meaning: The first one
is a traditional semantic approach:
one of articulating semantic structure in sentences of a given
language so as to enable a recursive assignment of truth condi-
tions, or alternatively propositions, to all the sentences of that
language. The assignments are understood as meaning giving,
and the language in question can thus be taken to be a vast
paring of sentences and meanings. (Leslie 2008, 3.)
We might now call this a narrow view. The second view could be called
a broader view. According to the second view, the “task is to explore the
actual cognitive abilities of speakers in order to explain just how it is that
they are able to speak the language so understood” (Leslie 2008, 3). Ac-
cording to Leslie, only the second view is sufficient to explain generics. She
argues that generics are based on psychological mechanism. At the same
time, she is sceptical whether traditional semantics based on recursive as-
signments of truth conditions can explain the psychological mechanism.
58Elisabeth Camp and Sally Haslanger acknowledge the generic nature of stereotypes.
They both say that this is why slurring utterances are so hard to deny. (Camp 2013,
342 fn. 16 and Langton, Haslanger and Andersen 2012, 764). Also Predelli notes that
the stereotype involves words like ’typically’ (Predelli 2010, 180). This is a hallmark
of a generic quantifier as seen below.
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She says that the psychological mechanism produces generalisations. It
provides a method of fast information gathering. In the following, I agree
that the psychological mechanism explains well some aspects of xenopho-
bic generalisations. The mechanism can then shed light on what slurs
express, on xenophobic thoughts. However, I am a bit sceptical whether
the view should be called semantic. The purpose of this chapter is to
explore the nature of derogatory information and I have already said that
the nature of derogation is epistemic. I do not think anything is lost if it
is said that the psychological mechanism sheds first and foremost light on
the epistemology of xenophobia.59
6.1.2 Structure of generics
Leslie’s work suggests that the key to solve the puzzle of generics lies in the
psychological aspects of our knowledge about our environment. Generics
are sentences like
(198) Ducks lay eggs.
(199) Mosquitoes carry the West Nile Virus.
The peculiar thing about generic sentences like (198) and (199) is that
although we tend to endorse them, they seem to resist any sort of specific
quantification. In actuality, not all ducks lay eggs. Only around 50 percent
of ducks actually lay eggs, namely female ducks. The mosquito example
is even more striking: only 1 percent of mosquitoes actually carry the
virus. These point out the obvious that ‘all’ quantifier cannot be applied
to generics. Furthermore, if you take (198) and try to quantify with ‘all’
quantifier, then surely
(200) Ducks are female.
should also count as true because you are quantifying over the very same
set. Nevertheless, (200) is obviously false. (Leslie 2007, 375-376.) An
59Furthermore, I am a bit sceptical whether semantics without compositionality and
recursiveness is semantics. To me, they are integral parts of semantics.
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intuitive thought is that if ‘all’ quantifier is too strong to be the key to in-
terpret generics then some weaker quantifier can capture generics. Hence,
‘some’ quantifier seems more promising. In the light of the evidence, it
is true that some ducks lay eggs (namely about 50 % of ducks) and that
some Mosquitoes carry that West Nile Virus (around 1 % of the mosquito
population). But when quantifying generics with ‘some’, we encounter a
problem with monotonicity. Existential quantifier is an upward monotonic
quantifier, meaning that you can always go from the subset to the superset
but not the other way round: If some tall men are coffee-drinkers, then
some men are coffee-drinkers but not the other way round. Monotonicity
holds for (198):
(201) Some ducks lay eggs. Thus, some birds lay eggs.
but upward monotonicity fails for (199). We tend to endorse ”Mosquitoes
carry the West Nile Virus” but we do not endorse
(202) Insects carry the West Nile Virus.
Neither we endorse
(203) Animals carry the West Nile Virus.
The intuitive reaction to the latter claim is something like
(204) Well, not all animals!
Hence, generics cannot be quantified with ‘some’.
Standard view
If semantics of generics is controversial, there is a bit more consensus
concerning syntax of generics. Hence, it seems to be a good place to
start the investigation. It is generally agreed that the logical structure of
generics is a tripartite structure consisting a generics operator, a restrictor
and a scope. With this structure of generic
(205) Tigers are striped.
can be regimented as
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Gen x [Tiger (x)] [Striped (x)]
where ‘Gen’ is a generic operator, the restrictor specifies the set over which
the variable ranges (in this case variables range over the set of tigers) and
the scope specifies the property attributed to the members of the domain.
(Leslie 2007, 387; see also Lewis 1998, 5-18.) Following Leslie, let us
label this as the standard view. At the heart of standard view is that
structurally generics are analogous to first-order quantification. It is just
that quantities keep changing with generics. You can say that mostly a
good indicator of generic sentence is the fact you can quantify it with the
word ’typically’ but even this does not always hold, as (199) shows. A
typical mosquito does not spread the West Nile Virus.
Uniform simple view
But concerning the syntax of generics, even the standard view is chal-
lenged. David Liebesman proposes a simple view concerning generics.
According to the view, generics are simply predications to kinds. On the
standard view there has to be a distinction between generics and kind-
predications. The difference is the following. The sentence
(206) Ravens are black.
is a generic sentence. According to the standard analysis, it contains a
hidden ‘Gen’ operator and it is analogous to first-order quantification. As
such, it must be distinguished from
(207) Dinosaurs are extinct.
as (207) cannot be a first-order quantified sentence. Extinction just is not
a property of individuals. Only species or kinds can be extinct. Liebesman
rejects the distinction and claims that both (206) and (207) are kind-
predications, meaning that generics too are in actuality kind-predication.
Thus, Liebesman rejects the analysis based on ‘Gen’. Liebesman’s most
compelling point for the view is uniformity. The structure of a kind-
predication like (207) consists a singular term and a property that is
predicated to the referent of the singular term. Hence, ‘tigers’ denote
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an object. It denotes the kind Panthera Tigris which is a singular ob-
ject. The object includes all individual tigers as its members. (Liebesman
2011, 411-414.) This way (205), (206) and (207) all get a uniform bipartite




The stucture of these sentences is the same as the structure of a simple
predication “a is F”: F(a). Consider the following sentences:
(208) Mosquitoes are widespread.
(209) Mosquitoes are irritating.
(210) Mosquitoes are widespread and irritating.
The simple view yields a uniform analysis for these sentences which is
analogous to F(a). While analysis based on ‘Gen’ is in trouble, especially
with (210). According to ‘Gen’ analysis, (208) is a kind-predication and
(209) is a generic sentence. What sort of sentence is (210) then? According
to the simple view, the structure of (210) is simply
F(a) ∧ G(a)
but it could be said that from the standard point of view, we have a fallacy
of equivocation. The term ‘mosquitoes’ has a different status in (208) and
(209). In (208), ‘mosquitoes’ is a singular term denoting an object, the
kind Culicidae and (209) involves ‘Gen’ ranging over individuals and yet
in (210) ‘mosquitoes’ is treated uniformly.
For ‘Gen’ analysis, there are two type-shifting related proposals to
overcome the previous problem, depending on the direction of the shifting.
Leslie says:
[T]here are two dominant views, with one view being that bare
plurals contribute kind-referring expressions which are then
type-shifted down to become predicates of individuals in exam-
ples such as [209]. This predicate of individuals then restricts
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the scope of Gen. This type shifting is triggered by the predi-
cate in question (”is annoying”) being a predicate of individu-
als, not kinds. In examples such as [208], no such type-shifting
need occur. The other view is effectively the converse of the
first – bare plurals contribute predicates of individuals with un-
bound variables. In examples such as [208], these predicates
are type-shifted ‘up’ to become predicates of kinds, which is
triggered by the predicate in question (”is widespread”) being
a predicate of kinds. (Leslie 2015, 19.)
Assuming that Liebesman is right, i.e. that kind-predication is the default
reading of both (205) and (206), then ‘Gen’ analysis can be maintained
by adding down-shifting operator ⇓ to the analysis of (205):
Gen x [⇓tigers (x)] [striped (x)].
In this analysis, (207) and (208) are left as they are since they are distin-
guished from generics as kind-predications in the first place. Their form
is the familiar F(a):
Extinct(dinosaurs)
Widespread(mosquitoes).
Assuming Leslie is right about the default reading of generics, then (209)
is analysed in according to the standard analysis:
Gen x [mosquitoes (x)] [irritating (x)].
and (208) is analysed as kind-predication with the help of upwards type-
shifting operator ⇑:
Widespread(⇑mosquitoes).
This solves the problem of equivocation in (210). It can be analysed either
as
Widespread(mosquitoes) ∧ Gen x [⇓mosquitoes (x)] [irratating (x)].
or
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Widespread(⇑mosquitoes) ∧ Gen x [mosquitoes (x)] [irratating (x)].
The former is an analysis according to which the kind-predication is the
default reading and the latter is the analysis according to which generics
are first-order quantification consisting ‘Gen’ operator.60
Standard view and indefinite singular generics
Leslie points out first that Liebesman’s view is in trouble with sentences
like
(211) Cats lick themselves.
If ‘cats’ refers to the species Felis Catus which has individuals as members,
then it would seem that (211) is true if cats never lick themselves but
only other cats. But that is not what the sentence means. It seems
rather obvious that the speaker means that an individual cat licks itself
and this is typical behaviour for cats. To express this, one needs first-
order quantification or something which keeps the idea of quantifying over
individuals, such as:
Gen x [cats(x)] [lick(x, x)].
Still in my view, one of the most compelling reasons to go for the mixed
analysis of (210) is the so-called indefinite singular generics. Some generics
can be rephrased in indefinite singular form:
(212) A tiger is striped.
(213) A duck lays eggs.
But not all bare plurals can be phrased in such a way:
(214) Barns are red.
(215) #A barn is red.
60The type-shifting operators have obvious similarities with Gennaro Chierchia’s
‘cap’ and ‘cup’ which allow to form kinds from properties and vice versa: “‘∩’ and ‘∪’
are maps that allow us to get a kind from the corresponding property and vice versa”
(Chiercia 1998, 349).
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Leslie says that the view on generics should be able accommodate this
feature and the simple view adjusts to this rather poorly but the standard
view has a natural explanation for this. The analogy is again first-order
quantification. Observe the sentence:
(216) If a lion has a mane, then it is a male lion.
This sentence is not just about an individual lion but rather proposed as
general rule about lions. Hence, the sentence is naturally quantified with
a universal quantifier:
∀x ((Lion(x) ∧ Mane(x)) → Male(x)).
It seems obvious that the speaker intends (216) as a general rule about
lions, as rule to identify male lions. If this is so, then (216) provides a
structural analogue for (212) and (213). This does suggests that generics
are rather first-order quantifications than kind-predications.
6.1.3 Psychology of generalisation
Absent ‘Gen’
A curious thing is that natural language does not manifest this kind of
operator: “there is no known language that has a dedicated, articulated
generic operator” (Leslie 2007, 381). Leslie has an explanation for this.
Note first that the semantic attempts to capture generics quantificationally
or set theoretically are very complex. I will not rehearse those attempts
here. Instead, I will go along with Leslie and say that those accounts suffer
from what might be called asymmetry of complexity. The accounts offered
are far more complicated than the simple definition for ‘all’ quantifier:
All Ks are Fs is true iff {x: x is a K} ⊆ {x: x is a F}
Yet a striking thing about the generics is that children learn them before
they learn quantifiers: “[Y]oung children find generics easier to acquire
and master than explicit quantifiers. Generics appear in children’s speech
[. . . ] significantly before explicit quantifiers do [. . . ]” (Leslie 2007, 380.)
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According to Leslie, the two facts, that there is no articulated operator
standing for generics and that children find generics easier to learn than
well-articulated quantifiers, are linked. How do all speakers learn generics
when these generics are associated with the absence of an operator? Leslie
provides an answer that ‘Gen’ is a default operator, just as the default
understanding of
(217) John climbed the mountain
is that John climbed up the mountain. If one wants to diverge from the
default reading, one must explicitly add ‘down’:
(218) John climbed down the mountain.
Similarly if a speaker wants to diverge from the default generalisation, the
speaker must specify this with a quantifier.
Primitive mechanism of generalisation
Leslie’s more controversial claim is this:
Children do not ever learn truth conditions for generic claims.
Rather, the generalisations that generic sentences express cor-
respond to the cognitive system’s most primitive, default gen-
eralisations. The ability to generalise pre-dates the acquisition
of language [. . . ] This mechanism must be in place before the
child begins to learn language, since pre-verbal infants have
the capacity to generalise. (Leslie 2007, 381.)
There is a motivation for this claim, not only based on experiments on
children61 but also on more theoretical grounds.
Animal kinds are similar on the level of abstraction. They
make same kind of noise, they move in the same way and so
on. Most important feature of this aspect is that the gen-
eralization can be made on as little evidence as one instance
of the kind. By registering the characteristic dimension of a
61More on these experiments below.
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kind, the mechanism enables efficient information gathering.
The mechanism takes advantage of the regularities of a given
kind. (Leslie 2007, 384.)
Three features
Leslie identifies three features on the primitive mechanism of generalisa-
tion:
1. Animal kinds are similar on the level of abstraction. They make
same kind of noise, they move in the same way and so on. Most
important feature of this aspect is that the generalisation can be
made on as little evidence as one instance of the kind. By register-
ing the characteristic dimension of a kind, the mechanism enables
efficient information gathering. The mechanism takes advantage of
the regularities of a given kind, like:
(219) Ducks lay eggs
which is a characteristic generic.
2. Cognitive mechanism is also well adopted to deal with striking or
horrific information. For example, sharks attack bathers although
very few sharks actually attack bathers. But the kind of information
we are dealing here is such that one would be well-served to be
forewarned about. The mechanism looks for a good predictor of the
property in question. The kind ‘shark’ is a good predictor of bather-
attacking property. This produces striking property generics.
3. When the generalised feature is neither characteristic nor striking,
the triggering of the mechanism requires that the majority of the
members of kind have this feature. For example,
(220) Cars have radios
(221) Barns are red
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are majority generics. If only a small percentage of cars had radios,
the generalisation would be false. Majority generics deal with in-
formation that is more neutral, i.e. does not stand out in the way
striking features stand. It is not even a characteristic feature.
Finally, the mechanism is adapted to deal with counterexamples to the
generalisations. (All of the above generics have counterexamples, even
majority generics). We can distinguish two kinds of counterexamples,
negative and positive counterexamples. A negative counterexample is a
male duck. Although a male duck is a counterexample to (219), he does
not show an alternative way of reproduction. If male ducks demonstrated
some alternative way of reproduction (e.g. a mammal type of reproduc-
tion), it would then count as a positive counterexample to the generic
(219). As long as the counterexamples are negative, the generic in ques-
tion does not need revision. (Leslie 2007, 384-385.)
Against the narrow semantic treatment
The above list comprises the features of generics in such a way that the
view can make sense of inferences and extensionality concerning generics.
Leslie notes that no logic out there can quite capture the inferences con-
cerning generics. As I noted, generics do not obey monotonicity and so
it has been suggested that the logic of generics can be captured by the
notion of defeasible validity which is a central notion in non-monotonic
logics. Defeasible inferences are warranted relative to the information in
the premises but may be retracted in the light of of new evidence. For
example
Birds fly
Tweety is a bird
Tweety flies
is defeasibly valid but may be retracted if it is discovered that Tweety
is a penguin. Nevertheless, even these kind of non-monotonic logics do
not accommodate all of the inferential patterns concerning generics. The





In many cases, this schema holds. It holds for example in the case of
Tweety. So it has been suggested that generics support this schema (Asher
and Morreau 1995; Pelletier and Asher 1997). Nevertheless, there are
generics which fit poorly to this schema. For example, in
Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus
Buzzy is a mosquito
Buzzy carries the West Nile Virus
the conclusion is unlikely to be true since only 1% of the mosquitoes
carry the Virus. Furthermore, Asher, Morreau and Pelletier couple the
above view of defeasible validity with the view that Gen is a restricted
‘all’ quantifier. Gen then means roughly ‘all normal’ but even then, the
following is wrong:
Ducks lay eggs
Bob is a duck
Bob lays eggs
This inference is plainly wrong. Bob does not lay eggs because he is
a male. According to Asher, Morreau and Pelletier, ‘Gen’ restricts the
quantification only to normal individuals but there is nothing abnormal
about Bob, i.e. there is nothing abnormal about being male. So it seems
that Asher, Morreau and Pelletier’s account fit to some generics but not
others. From this, Leslie draws a conclusion: ”There is no schematic in-
ference that holds regardless of the particular generic that figures in it”
(Leslie 2007, 388).
In sum, generics can be characterised in the following way. No monono-
tonic or non-monotonic logic can capture all of the particular inferen-
tial patterns of generics. Also, no quantificational theory based on set-
theoretical notions can capture generics. The view that Leslie advocates
instead is that generics are based on primitive cognitive mechanism that
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registers information on factors such as how striking and important it is
(Leslie 2007, 394-398).
6.2 Psychological essentialism
6.2.1 Varieties of Essentialism and the minimal hy-
pothesis
Douglas Medin and Andrew Ortony introduce the notion of psychological
essentialism. They argue that we are psychologically prone to essentialise
certain features in kinds. Although psychological essentialism is not by
any means incompatible with ontological essentialism, still it must be
distinguished from ontological essentialism: “[P]sychological essentialism
[. . . ] would not be the view that things have essences, but rather the
view that people’s representations of things might reflect such a belief”
(Medin and Ortony 1989, 183). Psychological essentialism does not there-
fore have an opinion about the truth of ontological essentialism. It only
suggests that people tend to believe in it. Furthermore, a key aspect of
psychological essentialism is that
[O]ur mental representations reflect the notion that properties
differ in their depth and that deep properties are often inti-
mately linked to the more superficial properties that so often
drive our perceptions of and intuitions about similarity (Medin
and Ortony 1989, 186).
This seems to be suggestive in the case of generics. It seems plausible that
we easily essentialise the feature of ‘attacks people’ in the shark kind. This
might be because various superficial features of sharks (big fin, sharp teeth
and so on) are good predictors of the deeper and more sinister property
of eating people or at least the superficial features are a good indicators
of the disposition to attack people.
Michael Strevens distinguishes two kinds of essentialisms. One branches
into three different versions but they have the commonality that they posit
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two beliefs to agents:
(i) Belief about essences.
(ii) Belief about K(ind)-laws between essences (deeper properties) and
observable properties (superficial appearance).
The K-laws are usually causal laws except Medin and Ortony maintain
that they are merely statistical laws. Strevens own preferred view is a
minimal hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, there is something in
the kind that causes the observable properties but it does not hypothesise
what that is. In other words, It posits only the belief in causal laws but not
in essences: ”you might have no opinion what does the causing [. . . ] or you
might think that it is just a brute fact about the world that being a tiger
causes an animal to grow stripes”. (Strevens 2000, 154 and 149-154.) In
the following, we have brief overview of each four strands of essentialism.
The point is not to choose right way to think about essentialism. Rather,
the point is that the xenophobes have plenty of room to manoeuvre, when
their xenophobia is challenged. (This will be discussed later below.)
Pure Essentialism
Strevens quotes Susan Gelman, John Coley and Gail Gottfried to charac-
terise pure essentialism:
[P]eople seem to assume that categories of things in the world
have a true, underlying nature that imparts category identity
[. . . ] that categories - and words referring to categories, such
as common nouns - map onto that structure. On this view,
categories are discovered rather than arbitrary or invented;
they carve up nature at its joints. The underlying nature, or
category essence, is thought to be the causal mechanism that
results in those properties that we can see.
In this sense then people seem to assume that the essence of, say, tigers
cause them to have stripes, to be ferocious and so on. (Gelman et al
1994, 344; see also Strevens 2001, 150-151.) Strevens encapsulates pure
essentialism with three claims:
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(PE1) Some naive theories posit the existence of essences, though they
may not represent what sorts of things essences are.
(PE2) Essences are represented as what define (at least some of) the cat-
egories of a theory, in the sense that possession of the essence is
represented as necessary and sufficient for category membership.
(PE3) Essences are represented as being causally responsible for certain
observable properties.
Statistical Essentialism
Medin and Ortony’s preferred version posits a statistical link between
essences and the surface features. That is, they agree with pure essential-
ist’s first claim. However according to Medin and Ortony, the relationship
often is causal but it does not have to be. It can be only statistical. In
this sense, they disagree with the third claim of pure essentialism which
states that the link has to be causal. Finally, the major difference with
statistical and pure essntialism is that Medin and Ortony do not believe
that having a certain essence is necessary and sufficient for membership
of the kind. The three tenets of statistical essentialism then are:
(SE1) Some naive theories posit the existence of essences, though they
may not represent what sorts of things essences are. (Same as
PE1.)
(SE2) Essences are not represented as necessary, and perhaps not repre-
sented as sufficient, for category membership.
(SE3) Essences are represented as being causally responsible for or statis-
tically correlated with certain observable properties. Other kinds
of links between essences and observable properties may also be
possible.
The first claim corresponds to the first claim of pure essentialism. How-
ever, the second claim is in direct clash with the second claim of pure
essentialism as it denies that essences are neither necessary nor sufficient
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condition for the membership of the relevant kind. Strevens says that the
third claim is a weakened version of the corresponding pure essentialist
claim. The link between essences and surface features can be but do not
have to be causal. (Strevens 2001, 152.)
Internal Essentialism
Internal essentialism holds that the subjects believe that essence of, say,
tiger is inside of an individual tiger. Several experiments have shown that
the subject do think that the insides are more important than the outsides
concerning the essential features of a given kind. The essence might be
the entire insides, or it can be in a certain place or organ such as heart,
or it can be buried in the DNA. According to the hypothesis the subjects
do not have to know exactly where the essence is but does rule out some
of the option available for the two previous views. First, the subject
cannot represent the essence of the kind to be on the surface. The skin,
for example, cannot be the essence. Secondly, the subjects need to have
some beliefs about the whereabouts of the essence and they need to have
beliefs about nature of essences (contra pure and statistical essentialism).
Finally, subjects cannot represent the essence as some aspect of the causal
history of the kind, such as some fact about its parents or its evolutionary
lineage. The claim that the essence of a tiger, for example, is somewhere
inside of a tiger clearly rules out the possibility that the essence of a tiger
is in some aspect of its causal history. (Strevens 2001, 153.) Consequently,
the three claims of Internal essentialism are
(lE1) Some naive theories posit a special role for a certain key property
(or properties) of an entity’s insides, the essential property, though
they may not represent which property this is.
(lE2) Essential properties are represented as what define the categories of
a theory, in the sense that the possession of the essential property
is represented as necessary and sufficient for category membership.
(lE3) The essential property of an entity’s insides is represented as being
causally responsible for certain observable properties.
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The previous three views adhere to both (i) and (ii). Strevens own pre-
ferred view is a minimal hypothesis which subscribe only to K-laws.
The minimal hypothesis
Strevens own preferred view is a minimal hypothesis. The core idea is
that does not posit essences at all but only so-called K(ind)-laws. The
idea is that the subjects who make inferences about kinds tend to believe
in causal laws about kinds. The subjects need not to have any beliefs
about essences:
Rather, [according to the hypothesis, the subjects need to be-
lieve that] there is something about being a tiger that causes
tigers to have stripes. I take this formulation to be equivalent
to it is a causal law that tigers have stripes. I will call these
laws K-laws. (Strevens 2001, 154.)
One could say that the minimal hypothesis has most in common with
PE and still it denies all the three claims made by PE. In this sense, it
is more conservative than PE. Strevens goes on to explain that his view
does not attribute beliefs about essences to people but his non-essentialist
hypothesis attributes beliefs about causal laws. According to him, beliefs
about K-laws are enough to explain the K(ind)-patterns of inferences.62
6.2.2 Rationalising xenophobia
Switching between theories
First as it stands, essentialism and minimalism are by definition incon-
sistent. The denial of essences makes minimalism inconsistent with any
strand of essentialism. Minimalism and essentialism cannot be both true
at the same time. Nevertheless, a group of essentialists propose in their
response to Strevens that minimalism and essentialism might co-exist as
62Much of literature on psychological essentialism is due to Karen Neander who
pointed me to the right direction.
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a continuum in development.63 Their point is that in child development,
a child can go through phases from minimalism to essentialism:
Perhaps children begin their lives with nothing more than the
minimal assumptions as depicted by Strevens and acquire un-
derstanding of causal mechanisms later in life [. . . ] In this way,
the minimal hypothesis may encapsulate an early set of beliefs
and be thought of as a developmental precursor to essential-
ism. (Ahn et al 2001, 67.)
Concerning xenophobia, it seems to me that the same xenophobic subject
can switch between the theories even though they are inconsistent.
First thing we have to remember is the status of the theories. In my
view, they are the rationalisation of the results of psychological mecha-
nism. They are there to justify the beliefs in generic statements, such
as “tigers are striped” or “Ducks lay eggs”. Given the multitude of the
interpretations of the ‘Gen’ quantifier, it is plausible that there more than
one theory to rationalise the quantities. This is especially plausible with
xenophobic beliefs. They are notoriously resistant to reform. Haslanger
notes the same (using Leslie’s terminology):
Consider again:
(15) Latinos are lazy.
Does (15) assert a majority generic or a characteristic generic?
Interpret (15) as a majority generic. To combat it, one pro-
vides many counterexamples. However, the speaker can then
suggest that, although many Latinos aren’t lazy, they tend to
be – thus embracing the characteristic generic. Instead inter-
pret (15) as a characteristic generic. To combat it one provides
evidence that, say, Latinos show no greater tendency towards
laziness than any other group. The speaker can then suggest
63The group is Woo-kyuoung Ahn, Charles Kalish, Susan Gelman, Douglas Medin,
Christian Luhmann, Scott Atran, John D. Coley and Patrick Shafto.
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that, although it is not part of the nature or essence of Lati-
nos to be lazy, most are. This slide back and forth between
different interpretations of the utterance allows speakers to
avoid taking responsibility for the implications of their claims.
(Langton, Haslanger and Anderson 2012, 764.)
As noted, here Haslanger follows Leslie’s terminology and that terminol-
ogy is directed at explaining generics (as linguistic items), not K-pattern
inferences. But I claim that analogous “slide back and forth” can be
witnessed in rationalising xenophobic beliefs. First, most likely behind
the formation of xenophobic belief is a striking feature. The subject sees
someone who appears to be different in surface features (different clothes,
language, habits and so on) having a striking feature. From this the
subject, infers that social kind with those surface features also have the
striking feature, even though they might not display it all the time. Then
comes the mistake. The subject identifies a striking feature generic with
a majority or a characteristic generic. These generic beliefs are then ra-
tionalised with some branch of essentialism. The most natural correspon-
dence is with majority generic and statistical essentialism. When you add
minimalism to this, the xenophobe has plenty of room to manoeuvre be-
tween the theories. Let us assume that the xenophobe justifies the generic
“Latinos are lazy” with statistical essentialism. In this case, the essen-
tialist belief can be held even if not all Latinos are lazy. The inference
from latino to laziness is defeasible. The xenophobe needs to believe in
statistical correlation between the social category of Latinos and the prop-
erty laziness. If the xenophobe is then somehow convincingly shown that
there is no statistical correlation, the xenophobe can resort to another
form of essentialism and at the same time majority generic to character-
istic generic. Although not all Latinos present laziness all the time, it
is still one of features that characterises Latinos. Hence given the right
conditions, Latinos are disposed to avoid proper work or perhaps the dis-
position is simply manifested in questioning protestant work ethics. The
theory-ladeness has its place here. Leslie argues that a popular placeholder
for essences is the genes. She says: “A number of social groups, such as
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groups demarcated by race and gender, are often highly quintessential-
ized”. Here Leslie terms psychological essentialism as ‘quintessentialism’.
She continues that DNA or genes are often invoked to explain essentialist
beliefs. It is often thought that the genetic variation within ethnic groups
is lower than between ethnic groups but actually it is not. The genetic
variation within any given ethnic group is just high as between ethnic
groups. (Leslie 2013, 122.) Again, if the xenopbobe who beliefs that a
certain striking property is based in the DNA is confronted with the in-
formation about genetic variation between and across ethnic groups, he
or she can switch to saying that it is in fact in the culture. As Leslie point
out:
[D]efenders of such claims as Muslims are terrorists routinely
argue that there is something about Islam – its very doctrine –
that instills in its followers the disposition to perform terrorist
acts (Leslie 2007, 385).
Here the word “something” is already vague enough to provoke minimal-
ism about K-patterns between Islam and terrorism: “something about
Islam (whatever it is) instills the disposition to violence”.
In sum, It seems to me that all of the theories have their place in
xenophobia and that is why xenophobic beliefs are so resistant to revision.
Even though the theories are inconsistent, a xenophobe can maintain that
one theory applies to that social group and another branch of essentialism
applies to another group, depending the how he or she has been confronted
to justify his or her beliefs.
6.2.3 Essentialism and social kinds
People have all sort of xenophobic beliefs about different ethnic groups
even if they have never met a member of the group. People have been
just told they are like that. These beliefs are resistant to revision just
because these beliefs are essentialised. Leslie and others have conducted
experiments in social transmission of essentialist beliefs. Essentialist be-
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liefs seem to have connection with social prejudice. Interestingly, generics
play a key role in this.
Allport notes that there is stark contrast between essentialism con-
cerning biological kinds and essentialism concerning social kinds (Allport
1954). Leslie and others put the contrast in a following way:
For biological categories, psychological essentialism facilitates
learning and knowledge acquisition. For example, viewing cat-
egory members as fundamentally alike allows a child to infer
that if one tiger is ferocious, then other tigers will be too [. . . ]
Similarly, viewing category-linked properties as arising from
an underlying nature allows children to infer that a baby tiger
will inevitably grow up to be ferocious, even if it does not ap-
pear ferocious at birth [. . . ] When applied to social categories,
psychological essentialism can have pernicious consequences,
however. As suggested by Allport’s observations, essentialist
beliefs about social categories [. . . ] facilitate social stereotyp-
ing and prejudice. (Rhodes et al 2012, 1)
Leslie and others summarise the results of previous studies with two
points:
1. Although children show early signs of essentialism concerning bio-
logical kinds (by age of 4 years), they have essentialist beliefs only
about a small subset of social categories.
2. Children growing up in a conservative communities have more so-
cial essentialist beliefs than children growing up in a more liberal
environment.
From these points Leslie and others draw the following conclusion:
3. There is an interaction between the emerging cognitive mechanism
and cultural input. Cultural input guides how children map essen-
tialist beliefs about particular categories in their environment.
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In their study, Leslie and others were especially interested in the nature of
the cultural input related to social essentialism. (Rhodes et al 2012, 1-2.)
In this respect, this sort study is especially apt for testing the impact of
generic language in the formation of essentialist beliefs. Previous studies
have shown that it is difficult to estimate the impact of generics concerning
the formation essentialist beliefs about biological kinds as the beliefs are
formed so rapidly and early stage in the development even in the absence
generics. All you can say that the essentialist beliefs about biological kinds
form with or without generics. This fact makes social essentialism very
apt for testing ground if generics facilitate the transmission of essentialist
belief.
6.2.4 Studies on the transmission of social essential-
ism
Generic language and formation of essentialist beliefs
Leslie and others conducted three different experiments on the transmis-
sion of essentialist beliefs. Needless to say, the essentialist beliefs were
about social kinds. The first experiment studied the difference between
plural generic language (e.g. Tigers are striped) in comparison to specific
language (This tiger is striped). The second experiment studied singular
generic language (A tiger is striped). Again, the comparison was specific
language. These two experiments studied how generic language facilitates
the formation of essentialist beliefs. The third experiment studied how
generic language facilitates the transmission of essentialist beliefs.
The first experiment was the following. Experimenters came up with
a new social kind called Zarpies. The Zarpies were introduced to subjects
through a illustrated storybook. Each picture presented a single person
with some property. At the same, it was made sure that the subjects could
not identify the Zarpies with any existing social group. In one picture,
the Zarpie was, say, an Asian man. In the next picture, the Zarpie was
a caucasian woman and so on. The property was described with a single
line text and there three versions of the text:
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Plural Generic: Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies are scared of ladybugs!
Specific: Look at this Zarpie! This Zarpie is scared of ladybugs!
No label : Look at this one! This one is scared of ladybugs!
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of these versions of the story-
book. After this, there were two versions of the study. In the first version,
adult subjects read the storybook before answering the test questions. In
the second version, the experimenters read one of the storybooks (more
than once) to a child participant in two sessions and then the children
completed the test questions. The test questions measured the extent to
which the subjects
1. expect properties associated with the new category to be innate and
inevitable (inheritance items),
2. expect properties attributed to a single category member to extend
to other category members (induction items),
3. view category membership as causing/explaining the development
of typical properties (explanation items).
In both versions of the tests, the subjects gave more essentialist responses
when the generic version of the storybook was in question. Both adults
in the first version of the test and the children after hearing the story
gave more essentialist answers when the storybook was written in generic
language. Leslie and others draw the conclusion that generic language
about a novel and diverse social category does lead to essentialist beliefs
about that category both among adults and children.
The study was then replicated with indefinite singular generics. That
is,
No label : This one is scared of ladybugs!
was replaced with indefinite singular generic descriptions:
Singular Generic: A Zarpie is scared of ladybugs!
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This study showed that there is no difference between bare plural generics
and singular generics. Both kind of generic forms support the formation
of essentialist beliefs.
Generic language and transmission of essentialist beliefs
The first two studies tested whether generic language can enable essential-
ist beliefs and the studies showed that, indeed, it does. The third study
study tested the transmission of essentialist beliefs through generic lan-
guage. The parents were told a story about the Zarpies in two ways. One
induced essentialist beliefs about the Zarpies by describing the Zarpies
as a distinct kind of people with biological and cultural differences from
other social groups. The other story highlighted the Zarpies’ biological
and cultural similarities with other social kinds. Thereby inducing non-
essentialist beliefs about the Zarpies. A pilot study confirmed this. After
that, the parents were given the storybook used in the first two studies
without any text. The parents were asked to describe the pictures to the
children. It should not come as a surprise that parents who were exposed
to the essentialist beliefs used more often generic language than parents
who had non-essentialisist beliefs about the Zarpies. it is then fair to say
that generics do transmit essentialist beliefs.
Results of the studies
Leslie and others say that the three studies provide strong evidence that
generic language does provide a mechanism that facilitates the transmis-
sion of essentialist beliefs. However, they are hesitant to conclude that
generic language generates essentialist beliefs as
Essentialist beliefs [. . . ] go far beyond any content that is
explicitly communicated by generic language, and essentialism
can emerge in the absence of generic language, such as in the
case of animal kinds [. . . ] (Rhodes et al 2012, 4.)
At this point it is enough to say that essentialist beliefs are generated by
the psychological mechanism. Leslie and the others continue:
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Rather, social essentialism appears to result from the interplay
of cognitive biases and cultural input; children’s cognitive bi-
ases lead them to assume that some or other social categories
reflect essential kinds, and generic language signals to them
to which categories they should apply these beliefs. (Rhodes
2012, 4.)
After this, generics take over by transmitting the essentialist beliefs.
Generics and negative evaluations
I have saved one interesting finding for last. In the third study the adults
were asked to comment the activities and properties depicted in the pic-
tures. The commentary was categorised as negative (e.g. “That’s yucky”)
or positive (e.g. “That’s cool, right”). Curiously, the subjects produced
more negative comments from the essentialist perspective than from the
non-essentialist perspective. In other words, ”parents who were induced to
hold essentialist beliefs about Zarpies were more likely to produce negative
evaluative statements about them”. This result suggests that essentialist
beliefs may contribute to the negative social attitudes. (Rhodes et al 2012,
4.) Given the connection between the transmission of essentialist beliefs
and generic language, it can be concluded that generic language is also
associated with negative attitudes.
6.2.5 Emotions and attention
It has been hypothesised that one of the functions of emotions is to speed
up the decision process in an unexpected situation. Especially, emotions
draw our attention to salient features of the situation. (Faucher and Tap-
polet 2009, 107.) de Sousa says
[Emotions] limit the range of information that organism will
take into account, the inferences actually drawn from potential
infinity, and the set of live options among which we choose (de
Sousa 1987, 195; Faucher and Tappolet 2009, 107).
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In this sense then, emotions draw our attention to the salient features of
the object. At the same time and as Bennett Helm argues, emotions gives
us a focus on these salient features. Emotions help us to evaluate these
features as dangerous, offensive, nutrious and so on. (Helm 2009, 248-
255.) In their paper ”Fear and Focus of Attention” (2009), Faucher and
Tappolet bring together the empirical evidence backing the connection
between fear and attention.
Concerning the attentional phenomena, there is a distinction between
involuntary and voluntary attention. Involuntary attention is said to be
under the control of external stimuli and voluntary attention is said to
be under the control of the subject’s goals and will. In our context, the
interesting difference between these two forms of attention is the develop-
mental point of view. It has been noted that the involuntary attention is
developmentally earlier than the voluntary attention. It has been proved
that there is a gradual development from involuntary attention to volun-
tary attention. Furthermore, there is psychological evidence that, given
appropriate setting, the involuntary attention will kick in. There are sev-
eral types of experiments conducted to investigate attentional bias. The
attentional bias is especially apparent when emotions are involved as the
so-called Emotional Stroop tasks shows. The involuntary attention in
connection to emotional response has also been so-called Popout tasks.
(Faucher and Tappolet 2009, 114-121.)
Kent Bach notes that some emotional disorders provides data to inves-
tigate the connection between emotion and attention because emotional
disorders “may be regarded as extreme versions of normal relations be-
tween emotion and attention” (Bach 1994, 66; Faucher and Tappolet 2009,
114). Indeed this kind of approach has been popular in psychological stud-
ies and many emotional disorders can be viewed as problems in attentional
management:
[M]any studies show that anxiety is accompanied by an in-
crease in involuntary attention to threat stimuli and that it
also tends to impair performance on certain tasks requiring
attention (Faucher and Tappolet 2009, 114).
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In the Emotional Stroop tasks, the subjects were presented words with
different colours. They were asked to ignore the meaning of the word and
only name the colour of the word. It turned out that subjects who had
emotional disorders had more difficulties to name the colour of word when
the meaning of the word was fear-related. Furthermore, it was established
that the emotion-attention connection can be very selective. For example,
panic patients manifested heightened bias towards words like ‘death’ and
social phobics found were more sensitive to socially threatening words.
The difficulties were based on the time spent on each word. Concerning
the fear-related words, the increased time interval would suggest that the
involuntary attention driven by the emotion hinders the voluntary atten-
tion which the subject uses to identify the colour. (Faucher and Tappolet
2009, 115-116.)
The Popout tasks also study how threatening stimuli catch (involun-
tary) attention. In one experiment, the subjects were shown nine images
in three rows. The images were either nine emotionally neutral images or
eight emotionally neutral images and one threatening image, a spider or
a snake or such. The subjects were asked to push the left button if they
thought all the images were the same and press the right button if the
images contained an intruder (a spider or a snake). The results were that
the reaction time was shorter when the intruder was among the images.
Furthermore, the time spent to find the intruder is independent of number
of distractors. “It is as if the spider or snake is “popping out” from the
background, capturing attention automatically”, summarise Faucher and
Tappolet the findings (Faucher and Tappolet 2009, 119). An interesting
further finding is that the popping out does not occur with an image of
neutral image on a background of threatening images. The experiment
has been repeated with array of faces, happy faces and angry faces, with
similar results. (Faucher and Tappolet 2009.)
The invited conclusion from these experiments is that fear is related to
attentional bias: “People in such states appear to experience involuntary
orienting of attention towards congruent stimuli”64. It seems that fear
64Italic in the original.
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can be associated with ”an automatic processing bias, initiated prior to
awareness” which serves to detect threatening cues from the environment
and hence it produces information about threats. (Faucher and Tappolet
2009, 123.) Although these experiments concern only fear, they are also
indicative concerning other strong emotions.
6.3 Slurs and biases
Generalisation and emotions
At this stage, the mechanism of over-generalisation can finally be laid out
in detail. Leslie argues that we are prone to generalise striking properties.
She also argues that this mechanism of generalisation is partly responsible
for xenophobic thoughts and I agree with this and I go even further by
arguing that slurs are based on these xenophobic thoughts. One might
quite rightly now ask, why the over-generalisation happens in connection
to negative properties or at least properties which are evaluated as nega-
tive. Our discussion on emotions and attention clarifies this point. In the
following, the answer is developed in two stages. The first stage concerns
members of a kind, i.e. individuals. The second stage concern the actual
generalisation to the whole kind.
First as we have seen, our attention is involuntarily focussed on prop-
erties to which we have an emotional response. In our brief survey, the
findings concern only the connection between fear and attention. But
as Faucher and Tappolet hypothesises, the connection between attention
could generalised to other emotional attitudes, such as anger, disgust, con-
tempt. Helm’s thoughts also suggests that such generalisation to other
emotions can be made. Helm points that the target of our attention has
some emotional importance in respect to a certain background concern. In
this respect, it is not huge surprise that our attention is focussed on bear’s
big size and big fangs instead of of his cute bobtail and cuddly palms. It
is just that our attention is focussed to the bears size and threatening
posture because we evaluate it as dangerous. In connection to Leslie’s hy-
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pothesis of over-generalisation, we have reasonable grounds to argue that
the striking feature of an object is likely to be negative because it is more
likely to get an emotional response. Thereby, it is more likely to draw our
attention.
Second, the property to which we have an emotional response gets
generalised across the whole kind because the individual of the kind is
recognisably a member of that kind on the basis of its surface features.
When we come across a threatening bear (and somehow manage to escape
the situation), the next time we will evaluate that individual as threaten-
ing too on the basis of its surface features (big size, brown fur and bobtail,
of course) even though this individual happens to be sleeping at that mo-
ment. To repeat what has been said earlier, generalisation requires two
sets of properties or features present in the individual. First, the target
has to present the feature that is emotionally evaluated as, say, dangerous.
Secondly, equally important are the distinguishing surface features. After
all, these features help us to determine the kind to which the evaluated
feature of attention is essentialised. Leslie calls this surface feature a good
predictor of the striking property (Leslie 2007, 385). On the basis of the
distinguishable surface feature, we are able to predict the presence of the
striking feature, even though it might not be visible at the moment.
Xenophobic thoughts and slurs
To begin our investigation how the mechanism contributes to the trans-
mission of xenophobic thoughts, let us start with the following Leslie’s
thought. She emphasises the importance of the distinguishing surface
feature in the following way:
Of course, it would be inefficient to generalize such information
[about striking property] to every kind that has a member with
the property. We do not judge “animals carry the West Nile
Virus” or even “insects carry the West Nile Virus” to be true,
even though both kinds have some members that carry the
virus, since those virus-carrying mosquitoes belong to both
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kinds. The mechanism, I suggest, looks for a good predictor
of the property in question, and thereby avoids generalizing
too broadly. (Leslie 2007, 385.)
Here Leslie hypothesises that the point of this aspect of mechanism makes
it more useful for human purposes. Too broad generalisation would render
the mechanism not only useless but in fact disadvantageous. Think about
the situation where someone evaluates a bear to be dangerous. Surely, it
would disadvantageous to generalise from this that animals are dangerous.
For humans clearly benefit from interaction with some animals. That is
why the mechanism looks for identifying surface features to identify the
specific kind. However, this feature of the mechanism seems to have a
downside in connection to social kinds. It seems that we more prone to
make generalisation on the basis that some social group just looks differ-
ent, i.e. this group possesses the relevant distinguishing surface feature:
If, for example, an accountant or two are convicted of murder,
we do not judge that accountants are murderers, because we do
not think that accountants are in any way generally disposed to
be murderers. The odd murdering accountant is a ’bad apple’,
in no way indicative of the nature of accountants in general.
Interestingly enough, defenders of such claims as Muslims are
terrorists routinely argue that there is something about Islam–
its very doctrine–that instills in its followers the disposition to
perform terrorist acts. (Leslie 2007, 385.)
But at the same time, the striking feature which gets essentialised has to
be striking in that we have an emotional response so it and hence it catches
our attention. For example, imagine someone who has a strong opinion
about thieves sees another person shoplifting a chocolate bar. He notices
this because the other person is different in some way, speaks different
language or the person has a distinctive attire. From this he generalises
that immigrants are thieves. But at the same time, he forgets that last
week two of his colleagues were caught cooking the company books. The
crucial point is that in the shoplifting incident both the distinguishing
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surface feature and the striking feature were present. In contrast, the
colleagues did not have the distinguishing surface features. They had a
similar ethnic background as our subject; hence the mechanism was not
triggered. Finally, our subject despises thievery and so he had strong
emotional response to shoplifting.
It is my contention that slurs contain and indeed transmit the negative
information about social kinds. Generics help in the formation and in the
transmission of essentialist beliefs. It may very well be that, analogously,
slurs induce xenophobic beliefs but even if that was not the case, it seems
overtly clear that slurs transmit negative information about the target.
The belief “immigrants are thieves” can be identified as a speaker’s specific
belief state about the target and on the basis this specific relation he
uses the term ’wetback’ correctly when he refers to immigrants with it.
Because of the general relation between the the term and the target, it is
conventionally recognised that the user of ‘wetback’ has negative thoughts
about immigrants. The use of slurs reveals speaker’s (xenophobic) biased
beliefs about the target. Usually, these biases are unwarranted and as
such they are cases of epistemic failings. The speaker has formed them on
the basis of too few instances, in the way the example explicates. Some
negative feature of an individual is generalised across the whole social
group. When a person applies (in thought or out loud) the slur ‘Frog’, as
in
(222) Max is a Frog
the xenophobe thinks about the French in a certain way. Because this
way is xenophobic, the thought is offensive even in the claims in which
nothing xenophobic is actually said. Rather, the slur is just applied to
the target.
On the cognitive side, the problem with slurs is that they incorrectly
invite us to think of the targets in certain way. They suggest that some
negative feature is a central feature in the target kind and worth high-
lighting with choice of words. Therefore, the target of a slur is worth of
derogatory term. In other words, the unwarranted nature of slur is that
219
Max is worth derogation because he is French.
But however mistaken the xenophobes are, these epistemic differences
between the xenophobic mindset and civilised thinking need not to entail
semantic differences between the slurring words and the neutral words.
It seems clear to me that when the xenophobes are referring to French
people as ‘Frogs’, they are mistaken about the French people.
6.4 Summary
This chapter begun with the psychological analysis of generics. This anal-
ysis supplemented the idea that slurs contain generic information. The key
element is the psychological mechanism that produces the generic infor-
mation. Leslie argues that the psychological mechanism of generalisation
is based on two things: on distinguishable surface features and on a deeper
feature which is generalised across the kind.
An integral part in the psychology of generalisation is essentialisation.
The generalised deeper features are thought to be essential features which
characterise the kind. I presented different versions of essentialisms. This
gives the xenophobe some room to quibble and at least partly explains
why the xenophobic beliefs are so resistant to reform.
I also laid out a brief overview of studies concerning the connection
between attention and emotions. The experiments confirmed that there
is a connection between emotions and the objects of our attention. Our
attention is drawn to features to which we have emotional response.
A crucial part in my argumentation is the transition from natural and
biological kinds to social kinds. The generalisation with an emotional
input works well with natural and biological kinds but not so well with
social kinds. Leslie and others showed that generic language transmits es-
sentialised beliefs far more efficiently than specific language. Furthermore,
generic language is often accompanied with a negative attitude towards
the target.
Finally, it is shown that generic language transmit essentialist beliefs
and negative attitudes but it is my contention that slurs transmit generic
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information and with that you the package deal of essentialised infor-
mation as well as negative attitude toward the target. Concerning so-
cial kinds, the mechanism can produce negative and unwarranted beliefs
about the target, in the sense that the xenophobic beliefs is often based
on isolated incident and generalised across the social kind. The idea is
that once the xenophobic over-generalisation is in place, then slurs take it





Generic descriptivism claims that derogation is a part of the descriptive
information that is associated with slurs. In other words, the nature of
derogation is epistemic, not semantic. The structure of this work has been
following the operation of purging semantics from derogation. Throughout
the investigation, other views have contributed to this process in a positive
way and in a negative way.
Three first views, pure expressivism and the two forms of pure descrip-
tivism claims that there is something wrong with slurs and the treatment
of slurs should reflect this. The summary of these views is that they all
hold that there is something wrong with the meaning of slurs. Pure ex-
pressivism claims that slurs are not truth apt at all. Hom and May’s pure
descriptivism holds that slurs are systematically false. Particularly, all
of the views claim that the semantic badness is manifested in the truth
conditions of slurs. Even Dummett holds that the consequence relation of
language LN consisting only the neutral term is different from language
LSl consisting also the slurring term. I agree that there is something wrong
with slurs and that the treatment of slurs should reflect this.
Nevertheless, I do not agree that the semantic treatment of slurs should
reflect this. It is my claim that all of the attempts to show why the badness
is somehow reflected by the truth conditions are unsuccessful. In general,
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the problems has to do with accommodating linguistic evidence concerning
the use of slurs. Pure descriptivism cannot explain why someone can
infer the descriptive information from a slurring utterance since it holds
that slurs do not have descriptive content at all. Concerning Hom and
May’s pure descriptivism, it is somewhat ironic that they cannot explain
civilised understanding since Hom and May think that most important
question concerning slurs is ”How can a competent, rational speaker know
that meaning of slurs”. The inability is most revealing in relation to the
inference patterns concerning slurs. Civilised speakers particularly infer
effortlessly from the slurring utterance its neutral content. The ability to
infer from ”Max is a Frog” that ”Max is French” is, in my view, easily
explained with the co-referentiality of the slurring term and its neutral
counterpart.
If pure descriptivism cannot explain the civilised thinking, what about
xenophobic thinking. Dummett’s inferentialism aims to answer this ques-
tion. It claims that the slurring words produce a non-conservative exten-
sion of the language which does not contain the slurring words but only
the corresponding neutral words. To put it a bit crudely, this is supposed
to show the warped thinking of the xenophobes but as Williamson shows
this strategy does not work. If the xenophobic utterances are taken as in-
dicators of xenophobic thinking, then the evidence shows that xenophobes
do not think the way Dummett suggested.65
7.2 Moderate views
I reside with moderate expressivism and descriptivism because the views
can explain the civilised understanding with the co-referentiality thesis.
Both views hold that the slurring terms and the counterparts are co-
referential but at the same time the views expand semantics to accommo-
date the expressive content of slurs and other expressive terms (excluding
Williamson). Moderate expressivism expands the semantic types to ex-
65Even though I later discuss more compelling way to think about Dummett’s pro-
posal, I still disagree with the basic point that the meaning of slurs reflects derogation.
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pressive types. The crucial feature of these types is that they can never
be input, only output. That feature secures the independence from truth
functional dimension. There simply is not any truth functional opera-
tion over expressive types. Predelli expands (pace Kaplan) semantics to
include expressive validity along with truth functional. The move accom-
modates Kaplan’s idea that inference is based the preservation of semantic
information, not on the preservation of truth. Finally, Williamson does
not expand semantics. He thinks that the slurring effect can be handled
with conventional implicature which is part of the meaning of a term,
broadly construed. Williamson most adamantly claims that the slurring
effect is first and foremost a linguistic phenomenon. He explicitly says
that his view is about the use of language and only secondary it is about
the speaker’s beliefs. The way that the slurring effect is produced re-
sembles the difference between ‘and’ and ‘but’. To Williamson, slurs tell
something general about the use of language.
In my view, the generality of the method is a crucial factor here. Mod-
erate views are not particularly about slurs. The key question is how do
we express non-truth functional attitudes. In essence, the views are an
exploration to the nature of language.
The pure views suggested that there is something wrong with the se-
mantics of slurs. Moderate views denies this. The badness of racism and
xenophobia is one thing, the semantic means to express racism and xeno-
phobia is another. I am sure that advocates for moderate views think
that racist and xenophobic attitudes particularly nasty and erroneous at-
titudes. Predelli even says this explicitly but just because xenophobia is
a nasty attitude, it does not have to make the means to express xenopho-
bia faulty. Although I think this a level-headed starting point, I still hold
that there is something wrong with slurs and the treatment of slurs should
reflect this. This is the part I find compelling in the pure views. Since I
denied that the nature of derogation is semantic, I need to find a another
way to reveal derogation specific to slurs. The way I am proposing is
epistemic. This is main thesis of generic descriptivism.
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7.3 Generic descriptivism
On one hand, the point I take from expressivism is that truth conditions
do not reflect derogation. On the other hand, the lesson learned from
descriptivism (and from pure expressivism) is that slurs are based on
mistaken beliefs and the treatment of slurs should reflect this.
To accommodate these claims I begin with a way to explicate deroga-
tion. My method borrows from Predelli in that there is truth conditional
aspect to correct use of slurs as I go on to put forward the equivalence
between correct use and speaker’s biased beliefs. My view also borrows
from originalism in that the equivalence should not be thought to reveal
semantic features of slurs (as Predelli’s view suggests) but epistemic fea-
tures. The decision to view derogation as an epistemic feature allows to
maintain the conjunction of the co-referentiality thesis and the view that
slurs contain a mistake.
In short, originalism holds that the failure of the substitution princi-
ple is not a semantic problem. Rather, it is an epistemic problem. In
the same spirit, generic descriptivism holds that the failure of substitu-
tion principle between the slurring term and its neutral counterpart is a
sign of epistemic differences, not semantic differences. The admission that
the substitution between slurs and neutral terms fails is a major differ-
ence compared to expressivism. In my view, this is a consequence of the
attempt to incorporate the idea of mistake to the treatment of slurs.
Generic descriptivism proposes that the use of slurs and the nature
of xenophobia are connected. Generic descriptivism puts forward that
slurs are correctly used if and only speakers have negative beliefs. These
negative beliefs are biased beliefs. The biases are xenophobic and at the
heart of xenophobia is generic information. There are three claims to
the generic information. (i) Generic information allows exceptions. The
next two points explain the central features of xenophobic beliefs which
make them appear like attitudes. (ii) The mechanism works with emotions
and that is why the cognitive state is emotionally charged. (iii) The belief
produced by the mechanism fit into the pattern of perspective dependence.
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I do not think I am over-intellectualising civilised speakers when I say that
civilised speakers (at some level) realise that xenophobia is a product of
the over-generalisation and the use of slurs reflect this.
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